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ABSTRACT 
 My three-paper dissertation is aimed at applying the concepts of bounded ethicality and 
ethical fading to accounting fraud. Typical of relatively new fields such as behavioral ethics, 
theoretical models are scarce (Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008). As such, the purpose of Study 
1 is to unify disparate theories and ideas from psychology and behavioral ethics as a means of 
constructing a theory, the Theory of Unintended Amoral Behavior (TUAB), which includes the 
concepts of bounded ethicality and ethical fading. In addition, the pressure for management to 
meet earnings expectations is discussed through the lens of the TUAB as an example of how one 
may unknowingly misreport. 
Studies 2 and 3 apply the TUAB to investigate how certain contextual factors interact 
with egocentric biases to increase the likelihood of ethical fading. Specifically, Study 2 consists 
of an experiment exploring how inferior pay among managers interacts with egocentric 
perceptions of fairness and envy to affect the likelihood of one engaging in ethical fading and 
fraudulent behavior. Study 3 also utilizes an experimental methodology to examine how the 
pressure to meet earnings forecasts interacts with egocentric perceptions of fairness and negative 
affect to influence the probability of ethical fading and fraudulent acts. 
The results for Study 2 indicate that one who is paid at a lower rate is more likely to view 
this disparity as unfair, which leads to a greater feeling of envy. Although envy had no 
significant direct effect on ethical fading in the primary analyses, a supplemental analysis 
revealed that a person’s risk preference might moderate this relationship. The primary findings of 
Study 2 suggest that individuals who experience a higher degree of ethical fading are more likely 
to commit fraud, and that ethical fading, along with perceived unfairness, seem to be significant 
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psychological processes that explain how differences in pay may lead to fraud. The primary 
finding of Study 3 is that, like Study 2, fraud is more likely to occur as an individual experiences 
a higher degree of ethical fading. Furthermore, this study suggests that those who are closest to 
meeting an earnings target are the most likely to engage in fraudulent behavior. Finally, the 
results failed to find any support that one’s egocentric perceptions of fairness and negative affect 
contribute towards his or her ethical behavior in a goal achievement setting. The primary 
contributions of this dissertation is that it unifies various theories and ideas from psychology and 
behavioral ethics to establish a testable theory (TUAB) that includes the concepts of bounded 
ethicality and ethical fading, serves as an initial test of TUAB, and provides evidence that 
unethical behavior is not necessarily the result of one consciously forsaking his or her ethics for 
some other desired goal (i.e., profit). 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 Financial statement fraud affects not only organizations, employees, investors, and audit 
firms, but society as well. In the most recent survey among its members, the Association of 
Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) reports that the median loss among organizations that have 
committed fraud was approximately $1 million (ACFE, 2012). These costs may include legal 
expenditures, fines, disgorgements, increased insurance rates, and loss of productivity (Wells, 
2010). The losses associated with an organization’s stock value are perhaps more noteworthy. 
One estimate indicates that the decrease in the market value of a company’s stock can be 
anywhere from 500 to 1000 times the amount of a fraud (Hall, 2005). For example, a $7 million 
fraud may result in a $3.5 billion to $7 billion decrease in stock value. Furthermore, an 
organization may be subject to the risk of having its stock involuntarily delisted from exchanges. 
There are also those costs that are immeasurable. An organization that is involved in financial 
statement fraud may adversely affect the morale of its employees, the goodwill of its customers, 
and the trust of its suppliers (Wells, 2010). The most significant penalty an organization can pay 
for fraud, though, is a decline into bankruptcy that can ultimately lead to the liquidation of the 
company. 
 Accounting fraud is especially harmful to investors in that it makes the capital markets 
either, at a minimum, less efficient (Wells, 2010) or, at worst, unstable. For example, the actions 
of just WorldCom, Qwest, Global Crossing, Tyco, and Enron together accounted for $460 billion 
in shareholder losses (Cotton, 2002). A more difficult cost to estimate, however, is the 
diminished confidence in the capital markets when the quality, transparency, integrity, and 
reliability of both the financial reporting process and financial information, in general, becomes 
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suspect (Wells, 2010). Mistrust of the capital markets and the financial reporting process on 
which it rests impinges upon the integrity of the auditing profession as well.  
 The reputation of the auditing profession as a whole suffers when firms, through either 
obliviousness, negligence, or turning a blind-eye, provided a clean opinion on fraudulent 
financial statements. Instances of fraud, especially when several, high profile companies are 
accused in a relatively short period, create doubt in the effectiveness of auditors and the audit 
process. As such fraud invites government oversight (e.g., the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board) and regulation (e.g., the Sarbanes-Oxley Act), which can be costly for the 
auditing profession in regards to lobbying and/or compliance expenditures. Individual 
accounting firms may also endure more direct, tangible costs as result of the fraudulent actions of 
their clients. At a minimum, the cost to perform an audit may rise if the firm’s tests for fraud 
indicate that procedures that are more extensive should be used due to an increased probability of 
its client misrepresenting financial information. More significant, however, are the legal costs a 
firm can incur if it provided a clean opinion on financial statements that were, in fact, fraudulent. 
The fate of Arthur Anderson is an example of an extreme price an auditing firm can pay for its 
dishonest clients.  
 Financial statement fraud, however, is not just an organizational, employee, investor, or 
auditing issue, or even a problem confined with the business realm, it is a societal issue given its 
impact on all of the public. At an individual level, accounting fraud can destroy careers, fuel 
massive job loss (Wells, 2010), and, in the case of Enron, erase one’s entire retirement savings 
(Oppel, 2001). At a societal level, it can negatively impact the nation’s prosperity and economic 
growth (Wells, 2010). Thus, given its enormous costs, fraud has received considerable attention 
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among regulators, organizations, audit firms, and researchers. Yet, efforts aimed at deterring 
such malfeasance have yielded minimal success. 
Incidents of accounting fraud have increased over the past decade 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011) despite the considerable legislative measures aimed at its 
deterrence, such as the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). One factor that might 
explain the ineffectiveness of these measures is their reliance on basic, yet inaccurate, 
assumptions regarding the decision-making that underlies fraudulent behavior. Specifically, that 
this behavior is (1) motivated by greed, or some other basic emotion, and (2) the result of a 
conscious decision to forsake one’s morals for some other desire good (i.e., satisfying the 
person’s greed). However, greed seems to be an overly simplistic explanation in that there are 
many “aggressively acquisitive” individuals who do not engage in fraud (Duffield & Grabosky, 
2001). Furthermore, in regards to the conceptualization of fraud as a self-interested, intentional 
act, Moore, Tanlu, and Bazerman (2010) argue that “if self-interest were computed rationally as 
an expected value and it then drove motivated reasoning, eliminating bias would be as simple as 
increasing the criminal penalties for fraud” (p. 46).  
Rather than “predatory fraudsters” who enrich themselves by exploiting weak accounting 
controls, the evidence suggests that “accidental fraudsters” constitute a larger share of frauds. 
The characteristics of an accidental fraudster are that he or she is a decent, law-abiding person 
who, under typical circumstances, would have never considered committing fraud (Dorminey, 
Fleming, Kranacher, & Riley, 2012). Data from the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners 
(2012) indicates that most fraudsters fit such a description in that they are trusted employees with 
clean employment histories and no prior criminal offenses. Charles Niemeier, the former chief 
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accountant for the SEC’s enforcement division, states that "[p]eople who never intend to do 
something wrong end up finding themselves in situations where they are almost forced to 
continue to commit fraud once they have started doing this. Otherwise, it will be revealed that 
they had used improper accounting in the earlier periods" (quoted from Bazerman, Loewenstein, 
& Moore, 2002, p. 100). As such, understanding why managers commit fraud perhaps requires a 
more nuanced examination into their psychological processes that drive ethical decision-making. 
Diverging from the traditional frameworks (e.g., Kohlberg, 1973; Rest, 1986) that view 
ethical decision-making as a rational, linear thought process, Chugh, Bazerman, and Banaji 
(2005) formulated the concept of bounded ethicality. Bounded ethicality is defined as the 
“systematic and predictable psychological processes that lead people to engage in ethically 
questionable behaviors that are inconsistent with their own preferred ethics” (Tenbrunsel, 
Diekmann, Wade-Benzoni, & Bazerman, 2010, p. 7). These processes consist of inherent biases 
and heuristics that impede a person’s ability to make an ethical decision (Chugh, Bazerman, 
Banaji, 2005). Implicit forms of prejudice, in-group favoritism, and a tendency to overclaim 
credit are distinct examples of biases that behavioral ethics researchers have identified and used 
to portray the role of bounded ethicality in decision-making (Banaji, Bazerman, & Chugh, 2003; 
Bazerman, 2011). As these psychological processes operate at a subconscious level (Gino, 
Moore, & Bazerman, 2011), the most sinister characteristic of bounded ethicality is that it allows 
the person to violate his or her morals without the awareness that he or she is doing so.  
The lack of awareness that one is behaving unethically is accomplished through the 
mechanism of ethical fading wherein the person’s psychological constraints fade any moral 
considerations from his or her decision-making process (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004). Studies 
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suggest that environmental factors such as sanctioning systems (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999) 
and goal setting (Schweitzer, Ordóñez, & Douma, 2004) can induce ethical fading in an 
individual (Tenbrunsel et al., 2010). In the accounting ethics literature, Murphy and Dacin 
(2011) argue that contextual elements such as the pressure to meet analyst expectations may 
influence managers to engage in financial statement fraud without the consideration that they are 
behaving unethically. As such, research with the goal of identifying the contextual factors that 
lead to ethical fading, as well as the psychological processes that trigger this operation, can 
contribute towards implementing measures that are more effective at deterring accounting fraud. 
This dissertation is aimed at applying the concepts of bounded ethicality and ethical 
fading to accounting fraud. However, common to relatively new fields such as behavioral ethics, 
theoretical models are nebulous and thus not well-defined (Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008). 
As such, the purpose of Study 1 (Chapter 2) is to unify disparate theories and ideas from 
psychology and behavioral ethics as a means of constructing a theory, the Theory of Unintended 
Amoral Behavior (TUAB), which includes the concepts of bounded ethicality and ethical fading. 
Studies 2 and 3 (Chapters 3 and 4, respectively) apply TUAB (Chapter 2) to investigate how 
certain contextual factors interact with egocentric biases to increase the likelihood of ethical 
fading. Specifically, Study 2 consists of an experiment exploring how unequal pay among 
managers provokes egocentric perceptions of fairness and envy which, in turn, increases the 
likelihood of one engaging in ethical fading and fraudulent behavior. Study 3 also utilizes an 
experimental methodology to examine how the pressure to meet earnings forecasts trigger 
egocentric perceptions of fairness and negative affect to influence the probability of ethical 
fading and fraud. If bounded ethicality and ethical fading help to explain accounting fraud, then 
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research such as this can have significant implications as to how regulators, executives, and 
auditors address this problem. What follows are brief overviews of the three studies as well as a 
discussion regarding the overall contributions of this dissertation. 
Overview of Study 1 
The purpose of Study 1 is to unify disparate theories and ideas from psychology and 
behavioral ethics as a means of constructing a theory, the Theory of Unintended Amoral 
Behavior (TUAB), which includes the concepts of bounded ethicality and ethical fading. The 
pressure for management to meet earnings expectations is discussed through the lens of TUAB 
as an example of how one may unknowingly engage in unethical behavior.  
In sum, TUAB (Chapter 2) states that quasi-static and task-specific factors can trigger 
certain biases and heuristics. Provoking those biases related to preserving one’s self-image, in 
particular, can lead to a distorted interpretation of stimuli that favor a preferred outcome 
(Messick & Sentis, 1983). These effortless and automatic evaluations are so primitive that they 
may not feel biased or distorted in any way (Bazerman & Banaji, 2004). Furthermore, the 
triggering of these biases can produce negative affect, for which the person will be motivated to 
pacify these emotions quickly and without utilizing a deliberate thought process (Kahneman, 
2011). Thus, if engaging in a questionable behavior eliminates any negative affect, then the 
individual’s affect-laden intuition will suggest that such behavior is “good” or “appropriate” in 
that it is the most emotionally satisfying. At this point, the person is likely to rely on an “affect 
heuristic” wherein the negative emotions serve as the basis for his or her decision. The individual 
is then likely to perform an act of substitution wherein a difficult question (what is the ethical or 
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proper action?) is replaced with an easier one (would this decision make me feel better?). Ethical 
fading has now occurred since the moral implications of the alternative decisions are not 
considered, thus increasing the probability that the person behaves unethically.  
Study 1 also discusses TUAB’s (Chapter 2) potential to predict and/or explain immoral 
behavior across the different functional areas of accounting research. In regards to Financial 
Accounting research, TUAB (Chapter 2) may explain how disclosures and ambiguity in the 
reporting standards (e.g., principle-based guidelines) can actually encourage unethical behavior. 
With respect to the AIS area, the TUAB (Chapter 2) can be utilized to address whether 
information systems foster an environment of instrumental rationality. That is, a focus on the 
process for completing a task in the most effective and efficient way without any consideration 
of the ethical implications of engaging in that process. The TUAB (Chapter 2) can also be used 
to explain how and why auditors sometimes forfeit their professional responsibilities and accede 
to their clients’ demands. In addition, TUAB (Chapter 2) may help explain how and why 
taxpayers and tax practitioners are willing to engage in behaviors related to tax avoidance and 
tax fraud. Finally, in regards to the Management Accounting area, TUAB (Chapter 2) may help 
explain a range of deviant behaviors such as the misappropriation of assets, bribery, and transfer 
price manipulation and can be used to explore the ethical and quasi-ethical issues related to 
budgeting and performance measurement such as dishonesty in budget reporting, the creation of 
budgetary slack, biased performance evaluation, and performance measurement manipulation. 
The primary contribution of Study 1 is that it unifies various theories and ideas from 
psychology and behavioral ethics to establish a testable theory that includes the concepts of 
bounded ethicality and ethical fading. Furthermore, Study 1 contributes to the ethics and 
8 
 
accounting literatures by introducing a model that makes a distinction between intentional and 
unintentional behavior by allowing for the systematic, psychological errors that constrain one’s 
ability to make an ethical decision, as well as the contextual factors that exacerbate those errors. 
This study also offers potential contributions to auditors, management, and regulators. 
An understanding of how certain contextual factors contribute towards bounded ethicality 
may result in improved fraud detection in the auditing profession. In addition, knowledge of 
those inherent biases that impair ethical decision-making can improve auditors’ defense against 
ethical fading, making them less likely to relinquish their professional responsibilities and accede 
to their clients’ demands. Furthermore, given the subconscious nature of ethical fading, TUAB 
(Chapter 2) suggests that auditors should reconsider the substantial weight they attach to a 
manager’s attitude and character when evaluating fraud risk. In regards to managers and 
organizations, knowledge of bounded ethicality may allow companies to implement controls that 
are more effective at preventing ethical fading. In addition, familiarity with those process that 
constrain ethical decision-making can help psychologically prepare CEOs and CFOs for when 
they are confronted with opportunities to engage in accounting fraud or some other type of 
unethical behavior. Finally, Study 1 suggests that regulators acknowledge the difference between 
intentional corruption and unintentional bias, and the environmental factors that drive such bias, 
if they are to draft laws and regulations that are more effective at deterring fraud or other types of 
unethical behavior. 
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Overview of Study 2 
The purpose of Study 2 is to examine how a particular contextual factor, inferior pay 
among managers, provokes egocentric perceptions of unfairness and envy to influence the 
likelihood of one engaging in ethical fading and fraudulent behavior. Researchers have started to 
investigate CEO reactions to their pay relative to others in the same labor market (Fong, 2010). 
Fong (2010), citing Porac, Wade, and Pollack (1999), explains that “the complex causes of 
organizational outcomes can motivate, or even necessitate, social comparisons by CEOs and thus 
they could recognize the going labor market rate for their services and possible deviations from 
such rates” (p. 1099). As such, an executive whose compensation is relatively lower than other 
CEOs may perceive this as a threat to his or her competency given that pay structure is 
considered to be reflection of one’s importance and managerial abilities (March, 1984). This 
perceived threat may motivate the manager to behave in ways that can lead to higher pay (Fong, 
2010). 
Gino and Pierce (2009) contend that envy towards wealthy targets increases the 
likelihood that a person will engage in unethical behavior to reduce any inequality resulting from 
those differences in wealth. The results of their study suggest that abundant wealth creates 
perceptions of inequity in individuals who function in environments where such abundance is 
present. Moreover, Gino and Pierce’s (2009) findings indicate that those perceptions drive 
feelings of envy, which, in turn, provokes unethical behavior. Their theoretical argument, and its 
empirical support, can be explained by the concepts of bounded ethicality and ethical fading. 
Furthermore, Gino and Pierce (2009) argue that their findings can be generalized to fraudulent 
behavior. Thus, given that average CEO pay continues to skyrocket, logic would dictate that 
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managers who earn less than their peers may be more likely to succumb to ethical fading and, as 
a result, commit fraud.  
Study 2 utilizes TUAB (Chapter 2) to predict that a manager who compares his or her pay 
to a higher-paid referent will view the discrepancy as more unfair as opposed to a manager who 
compares his or her earnings to a lower-paid referent. Furthermore, it is hypothesized that this 
perception will create a feeling of envy, which will subsequently increase the probability of 
ethical fading, and thus fraudulent behavior, in the manager who is paid less. The hypotheses 
were tested using a 1 x 2, between-participants design wherein the participants were asked to sell 
assets of given values (ranging from excellent to poor) to a computerized buyer. The 
manipulated variable was pay rate, where one group (high-pay rate) earned more money from 
each successful transaction than the other (low-pay rate). Before each attempted sale, the 
participants had the option to change (i.e., misrepresent) the asset’s value from what was initially 
provided. Intrinsically, there existed an incentive for the participant to misrepresent low quality 
assets as high since selling assets disclosed at higher qualities would have resulted in larger 
payouts. The participants’ egocentric perceptions of unfairness, episodic envy, ethical fading, 
and rate of misrepresentation were measured during the experiment.  
The findings indicate that a person who is paid at a lower rate is more likely to perceive 
this disparity as unfair, which leads to a feeling of envy. Envy, however, had no significant direct 
effect on ethical fading in the primary analyses, but a supplemental analysis suggests that one’s 
risk preference may moderate this relationship. The primary results of this study, although 
somewhat mixed, suggest that individuals who cede to ethical fading are more likely to engage in 
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fraud, and that ethical fading, along with perceived unfairness, are significant psychological 
processes that explain how differences in compensation can induce fraud.  
The main contributions of Study 2 are that it both provides initial support of TUAB 
(Chapter 2) and identifies a contextual factor that can impair one’s ability to act ethically. In 
addition, Study 2 presents evidence that the decision to engage in fraud is not necessarily the 
result of one consciously forsaking his or her morals for some other desired goal (e.g., profit). 
Finally, the supplemental analysis in this study suggests that future research using TUAB 
(Chapter 2) should consider how individual characteristics (e.g., personality traits) might affect 
the processes proposed in the model.  
Overview of Study 3 
The purpose of Study 3 is to examine how the pressure to meet earnings forecasts may 
trigger psychological processes that, in turn, influence the likelihood of a manager engaging in 
ethical fading and fraudulent behavior. Wyatt (2004) argues that the ambiguous nature of some 
FASB standards allow for “gaming the system” (p. 52). Supporting this claim, Xu, Taylor, and 
Dugan’s (2007) review of the earnings management literature states that managers do, in fact, 
“take advantage of the accounting discretion in GAAP to manipulate accruals through 
accounting choices and estimates” (p. 195). Given the line drawn between “clever earnings 
management” and outright fraud is not necessarily distinct, a manager can become too aggressive 
in meeting earnings targets and, according to Murphy and Dacin (2011), commit fraud without 
the awareness that he or she is behaving unethically. Why some managers may unknowingly 
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commit fraud in order to meet earnings expectations can perhaps be attributed to the effects of 
bounded ethicality and ethical fading. 
Study 3 utilizes TUAB (Chapter 2) to hypothesize that a manager who falls below an 
earnings target will engineer the egocentric perspective that he or she did not reach the goal 
because of unfair circumstances. In addition, Study 3 predicts that this egocentric perspective 
will generate a general negative affect, which will subsequently increase the likelihood of ethical 
fading, and thus fraudulent behavior, in the manager who falls below earnings targets. Finally, 
this study hypothesizes that an individual who is close to, yet still below, a target is more likely 
to commit fraud than either one who has already surpassed it or one who is more distant from 
that goal. Two experiments utilizing an asset-selling task similar to Study 2 were conducted to 
test the predictions. In both experiments, participants were advised that they could earn a bonus 
if a particular earnings target was reached based on their performance in the asset-selling task. In 
Experiment 1, the independent variable was whether the participant, who was given one of three 
earnings goals (i.e., hard, moderate, easy), had reached his or her respective goal before the final 
round. Experiment 2 consisted of a 1 x 3 design where the independent, manipulated variable 
was the participant’s proximity to the earnings target (i.e., reached, near, or far) after the 
penultimate round of the asset-selling task. The participants’ egocentric perceptions, negative 
affect, ethical fading, and fraudulent behavior were measured and/or observed across the two 
experiments. 
Similar to Study 2, the primary findings of this study, albeit mixed, suggest that fraud is 
more likely to occur as an individual experiences a higher degree of ethical fading. Furthermore, 
the results from Study 3 indicate that those people who are closest to meeting an earnings target 
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possess the highest probability of engaging in fraudulent behavior. However, the results of this 
study did not support the predictions that an individual’s egocentric perceptions of fairness and 
negative affect influence his or her ethical behavior in a goal achievement setting. 
The main contributions of Study 3 are that it identifies a psychological process suggested 
by bounded ethicality that constrains one’s ability to make an ethical decision in addition to an 
important contextual element that triggers this process. That is, the pressure to meet earnings 
targets can influence a manager to engage in fraudulent behavior through the mechanism of 
ethical fading. As such, Study 3 provides additional evidence that the decision to commit fraud is 
not necessarily a deliberate trade-off between ethics and some other desired goal. 
Overall Contributions 
The dissertation provides three important contributions to the accounting and ethics 
literatures. The first contribution is that it consolidates disparate, but related, theories and 
concepts from psychology and behavioral ethics to establish a testable theory (TUAB) that 
includes the concepts of bounded ethicality and ethical fading. As discussed in Study 1, TUAB 
(Chapter 2) has the potential to predict and/or explain unethical behavior across the different 
functional areas of accounting research. Furthermore, this dissertation extends the work of 
Murphy and Dacin’s (2011) framework that identifies the psychological pathways an individual 
may follow when making the decision to engage in fraud. They contend that contextual factors 
(e.g., the pressure to meet analysts’ forecasts) may compel a manager to unintentionally engage 
in fraudulent behavior. This dissertation offers a more detailed understanding of this 
phenomenon through its inclusion of the bounded ethicality and ethical fading concepts. The 
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second contribution of this dissertation is that it serves as an initial test of, and support for, 
TUAB. In particular, it provides evidence that, through the mechanism of ethical fading, 
unethical behavior is not necessarily the result of one consciously forsaking his or her ethics for 
some other desired goal (i.e., profit). Finally, this dissertation identifies some of the 
psychological processes suggested by bounded ethicality that limit one’s ability to make an 
ethical decision as well as two important contextual factors (i.e., pay inequities and earnings 
targets) that provokes those processes. 
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CHAPTER 2: THEORY OF UNINTENDED AMORAL BEHAVIOR: THE EFFECT OF 
BOUNDED ETHICALITY ON MANAGERIAL DECISION-MAKING UNDER SYSTEM 
1 AND SYSTEM 2 THINKING (STUDY 1) 
Introduction 
Bazerman and Tenbrunsel (2011) note that unethical behavior within organizations 
appears to be on the rise despite a considerable amount of effort, time, and money expended to 
discourage such conduct. Instances of financial statement fraud support this general observation. 
In 2002, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in order to restore the public’s trust in 
capital markets that had eroded because of an outbreak of fraud in the late 1990s and early 
2000s. SOX, with deterring and preventing fraud as its chief objectives, sought to enhance 
regulations regarding internal controls, financial disclosure, corporate governance, and auditor 
independence. As such, this legislation initiated profound changes to the U.S. financial reporting 
system, especially with respect to management’s responsibility over financial reporting.  
A provision embedded within SOX requires both the CEO and CFO to certify that the 
company’s financial statements and disclosures accurately represent the economic condition of 
their organization and imposes severe criminal penalties and fines for those who knowingly sign-
off on fraudulent information. However, despite SOX’s rigorous rules, penalties, and fines, along 
with the other concerted endeavors to improve corporate behavior, incidents of financial 
statement fraud seem to be rising, worldwide. PricewaterhouseCoopers’s latest biennial report on 
global economic crime shows the percentage of surveyed participants (members within an 
organization) who experienced accounting fraud within a twelve-month period has increased 
from 10 percent in 2003 to 24 percent in 2011 (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011). One possible 
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reason that explains SOX’s inability to curtail fraud is the law’s reliance on a flawed assumption 
about unethical behavior in general. That is, unethical behavior is a result of one intentionally 
sacrificing his or her ethics for some other desired goal (e.g., meeting analysts’ expectations).  
The psychological explanation for fraud, at first, appears simple. That is, greed motivates 
a dishonest individual to misreport. However, this seems to be too simplistic of an explanation as 
there are many dishonest and “aggressively acquisitive” people who are law abiding and never 
commit fraud (Duffield & Grabosky, 2001). Understanding why managers engage in fraud may 
require a more nuanced investigation into the manager’s psychological processes that are 
involved in decision-making. In particular, those inherent biases and heuristics aimed at 
preserving one’s sense of self-worth that, when activated, may constrain his or her ability to 
make an ethical decision. As such, the purpose of this chapter is to unify disparate theories and 
ideas from psychology and behavioral ethics as a means of constructing a theory, the Theory of 
Unintended Amoral Behavior (hereafter, TUAB), that explains how certain psychological 
processes may direct a person to unintentionally engage in fraudulent financial reporting through 
ethical fading, a mechanism that strips ethical considerations from decision-making (Tenbrunsel 
& Messick, 2004). 
Rather than the “predator” fraudster who is greedy and opportunistic, evidence indicates 
that fraud is usually perpetrated by the “accidental fraudster.” The accidental fraudster is one 
who is generally considered a decent, law-abiding citizen that, under normal circumstances, 
would have never contemplated engaging in accounting fraud (Dorminey, Fleming, Kranacher, 
& Riley, 2012). Data from the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, (ACFE, 2012) reveals 
that most fraudsters fit this description in that they are typically trusted employees who are first-
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time offenders and have clean employment histories. Anecdotally, Charles Niemeier, former 
chief accountant for the enforcement division of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), stated that "[p]eople who never intend to do something wrong end up finding themselves 
in situations where they are almost forced to continue to commit fraud once they have started 
doing this. Otherwise, it will be revealed that they had used improper accounting in the earlier 
periods" (quoted from Bazerman, Loewenstein, & Moore, 2002, p. 100). These comments 
suggest that initial acts of fraud may be unintentional. However, SOX, as well as most laws, 
definitions, and concepts regarding fraud, assume that such behavior is intentional. An 
understating of the psychological mechanisms that limit one's ethical decision-making, referred 
to as bounded ethicality, may thus offer potential contributions to auditors, management, 
regulators, and researchers in regards to how each address fraudulent financial reporting.  
With respect to the auditing profession, an understanding of how certain contextual 
factors contribute towards bounded ethicality may result in improved fraud detection. In 
addition, given the subconscious nature of ethical fading, TUAB suggests that auditors might 
reconsider the substantial weight they attach to management’s character and attitude when 
conducting fraud risk assessments. In regards to organizations and managers, knowledge of 
bounded ethicality may allow organizations to design superior fraud controls aimed at mitigating 
the contextual factors that influence ethical fading. Furthermore, understanding one’s own biases 
and heuristics may help CEOs and CFOs be more psychologically prepared when confronted 
with opportunities to engage in accounting fraud. This chapter suggests to regulators that 
recognizing the difference between intentional corruption and unintentional bias, and the factors 
that drive such bias, is needed to establish more effective fraud deterrents. Finally, this chapter 
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contributes to the ethics and accounting literatures by introducing a model that distinguishes 
between intentional and unintentional behavior by considering the systematic, psychological 
errors that constrain one’s ability to make an ethical decision, as well as the contextual factors 
that exacerbate those errors. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 constructs and describes 
a model of bounded ethicality in addition to providing background information on the current 
gaps in accounting research. Section 3 articulates TUAB’s implications to the accounting 
literature by discussing future avenues of research that may utilize this theory. Finally, Section 4 
provides a detailed examination of the chapter’s contributions. 
Background and Theoretical Model 
Cressey’s (1950, 1953) Fraud Triangle assists with understanding the accidental fraudster 
(Dorminey et al., 2012). Initially proposed to explain embezzlement, this framework was later 
expanded by both researchers and regulators to include fraudulent financial reporting 
(Trompeter, Carpenter, Desai, Jones, & Riley, 2013). According to the Fraud Triangle, three 
conditions are typically present when fraud occurs. First, the individual has an incentive or 
perceives a pressure to commit fraud. The second condition is that weak internal controls (which 
include management’s ability to override controls) must be present to provide the opportunity for 
one to engage in the act. Finally, the individual must be able to either rationalize the fraud to be 
consistent with his or her moral principles or possess some attitude, ethical principle, or character 
trait that allows that person to knowingly and intentionally commit a fraudulent act (Ramos, 
2003).  
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The Fraud Triangle has also been utilized by researchers as both theoretical support (e.g., 
Murphy, 2012) and a means of organizing the literature related to fraud (e.g., Trompeter et al., 
2013). Much of the accounting research, however, has focused on the incentives/pressures and 
opportunities elements of the Fraud Triangle while the rationalization component has received 
the least amount of consideration (Hogan, Rezaee, Riley, & Velury, 2008; Murphy & Dacin, 
2011; Trompeter et al., 2013; Wells, 2004). As such, there is a dearth of research regarding the 
psychological processes that enable a manager to justify fraudulent action. In addition, we have 
limited knowledge of how contextual factors, such as semi-static environmental influences (e.g., 
one’s corporate culture) and situation-specific considerations (e.g., time pressure), interact to 
affect how a person rationalizes. Recent research on bounded ethicality and ethical fading 
provides a foundation for explaining how psychological processes, specifically, common biases 
and heuristics, can limit one’s ability to recognize a situation as having ethical implications, thus 
allowing that person to act against his or her moral code. 
Embedded in laws such as SOX is the common supposition that unethical behavior is the 
result of bad actors consciously engaging in self-interested behavior at the expense of doing what 
is right. However, Messick and Bazerman (1996) argue against the perspective that executive 
ethics is primarily based on explicit tradeoffs between moral standards and profit. That is, ethical 
decision-making is not necessarily a rational, linear thought process as it is described in Rest’s 
(1986) or Kohlberg’s (1973) models. Rather, they contend that efforts to improve ethical 
decision-making are better aimed at understanding our psychological tendencies and, as 
Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe (2008) claim, the research examining the roles played by emotions, 
the subconscious, and intuition in our decisions highlights the incompleteness of rationalist 
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models. Furthermore, Moore, Tanlu, and Bazerman (2010) state that “if self-interest were 
computed rationally as an expected value and it then drove motivated reasoning, eliminating bias 
would be as simple as increasing the criminal penalties for fraud” (p. 46). In contrast to the 
traditional frameworks of ethics, Chugh, Bazerman, and Banaji (2005) proposed the concept of 
bounded ethicality.  
Bounded ethicality refers to “systematic and predictable psychological processes” which 
allow one to engage in unethical behavior that is inconsistent with his or her moral standards 
(Tenbrunsel, Diekmann, Wade-Benzoni, & Bazerman 2010, p. 7). These processes include 
systemic errors, specifically, self-serving biases and heuristics, which inhibit one’s ability to 
make an ethical decision (Chugh et al. 2005). Implicit forms of prejudice, in-group favoritism, 
and a tendency to overclaim credit are all specific examples of biases that researchers in 
behavioral ethics have used to illustrate the role of bounded ethicality in decision-making 
(Banaji, Bazerman, & Chugh, 2003; Bazerman, 2011). As these psychological tendencies operate 
at a subconscious level (Gino, Moore, & Bazerman, 2011), the most insidious aspect of bounded 
ethicality is that it allows the person to behave unethically without his or her awareness of doing 
so. This is accomplished through the mechanism of ethical fading wherein one’s psychological 
constraints fade any moral considerations from the decision-making process (Tenbrunsel & 
Messick, 2004). Bounded ethicality and ethical fading may offer a considerable degree of 
explanatory power with respect to decision-making in a fraud context. However, theoretical 
models are typically scarce in relatively new fields such as behavioral ethics (Tenbrunsel & 
Smith-Crowe, 2008).  
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Research in psychology suggests that people, in general, value ethical behavior (Gino et 
al, 2011). As such, individuals are compelled to view and present themselves as moral and 
honest (Messick & Bazerman, 1996; Tenbrunsel, 1998) because of both the rewards to the self 
(i.e., maintains psychological well-being and a sense of self-worth) and the benefits derived from 
having a reputation of high moral character (Baston, Kobrynowicz, Dinnerstein, & Wilson, 
1997). Most people, however, believe themselves to be more ethical than their peers 
(Tenbrunsel, 1998), overestimate the degree to which they will engage in behaviors that are 
socially acceptable in the future (Epley & Dunning, 2000), and perceive their own questionable 
actions as less objectionable than others performing similar actions (Valdesolo & DeSteno, 
2007). Furthermore, research indicates that individuals have a propensity to exhibit “moral 
hypocrisy” wherein they present themselves as ethical, even while acting in a manner that 
conflicts with their views of morality (Baston, et al., 1997). Thus, an interesting question exists 
regarding how people are able to engage in behavior they would otherwise find unacceptable, or 
even reprehensible, while maintaining the belief that they are moral and honest. An 
understanding of two concepts from behavioral ethics and psychology, bounded ethicality and 
ethical fading, is an important step in addressing this question. However, in order to have a more 
fundamental understanding of these concepts, the “want” versus “should-self” distinction should 
first be examined. 
“Want-self” versus “Should-self” Distinction 
Bazerman, Tenbrunsel, and Wade-Benzoni (1998) proposed the “want-self” versus 
“should-self” distinction as a framework for understanding intrapersonal conflict (Tenbrunsel et 
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al., 2010). The “should-self” is characterized as rational, thoughtful, and “cool-headed,” and is 
believed to embody our ethical intentions and beliefs that we should act in accordance with our 
moral principles (Tenbrunsel et al., 2010). Conversely, the emotional, impulsive, and “hot 
headed” “want-self” is conceived as an expression of one’s self-interested desires and needs 
(Tenbrunsel et al., 2010). There exists a temporal element in the conflict between the “want-
selves” and “should-selves” in that the “self” which dominates a person’s thoughts varies as that 
individual proceeds through the stages of predicting his or her behavior (the prediction phase), 
engaging in a behavior (the action phase), and then recollecting on the behavior performed (the 
recollection phase) (Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011). The “want-self” versus “should-self” 
distinction is represented in Figure 1. 
The Prediction Phase  
When an individual is making predictions about his or her future behavior, the “should-
self” is believed to be in control (Tenbrunsel et al., 2010). The abstract nature of anticipating 
how one will behave in a particular scenario allows the individual to rationally and deliberatively 
evaluate alternative actions and choose the behavior that is most consistent with his or her 
general attitude and moral principles. Essentially, during the prediction phase, people recognize 
how they should act (i.e., according to their respective moral principles) and believe that they 
will behave ethically if found in a situation similar to a particular hypothetical scenario 
(Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011). Research, however, has demonstrated that individuals are 
prone to commit forecast errors when predicting behavior (Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011; 
Diekmann, Tenbrunsel, & Galinsky, 2003).   
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When making predictions, there are several factors, which limit a person’s ability to 
predict accurately his or her ethical behavior in a particular situation. One such factor is that 
individuals often fail to consider what their motivations will be during the action phase and, as a 
result, will commit attribution errors in their predictions (Diekmann et al., 2003). That is, people 
believe that their general dispositions will dictate future behavior while failing to consider the 
situational influences that may actually motivate their behavior. Trope and Lieberman (2003) 
illustrate the attribution bias that may be exhibited when predicting one’s behavior by utilizing 
an example where an individual decides whether to donate blood. When a person is asked to 
donate blood at a future date, that individual’s general attitude, or disposition, towards giving 
blood will be the dominant influence on his or her decision to volunteer. However, when the day 
arrives for that person to make the donation, situation-specific factors such as the location and 
time of the collection are more likely to influence his or her behavior. Another factor which leads 
to forecast errors, as discussed by Newby-Clark, Ross, Buehler, Koehler, and Griffin (2000), is 
that an individual’s predictions of his or her behavior are more of a reflection of that person’s 
hopes and desires rather than a realistic understanding of the self. Furthermore, Epley and 
Dunning (2000) argue that one’s predictions about ethical behavior tend to be overly optimistic 
and motivated by self-aggrandizement. Finally, predicting how one will behave in a given 
scenario takes place in a relatively “consequence-free” environment wherein the individual does 
not incur any real costs (i.e., social repercussions) from the choices he or she makes (Bazerman 
& Tenbrunsel, 2011). These factors help explain why there is a disparity between one’s 
predictions of ethical behavior and his or her actual behavior in the action phase. 
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The Action Phase 
When the time comes for the individual to make a decision, one’s rational “should-self” 
yields to his or her impulsive, emotional “want-self” (Tenbrunsel et al., 2010). At this stage, the 
individual is no longer afforded the opportunity to think abstractly or in general terms as he or 
she is confronted with the concrete realities of the situation. The contextual factors, or pressures, 
of the situation are interpreted through “systematic and predictable psychological processes” 
(Tenbrunsel et al., 2010) which “fade” consideration of the ethical implications resulting from 
one’s decision or behavior (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004). As such, the person’s thoughts 
regarding what he or she wants to do replace those of how one should act (Bazerman & 
Tenbrunsel, 2011), essentially giving that individual a “psychological license” to behave in a 
self-interested manner. Thus, one’s probability of engaging in an unethical behavior increases 
when the “want-self” is given free reign. Bounded ethicality and ethical fading, as discussed later 
in this section, may help explain why the “want-self” yields to “should-self” during the action 
phase. 
The Recollection Phase 
As the person moves beyond the action phase, the pressures present at the time of the 
behavior have diminished and that individual may return to thinking in abstract and general 
terms. As such, the “should-self” reasserts control when one is reflecting upon his or her 
behavior during the recollection phase (Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011). During this phase, or at 
least once the person is past the action phase, an unethical behavior may become the new 
standard if it represents just a slight deviation from one’s typical, perhaps moral, behavior. This 
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is because the difference between the unethical behavior and one’s normal behavior is 
unnoticeable (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004).
1
 As such, the person may continue without any 
adjustment to his or her behavior. However, if confronted with the idea that one might have 
behaved unethically, cognitive dissonance may occur (Festinger, 1957; Festinger & Carlsmith, 
1959) as there will be an inconsistency between the person’s unethical behavior and his or her 
self-image as an ethical individual.   
 Cognitive dissonance may produce unpleasant feelings such as guilt (Bandura, 1991, 
1999; Sykes & Matza, 1957) that in turn will motivate the individual to change either his or her 
behavior or attitude to reduce any negative affect (Bandura, 1991, 1999; Festinger, 1957; Sykes 
& Matza, 1957). As it is typically easier to change one’s beliefs rather than actions that have 
already occurred (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959), the individual is likely to utilize a particular 
rationalization, moral disengagement, or neutralization technique to make the unethical behavior 
acceptable in his or her mind.
2
  For example, research by Shu, Gino, and Bazerman (2010) 
indicates that individuals working in an environment that is permissive towards cheating will 
minimize the degree to which they see cheating as a moral issue (e.g., adopt the attitude that 
everyone cheats). Essentially, this act of changing one’s standards of ethical behavior allows the 
person to preserve his or her self-image as a moral person while behaving in ways that violate his 
or her personal code of ethics (Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011).  
                                                 
1
 In fact, a deviation between an unethical behavior and one’s normal behavior may be so slight that the person does 
not feel motivated to reflect upon that particular unethical action.  
2
 See Murphy & Dacin (2011) for a discussion regarding the various types of rationalization, moral disengagement, 
and neutralization techniques that are used to justify one’s behavior, especially acts of fraud. 
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Summary of “Want-self” versus “Should-self” Distinction 
 The “want-self” versus “should-self” framework offers an initial, temporal explanation 
as to how an individual may act in ways that violate his or her own moral code while preserving 
a self-image as an ethical person. In the action phase of this framework, it is posited that 
unethical behavior may occur when contextual stimuli, or pressures, interact with certain 
psychological processes to fade the consideration of ethical implications at the time of the 
decision (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004), thus allowing “want-self” to assume control 
(Tenbrunsel et al., 2010). A question remains, however, as to how this interaction leads to ethical 
fading. Research on bounded ethicality (Bazerman, 2011; Tenbrunsel et al., 2010) may provide a 
structure for addressing this question.  
Bounded Ethicality 
Bounded ethicality is defined as the “systematic and predictable psychological processes 
that lead people to engage in ethically questionable behaviors that are inconsistent with their own 
preferred ethics” (Tenbrunsel et al., 2010, p. 7).3 These psychological processes include inherent 
biases and heuristics, which inhibit one’s ability to make an ethical decision (Chugh et al., 2005). 
Implicit forms of prejudice, in-group favoritism, and a tendency to overclaim credit are all 
specific examples of biases that researchers in behavioral ethics have used to illustrate the role of 
                                                 
3
 Bounded ethicality is derived from Simon’s (1983) concept of bounded rationality, which states that human 
rationality is constrained and thus limited, by both contextual features and the individual’s computational abilities. 
Chugh, Bazerman, and Banaji (2005) applied Simon’s (1983) concept of boundedness, which was extend by Thaler 
(1996), to ethical decision making. 
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bounded ethicality in decision-making (Banaji et al., 2003; Bazerman, 2011). As these 
psychological processes operate at a subconscious level (Gino et al., 2011), the most insidious 
aspect of bounded ethicality is that it allows the person to behave unethically without his or her 
awareness of doing so. A theoretical model as to how bounded ethicality may influence ethical 
fading during the action phase is represented by Figure 2. What follows is an explanation of how 
bounded ethicality can lead to an unethical decision, as well as the critical role that ethical fading 
plays in this process.   
Contextual Stimuli/Pressures 
Kern and Chugh (2009) demonstrate that contextual factors such as time pressure, for 
example, can have an impact on one’s ethical behavior. Additionally, studies involving the 
priming effect suggest that even unnoticed stimuli may significantly affect one’s thoughts and 
actions (Kahneman, 2011). Despite the substantial influence that contextual stimuli may have on 
behavior, however, most individuals underestimate the degree to which these factors can 
influence their actions (Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011). One explanation for this 
underestimation is that individuals, in general, view their respective moral identities as static and 
constantly active. 
Wade-Benzoni, Li, Thompson, and Bazerman (2007) argue that although there are core 
traits of an individual that are static and thus generally unresponsive to changes, there are many 
other attributes which may become salient given the context of the situation or the individual’s 
motivated state. Therefore, one’s moral identity may be more of a “working self-concept” that is 
based on his or her social experiences rather than a static view of the self. In addition, Aquino, 
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Freeman, Reed II, Lim, and Felps (2009) argue that environmental factors can effectively 
“neutralize” one’s moral identity. For example, Murphy and Dacin (2011) point to a company 
that condones unethical behavior as one such factor that can overwhelm an individual’s 
predisposition not to commit financial statement fraud. Combining these arguments suggests that 
an individual’s moral identity is neither static nor always active, and that contextual factors may 
have a significant influence on such an identity. By translating these concepts into the 
terminology of bounded ethicality, I argue that semi-static environmental factors such as one’s 
corporate culture interact with other situational or task-specific factors to provoke certain biases 
and heuristics. In turn, the elicitation of these biases and heuristics results in the individual 
evaluating and interpreting the contextual stimuli not through a rigid moral lens, but in a manner 
free of moral considerations and influenced by the specific details of that context. What follows 
are explanations as to how particular biases and heuristics can lead to unethical behavior under 
two distinct systems of decision-making (see Figure 2). 
Unethical Behavior under System 1 Thinking  
Kahneman (2011) describes decision-making as having two distinct modes of cognitive 
processing, labeled System 1 and System 2 thinking. The primary function of System 1 is to 
construct links among ideas of contexts, events, actions, and consequences that frequently 
coincide. These associations create a working model that facilitates one’s understanding of his or 
her environment, establishes a narrative for the events of that individual’s life, and develops 
expectations for the future. Kahneman (2011) characterizes System 1 thinking as automatic, 
intuitive, impulsive, effortless, and emotional. That is, System 1 evaluates contextual stimuli 
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“automatically and quickly, with little or no effort and no sense of voluntary control” 
(Kahneman, 2011, p. 20). In contrast, System 2 is deliberative, capable of reasoning, and 
associated with self-control. The primary function of System 2 thinking is to monitor the 
continuous intuitions, intentions, impressions, and feelings intimated by System 1. Essentially, 
one’s intuitions regarding a particular scenario are a product of the primitive evaluations carried 
out by System 1. However, these intuitions are subject to the systematic errors, or cognitive 
biases and heuristics, that are embedded within System 1 and activated under specified 
conditions (Kahneman, 2011).  
Biases and Heuristics  
Caruso, Epley, and Bazerman (2006) argue that an individual’s perspective must 
necessarily affect his or her interpretation of environmental stimuli since the world can only be 
experienced through one’s own senses. As such, research indicates that an individual is often not 
able to interpret information in an unbiased way, even when it is so desired (Babcock & 
Loewenstein, 1997; Diekmann, Samuels, Ross, & Bazerman, 1997). This interpretation, and the 
subsequent weighting, of environmental stimuli are especially subject to biases related to 
egocentrism.   
Egocentric biases are intended to maintain a person’s sense of self-worth such as the need 
to see him or herself as moral, competent, and deserving (Chugh et al., 2005). In a dilemma 
where a person’s self-worth is threatened, an individual is more motivated to avoid negative 
perceptions of the self (e.g. “I am not competent”) rather than pursue positive ones (e.g., “I am 
moral”) (Kahneman, 2011). As such, the need to maintain one’s self-worth can often lead to a 
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skewed interpretation of stimuli that favors the individual’s preference for a particular outcome 
(Messick & Sentis, 1983) or results in the perception that the most beneficial outcome to him or 
her is the most “fair,” or both (Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008). As discussed in Bazerman & 
Tenbrunsel (2011), an individual first determines his or her preference, based on self-interest, for 
a particular outcome and then legitimizes that preference by redefining the characteristics (i.e., 
the importance of those characteristics) which influence his or her perspective of fairness 
(Messick & Sentis, 1979; Messick & Sentis, 1983). This is consistent with Kunda’s (1990) 
Theory of Motivated Reasoning, which posits that individuals can be unknowingly biased toward 
reaching a preferred outcome.   
Since one automatically interprets information egocentrically (Epley & Caruso, 2004), 
that is, evaluates contextual stimuli on the basis of how those factors affect one’s sense of self-
worth, objective assessments of a situation may be challenging (Bazerman & Chugh, 2006). As 
discussed in Epley, Caruso, and Bazerman (2006), an individual will search for evidence that 
justifies his or her action which effectuates a preferred, self-interested outcome while evaluating 
more critically, or completely discounting, evidence that does not support the selection of that 
desired action (Dawson, Gilovich, & Regan, 2002; Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Ditto, Scepansky, 
Munro, Apanovitch, & Lockhart, 1998; Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979). In addition, evidence 
supporting the individual’s desired action is often weighted more than that which does not 
(Babcock, Loewenstein, Issacharoff, & Camerer, 1995; Messick & Sentis, 1979). Furthermore, 
because these automatic and primitive evaluations happen so quickly and effortlessly, a person’s 
perceptions may not feel biased or distorted in any way (Bazerman & Banaji, 2004).  
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Affect-laden Intuition 
Not only are contextual stimuli interpreted in a biased, egocentric manner, but they may 
also elicit an emotional reaction in a person (Slovic, 1999). If the stimuli produce negative affect, 
then the individual will be motivated to reduce those unpleasant feelings without engaging in 
more deliberative thinking (Kahneman, 2011). As such, visceral responses tend to dominate at 
the time a decision is made (Loewenstein, 1996). In addition to the incentive to swiftly resolve 
any negative affect, Murphy and Dacin (2011) argue that the individual may rely on his or her 
“affect-laden moral intuition” (i.e., a “gut feeling”) to determine whether a potentially unethical 
action to address a particular situation is acceptable. However, whereas Murphy and Dacin 
(2011) postulate that one will utilize affect-laden intuition to guide behavior once he or she is 
aware the potential act in question is fraudulent, I contend it is affect-laden intuition which may 
prevent one from recognizing the potential act of fraud as unethical. 
Haidt (2011) asserts that moral judgment is often rendered by quick intuition. This may 
be due to the “affect heuristic,” which refers to how one’s intuitions, formed by the automatic 
and rapid emotions that precede cognition, are used as a basis to guide the person’s decisions and 
subsequent behaviors (Bazerman & Chugh, 2006; Finucane, Alkahami, Slovic, & Johnson, 
2000). Kahneman (2011) contends that the affect heuristic is an instance of substitution. That is, 
System 1 answers a more difficult question (e.g., does this particular decision have ethical 
implications?) by automatically substituting and answering an easier one (e.g., how do I feel 
about this decision as opposed to its alternatives?). Thus, how the person feels with respect to 
each alternative decision will determine whether he or she engages in ethical fading and, as a 
result, unethical behavior. 
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Ethical Fading and Unethical Behavior 
Kahneman (2011) states that individuals are overconfident in (i.e., biased towards) their 
intuitions derived from automatic cognitive processes such as the affect heuristic. A person’s 
behavior, therefore, is not necessarily the result of a conscious, reasoned decision to forsake his 
or her ethics in order to satisfy some other desire. Rather, one’s behavior in an ethical dilemma is 
more “emotion driven” that is subject to the biased and automatic cognitive processes of System 
1 thinking. Accordingly, if a potential unethical act may relieve any negative affect experienced 
in a particular dilemma, then the individual’s affect-laden intuition is likely to suggest that such 
an act is “good” or, at least, appropriate, in that it is the most emotionally appealing. This desire 
to assuage visceral impulses can lead to ethical fading wherein the “moral colors of an ethical 
decision fade into bleached hues that are void of moral implications” (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 
2004, p. 224), thus increasing the probability that one engages in unethical behavior without that 
individual’s awareness that he or she is doing so. An application of bounded ethicality and 
ethical fading to a dilemma involving a manager failing to meet analysts’ expectations can help 
synthesize these concepts and illustrate their role in influencing unethical behavior under System 
1 thinking. Before applying these concepts, however, a brief discussion is necessary to 
differentiate ethical fading from other similar terms. 
In the ethics literature, ethical fading has yet to be clearly distinguished from other 
related concepts such as ethical sensitivity, moral disengagement, neutralization, and 
rationalization. Hunt and Vitell (1992) characterize ethical sensitivity as an individual trait that 
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enables one to recognize a situation as having ethical implications.
4
 As such, ethical sensitivity 
may be related to ethical fading in that one who is more aware of the moral implications of 
situation may be less inclined to fade ethically. 
With respect to moral disengagement, Moore, Detert, Treviño, Baker, and Mayer (2012) 
argue that Bandura (2002) views this concept as a personal characteristic wherein the propensity 
to employ mechanisms of disengagement varies across people. Murphy and Dacin (2011) view 
neutralization and rationalization as different terms that describe the same construct as moral 
disengagement. That is, a mechanism which allows one to change his or her perception of either 
a situation or action, or both, in order to justify any potential or past behavior. One may infer 
from this conceptualization that utilizing one’s ability to disengage (or neutralize or rationalize) 
is a conscious strategy employed by the decision maker. Ethical fading, in contrast, is the result 
of a subconscious processes. Thus, there is not a “conscious” decision to fade the implications 
from one’s decision.  
Whether moral disengagement is an antecedent to (e.g., Detert, Treviño, & Sweitzer, 
2008), or is a consequence of (e.g., Shu, Gino, & Bazerman, 2011), unethical behavior is still an 
empirical question. Haidt (2001), however, contends that emotional reactions drive one’s 
judgments and only afterwards does the person engage in reasoning that is more deliberate to 
justify his or her reactions. As such, if moral disengagement is a consequence, then ethical fading 
may explain the process that leads to an unethical act while disengagement describes how the 
individual “copes” with that behavior. Conversely, if it is an antecedent, then ethical fading may 
perhaps be a competing explanation for unethical behavior.  
                                                 
4
 The term “moral awareness” is one that is used synonymously with ethical sensitivity. 
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Example of Unethical Behavior under System 1 Thinking.  
Bazerman and Tenbrunsel (2011) state that executives often depend on System 1 thinking 
given both the demands of their position and the hectic atmosphere in which they operate. 
Murphy and Dacin (2011) discuss how one such demand, the importance placed on management 
to meet analysts’ forecasts, can motivate an individual to act unintentionally in an unethical 
manner in order to achieve a particular goal. The effects of bounded ethicality and ethical fading 
under System 1 thinking can explain why some managers may unwittingly engage in 
unscrupulous behavior, that is, financial statement fraud, to meet these analysts’ expectations.  
Xu, Taylor, and Dugan’s (2007) review of the real earnings management literature 
suggests that managers “take advantage of the accounting discretion in GAAP to manipulate 
accruals through accounting choices and estimates” (p. 195). Furthermore, Burgstahler and 
Eames (2006) provide evidence that managers avoid issuing earnings statements that are below 
analysts’ expectations. This is accomplished by both upwardly managing reported earnings and 
downwardly managing the expectations of analysts. Thus, as argued by Murphy and Dacin 
(2011), management appears preoccupied with meeting analysts’ estimates and will take 
advantage of nebulous accounting standards (i.e., manage earnings) in order to reach these goals. 
However, as the line between “clever earnings management” and outright fraud is sometimes 
indistinct, a manager can be too aggressive in meeting these targets and commit financial 
statement fraud without the awareness that he or she is acting unethically. In terms of bounded 
ethicality, this is likely due to a semi-static environmental factor (i.e., the pressure to meet 
analysts’ expectations) provoking particular biases and heuristics which, in turn, fade any 
consideration of the ethical implications in one’s decision.   
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As previously discussed, egocentric biases, such as one’s need to see himself or herself as 
moral, competent, and deserving, function to maintain an individual’s sense of self-worth 
(Chugh et al., 2005). These biases can be exaggerated under conditions of uncertainty (Bazerman 
& Tenbrunsel, 2011), which the interpretation of accounting standards can sometimes produce. 
As such, one’s sense of both competency and deservingness as an executive may feel threatened 
if his or her company is unlikely to meet analysts’ expectations. However, if the CEO is able to 
push beyond the acceptable boundaries of GAAP and achieve these targets, that manager is 
likely to prefer such an option because of the desire to uphold his or her sense of self-worth. 
Consequently, the manager will subconsciously search and place more emphasis on the evidence 
which supports the option to violate GAAP while evaluating more critically, or completely 
discounting, the evidence which does not support that option. The pressure to achieve analysts’ 
targets may not only result in the individual interpreting the contextual stimuli in a biased, 
egocentric manner which favors the decision to push beyond the boundaries of GAAP, but it can 
also encourage risk-seeking behavior. 
Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; 1984) maintains that outcomes that 
exceed a reference point are considered psychological gains and those below are losses. 
Correspondingly, analysts’ estimates serve as a natural reference point (i.e., the status quo) for 
the management of public corporations (Murphy & Dacin, 2011). As such, the chance of not 
meeting forecasts, along with the forfeiture of benefits (e.g., stock options) that are normally 
associated with reaching such goals, is going to register as a psychological loss for a CEO. 
Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; 1984) further posits that people respond to 
relative, rather than absolute, changes in wealth and that individuals are loss averse (i.e., losses 
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loom larger than gains). Kahneman (2011) claims that loss aversion is embedded within System 
1 thinking and encourages risk seeking when an individual is faced with two “bad” options 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). That is, when given the option between a guaranteed loss of 
status and income (staying with the boundaries of GAAP and not meeting analysts’ estimates) 
and a riskier option (violating GAAP to meet earnings forecasts), an individual will choose the 
latter (Moore et al., 2006; Schweitzer, Ordóñez, & Douma, 2004). Finally, in addition to 
inducing risk-seeking behavior, experiencing a loss by not meeting analysts’ targets may also 
evoke strong, negative emotions (Kahneman, 2011).  
Extending Kahneman’s (2001) thinking to a managerial setting I would expect that, along 
with the unpleasant emotion prompted by a potential loss, the threat to a manager’s sense of self-
worth will elicit negative affect. That is, not achieving the critical goal of meeting forecasts 
suggests to the manager that he or she is not suited for an executive position. This creates an 
uncomfortable conflict within the individual (i.e., cognitive dissonance) since the person has the 
psychological need to see him or herself as competent, “good” at that particular job, intelligent, 
and so forth. Additionally, the manager may deem the situation of not meeting analysts’ targets 
as “unfair” since he or she deserves the benefits (e.g., stock options) that are associated with 
reaching such goals, especially given the amount of work that an executive position requires. The 
manager will be motivated to reduce the negative feelings created from both the sense of loss and 
the attacks on his or her ego and will, as a result, rely on an affect-laden moral intuition to 
determine whether violating GAAP is acceptable. 
The manager is likely to depend on an affect heuristic where the negative emotions 
produced by not meeting analysts’ forecasts serve as the basis to guide his or her decision. Thus, 
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the executive automatically substitutes a difficult question (what is the ethical or proper action?) 
with an easier one (how does choosing this particular option make me feel?). At this point, 
ethical fading has transpired and the manager’s affect-laden intuition suggests that contravening 
GAAP, in which the evidence supporting this option has been skewed in its favor, is appropriate 
as it will relieve the negative emotions experienced in this scenario. However, if the manager has 
ambiguous or conflicting intuitions about this decision, then he or she may utilize a more 
deliberate reasoning approach (Murphy & Dacin, 2011) that is consistent with System 2 
thinking.   
Unethical Behavior under System 2 Thinking.  
Kahneman (2011) states that System 2, as opposed to the impulsive and intuitive nature 
of System 1, is cautious, deliberative, capable of reasoning, and associated with self-control. One 
of the main tasks of System 2 thinking is to monitor the continuous intuitions, intentions, 
impressions, and feelings suggested by System 1. Additionally, System 2 has the ability to exert 
control in difficult situations (i.e., instances of cognitive strain), such as when one’s intuitions are 
unclear or conflicting, and expend the additional energy required for logical analysis, expression 
of judgments, and making choices. System 2 is thus considered the final authority in decision-
making as it is able to resist the suggestions of System 1. Although one is more likely to behave 
ethically if he or she is able to utilize System 2 (Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011), this mode of 
thought shouldn’t be considered a perfect model of rationality (Kahneman, 2011) given both its 
operational limitations that are a result of the structuration between the two systems to divide 
cognitive labor and its dependence on biased knowledge used to frame the situation. 
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Typically, System 2 operates without putting forth much effort and passively accepts the 
suggestions of System 1 with little or no modification (Kahneman, 2011). The division of labor 
between Systems 1 and 2 is structured for the sake of optimizing cognitive performance while 
minimizing effort (Kahneman, 2011). Addressing the ethical implications of a dilemma requires 
the deliberate reasoning of System 2, however, but its indolence for the sake of cognitive 
efficiency prevents such analyses. Kahneman (2011) also states that questioning one’s intuitions 
is uncomfortable, which helps reinforce the inertness of System 2. Yet, despite its general 
“laziness,” System 2 will put forth effort when prompted to do so by System 1 (Kahneman, 
2011). 
Traditional models of ethical decision-making such as Rest’s (1986) assert that moral 
reasoning precedes moral judgment (Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011). Conversely, Haidt (2001) 
argues that it is emotional reactions that drive one’s judgments and only afterwards does the 
person engage in more deliberate reasoning to justify his or her reactions (Bazerman & 
Tenbrunsel, 2011). Thus, rationalizing the emotions generated in System 1 is a characteristic of 
System 2, making it more of an “apologist” for the affect-laden intuitions of System 1 rather than 
a critic of them (Kahneman, 2011). Accordingly, if one’s affect-laden intuition is unambiguously 
leading that person towards an unethical decision, then System 2 is not likely to engage and will 
passively endorse the option. However, if the individual’s intuition is unclear or conflicting, then 
he or she is inclined to utilize the reasoning capabilities of System 2. A problem exists, though, 
in that System 2 depends on System 1’s egocentric interpretation of the contextual stimuli to 
conduct its analyses. 
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As discussed earlier, under System 1 thinking, an individual will search for evidence that 
justifies pursuing a preferred outcome while assessing more critically, or completely discounting, 
evidence that does not support the selection of that desired action (Epley, Caruso, & Bazerman, 
2006). In addition, evidence supporting the individual’s preferred option is often given more 
weight than that which does not (Babcock, Loewenstein, Issacharoff, & Camerer, 1995; Messick 
& Sentis, 1979). Since these automatic and crude evaluations happen so quickly and effortlessly, 
a person’s perceptions may not feel biased or distorted in any way (Bazerman & Banaji, 2004). 
The end result is that one subconsciously excludes relevant and important information while 
including and overweighting that which is irrelevant or simply not as important, (referred to as 
“bounded awareness”), thus distorting the type of decision the person thinks he or she is making 
(Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011). Consequently, System 2’s reliance on biased information may 
allow the individual to frame his or her decision as an “economic” or “legal” dilemma rather than 
one that has ethical implications.  
Reasoning Utilizing a Non-ethical Decision Frame 
Neale, Huber, and Northcraft (1987) argue that both task-responsive and contextual 
stimuli can frame a person’s decision in systematic and predictable ways. As such, various 
“mixtures” of contextual, situational, and task-specific factors may result in different decision 
frames that, in turn, bring about different responses. Pillutla and Chen (1999) demonstrated the 
framing of a social dilemma influences ones’ tendency to cooperate in that situation. In their 
study, individuals were less cooperative when presented with a dilemma framed in economic 
rather than one framed in non-economic terms, despite both dilemmas having the same payoffs 
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(Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999). In addition, problems interpreted as threats or crises may elicit 
different responses than those interpreted as opportunities (Tenbrunsel & Northcraft, 2008).  
Both the argument posited by Neale et al. (1987) and the research by Pillutla and Chen (1999) 
seem to be consistent with the logic of appropriateness framework.   
The logic of appropriateness framework states that a person first identifies what type of 
decision he or she perceives to be making and that judgment will in turn determine behaviors, 
norms, and expectations (Messick, 1999; Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008). A personal 
anecdote from Messick (1999, p. 11-12) helps elucidate the logic of appropriateness framework:   
“In the mid-1970s my family and I lived in Bergen, Norway. During the Easter 
school break, we joined most Norwegians in going to the mountains for cross-
country skiing. We stayed in a communal cabin in the mountains in western 
Norway with six other families. Each family had its own bedrooms, but we shared 
the kitchen facilities and dining area. The atmosphere was friendly and 
cooperative.   
 
A couple of days before the end of our stay, an announcement was made that 
there would be a ping-pong tournament for the residents of the cabin. It would be 
a single elimination tournament, handicapped so that children under 14 got a 10-
point bonus when playing against an adult, and women got a 10-point bonus when 
playing against an adult man. A schedule was presented so that every person 
knew whom they were to play, winners knew whom they were to play when they 
won, and so on.  
 
At the end of the first day of play, I discovered that I was in the final match to be 
played the following morning. I was to play a 14 year-old girl. I also discovered 
that all of the other adults had lost to children early in the tournament. I was the 
only one who had moved forward. I realized then, of course, that this tournament 
was designed and intended to have a child as the winner. All of the adults (save 
me) understood this. I had a different understanding. My incorrect understanding 
was comprehensive. It not only influenced how I played (to win) but also my 
expectations of how others would play (to win), my perception of the rules and 
norms (everyone will try hard), and my interpretation of outcomes (losers of 
matches were not good enough players to overcome the handicap), along with the 
attributions these interpretations supported.   
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The new interpretation led not only to a different prescription for choice (lose if 
you are an adult, especially if you are a man), but also to new expectations about 
how others would act (adults will lose), what the rules and norms were (kids 
should win, but should not be told that they are being allowed to win), and how I 
interpreted the play of the others, especially the men in the cabin (there is nothing 
to be learned about skill level from the matches). The skill attributions I had made 
from the other vantage point were almost surely incorrect.” 
 
In applying the logic of appropriateness framework to ethical decision-making, one may infer 
that the type of decision frame an individual adopts will determine whether he or she recognizes 
the situation as having ethical implications (Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008). That is, people 
who view a particular situation as an ethical dilemma (an ethical frame) are morally aware and as 
a result will frame the decision as one that has ethical implications. However, those who do not 
see the situation as an ethical dilemma (e.g., an economic or legal frame) are not morally aware 
and will thus not frame the decision as having ethical consequences. Research by Tenbrunsel and 
Messick (1999) demonstrates how interpretations of contextual factors, in the form of adopting 
either an ethical or non-ethical decision frame, may influence one’s behavior.   
Tenbrunsel and Messick (1999) investigated how sanctioning systems affect cooperative 
behavior in dilemma situations. In two of the three experiments, participants were asked to 
assume the role of a manufacturer in a toxic-gas emitting industry and make a decision to adhere 
to (cooperate), or defect from, an agreement which would voluntarily reduce their company’s 
emissions. The results show that participants were more likely to adopt a non-ethical decision 
frame (i.e., an economic frame) in the presence of a sanctioning system, which was designed to 
deter defection from the agreement, than those participants not operating under such a system.  
Furthermore, the participants under a weak sanctioning system were more likely to defect than 
those under a stronger system or those who faced no sanctions at all. Thus, a participant’s 
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decision to defect or cooperate depended on both how the participants framed the decision 
(ethical vs. economic) and the strength of the sanctioning system. Tenbrunsel and Messick 
(1999) proposed a two-stage, “signal processing” model to help explain their results (Tenbrunsel 
& Smith-Crowe, 2008). 
According to Tenbrunsel & Messick’s (1999) signal processing model, an environmental 
factor such as the presence of a sanctioning system has both signaling and processing effects.  
That is, the sanctioning system signals to the individual the type of decision he or she is to make.  
Based on that signal, an individual adopts a particular decision frame that influences “the unique 
processing that occurs within that frame” (Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008, p. 564).  Applying 
this model to explain Tenbrunsel and Messick’s (1999) results, the presence of a sanctioning 
system signaled to the participant that he or she was making a business decision whereupon a 
cost-benefit process was to be utilized. Participants under the strong sanctioning system 
calculated the potential costs of defection as too high and were thus more likely to cooperate than 
those individuals in the weak sanctions manipulation who estimated that the benefits of defection 
outweighed the costs. Conversely, as social dilemmas typically give rise to both economic and 
ethical considerations (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999), the participants not operating under a 
system of sanctions were able to focus more on the ethical implications of defecting or 
cooperating since their attention was not specifically cued to the economic consequences of their 
actions.
5
 As such, these participants were more likely to adopt an ethical frame and thus process 
                                                 
5
 With respect to the non-ethical decision frame, an argument can be made that considerations regarding the ethical 
implications of alternative decision are not completely absent from an individual’s decision-making process.  
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their decision utilizing a “cooperative” heuristic (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999). Essentially, one 
may infer that the adoption of an ethical decision frame encourages one to consider the ethical 
implications of alternative decisions whereas the utilization of a non-ethical frame may lead to a 
fading of those considerations.    
The Role of Self-Deception and Ethical Fading  
Although one’s affect-laden moral intuition may be ambiguous as to whether a potential 
unethical act is acceptable, the motivation to reduce any negative affronts to the individual’s self-
worth will remain. As such, the person may resort to self-deception. Tenbrunsel and Messick 
(2004) propose that self-deception is a key element, which explains the relationship between 
environmental cues and how one construes a particular situation. They argue, simply, that 
contextual stimuli may activate a self-deception mechanism that, in turn, influences the type of 
decision frame one adopts. With respect to egocentric biases, if they are provoked, that is, if the 
individual’s sense of self-worth is under attack, then he or she may resort to self-deception in 
order to maintain a particular self-image (Tenbrunsel, 2005). As the level of self-deception 
required by the individual increases the likelihood that the person will adopt an ethical decision 
frame decreases, thus lessening the saliency of the situation’s moral dimensions (Tenbrunsel & 
Messick, 2004). Ethical fading occurs since an ethical frame is not adopted, thus increasing the 
probability that one engages in unethical behavior without that individual’s awareness that he or 
                                                                                                                                                             
Instead, they may simply be “out of focus” because the individual is primarily focused on the self (Bazerman & 
Chugh, 2004).   
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she is doing so. Returning to the dilemma of a manager not meeting analysts’ forecasts can help 
illustrate the effects of decision framing on ethical fading.  
Example of Unethical Behavior under System 2 Thinking 
If a manager is not expected to meet analysts’ forecasts, then that person will be 
motivated to reduce the negative feelings created from both the sense of loss and the damage to 
his or her ego. As a result, the manager may rely on an affect-laden moral intuition to determine 
whether pushing the limits of GAAP is acceptable. However, if the manager’s intuitions are 
ambiguous about this decision (i.e., suggesting that a particular action may in fact violate 
GAAP), then he or she will utilize the reasoning ability of System 2 when prompted to do so by 
System 1. 
The reasoning ability of System 2 may be limited by its reliance on System 1’s biased 
processing of contextual stimuli. As previously mentioned, System 1 excludes relevant and 
important information while including and overweighting that which is irrelevant or simply not 
as important, thus distorting the type of decision the person thinks he or she is making 
(Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011). As such, a manager failing to meet analysts’ expectations 
results in that person focusing on the attack to his or her self-worth while ignoring other, relevant 
information which does not influence one’s self-perception. The distress experienced from this 
situation motivates the individual to self-deceive in order to maintain his or her self-image as 
competent and deserving. Although the person’s affect-laden intuition may initially suggest that 
pushing beyond the boundaries of GAAP is wrong, self-deception (i.e., assuring oneself that he 
or she is competent and deserving) allows the individual to frame the decision as an opportunity 
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to correct for the “unfairness” of the situation.” Thus, ethical fading is likely to occur as the 
individual adopts a non-ethical decision frame.  
Implications for Accounting Research 
 TUAB has the potential to predict and/or explain unethical behavior across the different 
functional areas of accounting research. With respect to Financial Accounting research, TUAB 
may explain how disclosures and ambiguity in the reporting standards may actually promote 
unethical acts. For example, corporations are required to disclose the processes that underlie their 
Level 3 fair value estimates (Financial Accounting Standards Board, 2011). Christiansen, Glover 
and Wood (2013) argue that even though these estimates possess a significant degree of 
uncertainty, auditors are dependent on management’s judgment due to the “unobservable” nature 
of the assumptions and inputs that are a part of the valuation process. Research, however, has 
shown that disclosure can actually exacerbate bias and can thus have a perverse influence on 
behavior (Cain, Loewenstein, & Moore, 2005). As such, disclosure may give a manager the 
psychological license to manipulate the inputs of fair value estimates in order to improve the 
appearance of his or her company’s financial statements.  
  The SEC has stated its desire for the adoption of a global set of accounting standards 
such as the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) (SEC, 2010). Those who support 
this measure contend that adopting a single set of principles-based accounting standards will 
benefit the investor because of increased comparability and simplicity in the financial reports. 
However, due to the ambiguity inherent in principles-based standards, there are concerns 
regarding IFRS. Wade-Benzoni, Li, Thompson, and Bazerman (2007) argue that ambiguity in a 
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situation allows people to exaggerate their competence in a particular area. Thus, the move to 
principles-based guidelines, especially for revenue recognition, might be a catalyst for unethical 
behavior as managers will have leeway in interpreting those rules in a more self-serving manner 
than is possible under rule-based guidelines. 
 In regards to the AIS area, there is a stream of research that examines the ethicality of 
implementing various types of information systems (e.g., Sutton, Arnold, & Arnold, 1995, 
Dillard, Ruchala, & Yuthus, 2005). Dillard et al. (2005, p. 108), in particular, argue that 
enterprise resources planning systems (ERPs) are “the physical manifestation of instrumental 
rationality.” That is, ERPs promote a focus on the process for completing a task in the most 
effective and efficient way without any consideration of the ethical implications of engaging in 
that process. Considering the ubiquity of information systems across all sizes and types of 
organizations, whether these systems foster an environment of instrumental rationality is an 
important ethical question for which TUAB can be utilized. 
 Some academics argue that conflicts of interest are pervasive in auditing given the 
current structural characteristics of that profession (e.g., Bazerman, Morgan, & Loewenstein, 
1997; Moore et al., 2006). Moore et al. (2006) contend that these characteristics (e.g., the client 
is who pays the auditor, auditors accepting positions from ex-clients, and so forth) both promote 
motivated reasoning and exacerbate self-serving biases in auditors whereupon they become more 
likely to acquiesce to their clients demands or perhaps even ignore any questionable behavior 
thereof. In his summary of the literature that examines conflicts of interest in auditing, Nelson 
(2005) concludes that the experimental research supports the notion that conflicts of interest do 
seem to affect decisions in audit settings. In particular, research has shown that social pressures 
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(e.g., Moore et al., 2010) and incentives (Hackenbrack & Nelson, 1996) can influence an 
auditor’s decision with respect to reporting. Thus, in regards to the Auditing research area, 
TUAB can be used to explain how and why auditors sometimes negate their professional 
judgment and accede to their clients’ demands. 
 There is considerable research in the Tax area that has examined factors related to 
behaviors such as tax compliance (e.g., Bobek & Hatfield, 2003; Bobek, Roberts, & Sweeney, 
2007; Davis, Hecht, Perkins, 2003), tax avoidance (e.g., Dyreng, Hanlon, & Maydew, 2010) and 
tax fraud (e.g., Lennox, Lisowsky, & Pittman, 2013). TUAB may help explain how and why 
taxpayers, both at the individual and organizational level, are willing to engage in these 
behaviors or push the boundaries of tax law. Furthermore, research in the Tax area has 
investigated the ethical decision-making of tax practitioners (e.g., Burns & Kiecker, 1995). The 
willingness for some accountants to establish illegal and quasi-legal tax shelters on behalf of 
their clients, for example, can perhaps be explained by TUAB in addition to other “aggressive” 
tax-related behaviors.   
With respect to the Management Accounting area, TUAB may help explain a range of 
deviant behaviors. In particular, TUAB can be applied to explain types of frauds, apart from 
financial statement fraud, such as the misappropriation of assets (e.g., Chen & Sandino, 2012), 
bribery (e.g., Christensen, 2015), and transfer price manipulation (e.g., Mehafdi, 2000). 
Furthermore, TUAB can be utilized to address ethical and quasi-ethical issues related to 
budgeting and performance measurement such as dishonesty in budget reporting (e.g., Church, 
Hannan, and Kuang, 2012), the creation of budgetary slack (e.g., Davis, DeZoort, & Kopp, 
2006), biased performance evaluation (e.g., Bol & Smith, 2011), and performance measurement 
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manipulation (Demski, 1998). Finally, TUAB can be used to explore issues related to corporate 
social responsibility disclosure (e.g., Roberts, 1992). As previously mentioned, research suggests 
that disclosure can actually provoke bias which, in turn, can have a perverse influence on 
behavior (Cain et al., 2005). Thus, TUAB can explain how social responsibility disclosure may 
actually give managers the psychological license to engage in undesirable corporate actions such 
as the exploitation of third-world labor, for example.  
Research is needed to assess TUAB’s explanatory power regarding the behaviors of 
professional accountants and managers listed above. In particular, research should focus on both 
exploring the relationship between ethical fading and unethical behaviors and identifying the 
psychological operations (i.e., biases and emotions) that lead to ethical fading across various 
accounting contexts. It is reasonable to postulate that ethical fading can result from an array of 
biases and emotions that vary across situations due to factors that are specific to particular 
contexts. Finally, research should examine how individual characteristics (e.g., the dark triad) 
and organizational characteristics (e.g., corporate culture) affect the psychological processes as 
described in TUAB. 
Contributions 
The primary contribution of this chapter is that it unifies disparate theories and ideas from 
psychology and behavioral ethics as a means of constructing a testable theory that includes the 
concepts of bounded ethicality and ethical fading. Bazerman and Tenbrunsel (2011) contend that 
traditional models of ethical decision-making such as Rest (1986) and Kohlberg (1973) are built 
on a faulty supposition that judgments are based on a rational, linear thought-process, thus 
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making those models incomplete. Specifically, these models assume that (1) awareness is 
necessary for the decision to have ethical implications, (2) reasoning will determine an 
individual’s judgment (moral judgment), (3) and moral intention is necessary for one to 
understand his or her action (moral intention). Research from psychology and behavioral ethics, 
however, suggests that individuals often (1) lack moral awareness, (2) judge before utilizing 
moral reasoning, and (3) misjudge moral intention (Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011). 
Consequently, this research, which examines how emotions, the subconscious, and intuition 
affect decision-making, highlights the limitations of rationalist models (Tenbrunsel & Smith-
Crowe, 2008). In regards to the accounting literature, Bazerman et al. (2006) are critical of 
researchers in this discipline, especially those who utilize the “tools of economics,” for not being 
concerned with the distinction between an act of conscious corruption and an error resulting from 
unintentional bias.
6
 Thus, this chapter contributes to the ethics and accounting literatures by 
introducing a testable model that differentiates between intentional and unintentional behavior by 
considering the systematic, psychological errors that constrain one’s ability to make an ethical 
decision, as well as the contextual factors that exacerbate those errors. 
This chapter also contributes to the academic literature by extending the work of Murphy 
and Dacin (2011). Murphy and Dacin (2011) developed a framework that identifies the 
psychological pathways an individual may follow when making the decision to engage in fraud. 
Within this framework, they acknowledge that contextual factors (i.e., obedience to authority, 
                                                 
6
 For example, Bazerman et al. (2006) point to models of auditor independence (e.g., Antle, 1984; DeAngelo, 1981; 
Simunic, 1984) which assume that the auditor makes a deliberate, conscious decision to either conduct an unbiased 
audit or collude with the client’s managers. 
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organizational culture, the pressure to meet analysts’ forecasts) may drive an individual to 
commit unintentional fraud. As such, this chapter provides a more detailed understanding of this 
phenomenon by its incorporation of the bounded ethicality and ethical fading concepts.  
TUAB also offers potential contributions to auditors, management, and regulators. An 
understanding of bounded ethicality and ethical fading may have potential implications for the 
auditing profession in that it can increase an auditor’s sensitivity to both the contextual factors 
that can lead to unintentional financial statement manipulation and his or her own susceptibility 
to systematic errors when dealing with clients. Research indicates that auditors attach substantial 
weight to management’s character and attitude when conducting fraud risk assessments 
(Heiman-Hoffman, Morgan, & Patton, 1996). As such, auditors will adjust their decisions based 
on their evaluations of management’s integrity (Ayers & Kaplan 1998; Beaulieu 2001; Kizirian, 
Mayhew, & Sneathen, 2005; Shaub 1996). However, as discussed in Wilks and Zimbelman 
(2004), regulators and practitioners have expressed concern regarding the overreliance on 
management's attitude when an auditor’s perception suggests a low risk of fraud. This is a valid 
concern given both auditors’ historically low rates of fraud detection (Cullinan & Sutton, 2002) 
and their documented deficiencies in testing for such risk as reported by the PCAOB (Trompeter 
et al., 2013).
7
 If most unethical behavior is unintentional (Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011), and 
bounded ethicality and ethical fading thus play significant roles in most accounting fraud, then a 
manager’s behavior may not indicate that he or she behaved unethically even if such an act was 
                                                 
7
 Among its sample, the ACFE (2012) survey data reveals that accounting fraud was initially discovered by an 
external auditor review in only 5.7% of the cases. This percentage is relatively consistent with surveys conducted 
before the implementation of SOX (e.g., KPMG, 1998).  
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committed. A manager may believe that he or she utilized “clever earnings management” 
techniques rather than outright deceptive practices since the line between the two is not 
necessarily distinct. An understanding of bounded ethicality and ethical fading may improve an 
auditor’s sensitivity to the contextual features, which can compel a manager to unintentionally 
engage in unethical behavior. Additionally, an awareness of systematic psychological errors may 
heighten skepticism when an auditor’s perception of management’s integrity indicates a lower 
fraud risk. As such, knowledge of bounded ethicality and ethical fading may improve an 
auditor’s ability to detect fraud. 
 Moore, Tetlock, Tanlu, and Bazerman (2006) discuss that professionals are vulnerable to 
the same biases as laypersons or novices and are often unaware of how compromised they are in 
conflict of interest situations.
8
 With respect to auditor independence, the external audit process 
inherently contains a conflict of interest since there is tension between pleasing a paying client 
and ensuring that client adheres to generally accepted accounting principles (Moore et al., 2006). 
As such, Bazerman, Moore, Tetlock, and Tanlu (2006) claim that the “clear findings of the 
psychological perspective on auditing is that a bias can exist in auditors without their being 
aware of it” (p. 45).9 Thus, an understanding of bounded ethicality and ethical fading may also 
assist with auditors’ recognition of their psychological limitations when dealing with clients. 
Bazerman and Tenbrunsel (2011) argue that the demands of an executive position may 
intensify the role of bounded ethicality in decision-making. As such, research on bounded 
                                                 
8
 Moore et al. (2006) propose a “Theory of Moral Seduction” from which this hypothesis is derived. 
9
 For example, the results of an experiment utilizing Big 4 auditors suggest that their judgments are biased by client 
preference (Moore, Tanlu, & Bazerman, 2010). 
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ethicality and ethical fading may also benefit management and the companies they represent. 
Tenbrunsel et al., (2010) state that most efforts to improve ethics within organizations have 
ignored the individual faced with the dilemma and have focused instead on formal systems such 
as training and developing a code of ethics. This current “fix-it” approach, they contend, ignores 
the psychological processes that may undermine organizational-level interventions. Thus, 
knowledge of bounded ethicality and ethical fading, and the contextual factors that influence 
these processes, may allow organizations to design superior fraud-deterrence mechanisms. 
Finally, understanding their own biases and heuristics may help CEOs and CFOs be more 
psychologically prepared when confronted with opportunities to engage in accounting fraud.  
An understanding of bounded ethicality may assist legislators in designing laws that are 
more effective in influencing the ethicality of organizational actors. Bazerman and Banaji (2004) 
argue that the common assumption embedded in laws such as SOX is that unethical behavior is 
the result of a bad actor consciously sacrificing his or her ethics. A failure to understand the 
psychological constraints on ethical decision-making, as well as the subconscious nature in 
which these constraints operate, may limit the effectiveness of legislation aimed at influencing 
ethical behavior in organizations. Recognizing the distinction between conscious corruption and 
unconscious bias is imperative to the implementation of effective anti-fraud measures as both 
drivers of behavior respond to different incentives (Moore et al., 2006). In addition to 
recognizing this distinction, researchers have also proposed that the definition of fraud should be 
reconsidered.  
Bazerman and Banaji (2004) state that the “pervasiveness of what is termed ‘unethical’ 
must be rethought, and as such the solutions to contemporary ethical scandals may need special 
57 
 
attention” (p. 111). Concomitantly, Bazerman et al. (2006) assert that accounting academics 
should recommend that the definition of fraud be broadened to include any deviations from 
accuracy, regardless of the intentionality or awareness of those deviations. Legally, fraud is 
distinguished from error in that fraud is defined as an intentional act (Bazerman et al., 2006). As 
such, successful prosecution of fraud typically requires demonstrating that the fraudster knew he 
or she was in fact misstating the financials in an attempt to deceive auditors, investors, or other 
parties. However, if bounded ethicality and ethical fading have considerable explanatory power 
with respect to fraudulent behavior, then it is reasonable to ask whether the definition of fraud is 
narrow, or even naïve. Expanding the legal definition to include unintentional acts would make 
executives more accountable for the harms their organizations create when fraud is committed.
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CHAPTER 3: UNINTENTIONAL FINANCIAL STATEMENT FRAUD IN AN ERA OF 
ESCALATING MANAGEMENT PAY: THE ROLE OF EGOCENTRISM, ENVY, AND 
ETHICAL FADING (STUDY 2) 
Introduction 
Despite extensive legislative efforts designed to improve corporate ethics, such as the 
passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), incidents of accounting fraud have increased 
over the past decade (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011). One possible reason that explains SOX’s 
inability to curtail fraud is the law’s assumption that such behavior is intentional. Embedded in 
laws such as SOX is the common supposition that unethical behavior is the result of a conscious 
decision. However, Moore, Tanlu, and Bazerman (2011) argue that “if self-interest were 
computed rationally as an expected value and it then drove motivated reasoning, eliminating bias 
would be as simple as increasing the criminal penalties for fraud” (p. 46). In contrast to the 
traditional frameworks (e.g., Kohlberg, 1973; Rest, 1986) that view ethical decision-making as a 
rational, linear thought process, Chugh, Bazerman, and Banaji (2005) proposed the concept of 
bounded ethicality.  
Bounded ethicality is defined as the “systematic and predictable psychological processes 
that lead people to engage in ethically questionable behaviors that are inconsistent with their own 
preferred ethics” (Tenbrunsel, Diekmann, Wade-Benzoni, & Bazerman 2010, p. 7). These 
processes include inherent biases and heuristics that inhibit one’s ability to make an ethical 
decision (Chugh, Bazerman, & Banaji, 2005). Implicit forms of prejudice, in-group favoritism, 
and a tendency to overclaim credit are all specific examples of biases that researchers in 
behavioral ethics have used to illustrate the role of bounded ethicality in decision-making 
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(Banaji, Bazerman, & Chugh, 2003; Bazerman, 2011). As these psychological tendencies operate 
at a subconscious level (Gino, Moore, & Bazerman, 2011), the most insidious aspect of bounded 
ethicality is that it allows the person to behave unethically without his or her awareness of doing 
so. This is accomplished through the mechanism of ethical fading wherein one’s psychological 
constraints fade any moral considerations from the decision-making process (Tenbrunsel & 
Messick, 2004).   
 Identifying and examining the psychological operations that lead to ethical fading, as 
well as the contextual factor that trigger those operations, can contribute towards implementing 
measures that are more effective at deterring and preventing accounting fraud. Research in 
behavioral ethics suggests that once such factor, pay inequality, can provoke psychological 
processes (i.e., biases and negative emotions) that, in turn, induce ethical fading and thus 
increase the likelihood of cheating behavior. In particular, Gino and Pierce (2009) argue that 
envy toward wealthy targets, whether individuals or organizations, influences the probability that 
a person will engage in unethical behavior to attain similar wealth and reduce inequality resulting 
from differences in wealth. The study’s results imply that abundant wealth activates perceptions 
of unfairness in those individuals who operate in the wealthy environment. The distress created 
from those perceptions drive feelings of envy, which, in turn, induces unethical behavior. Gino 
and Pierce (2009) also believe that their results are generalizable to fraudulent behavior. Their 
theoretical argument, and its empirical support, can be explained by the concepts of bounded 
ethicality and ethical fading. Thus, as the average CEO pay continues to skyrocket, it follows 
that managers who earn less than their peers may be more likely to succumb to ethical fading 
and, as a result, commit fraud. The purpose of this chapter is to examine how a particular 
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contextual factor, inferior pay among managers, provokes egocentric perceptions of unfairness 
and envy to affect the likelihood of one engaging in ethical fading and fraudulent behavior. 
The Theory of Unintended Amoral Behavior (Chapter 2, hereafter TUAB), which 
incorporates the concepts of bounded ethicality and ethical fading, is drawn from to predict that a 
manager who compares his or her pay to a higher-paid referent will perceive the disparity as 
more unfair than a manager who compares his or her earnings to a lower-paid referent. In 
addition, it is hypothesized that this perception will trigger a feeling of envy, which, in turn, 
increases the probability of ethical fading, and thus fraudulent behavior, in the manager who is 
paid less. A 1 x 2, between-participants design was used to test these predictions. The experiment 
required participants to sell assets of given values (ranging from excellent to poor) to a 
computerized buyer. One group (high-pay rate) earned more money on each successful 
transaction than the other (low-pay rate). Before each attempted sale, the participants had the 
opportunity to change the asset’s value from what was initially provided. Intrinsically, there 
existed an incentive for the participant to misrepresent lower quality assets as higher in that 
selling assets disclosed as high quality could have resulted in larger payouts. The participants’ 
egocentric perceptions of unfairness, episodic envy, ethical fading, and rate of misrepresentation 
were measured during this experiment.  
The results indicate that one who is paid at a lower rate is more likely to view this 
disparity as unfair, which leads to a greater feeling of envy. Although envy had no significant 
direct effect on ethical fading in the primary analyses, a supplemental analysis revealed that a 
person’s risk preference might moderate this relationship. The primary findings of this chapter, 
albeit somewhat mixed, suggests that individuals who experience a higher degree of ethical 
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fading are more likely to commit fraud, and that ethical fading, along with perceived unfairness, 
are significant psychological processes that explain how differences in pay may lead to fraud.  
Overall, the main contributions of this chapter is that it both provides initial support of 
TUAB (Chapter 2) and identifies a key contextual factor, pay disparity, and its effect on the 
psychological processes that constrain one’s ability to act ethically. In addition, it presents 
evidence that the decision to commit fraud is not necessarily a conscious trade-off between ethics 
and some other desired goal (e.g., profit). Furthermore, supplemental analysis suggests that 
future research on TUAB (Chapter 2) should consider how individual characteristics might 
influence the processes proposed in the model. This research also provides specific contributions 
to the auditing profession, organizations, and regulators.  
With respect to the auditing profession, an understanding of how certain contextual 
factors and psychological processes interact to influence unethical behavior may result in 
improved fraud detection. In addition, given the subconscious nature of ethical fading, this 
research suggests that auditors reconsider the substantial weight they attach to management’s 
character and attitude when conducting fraud risk assessments. In regards to organizations, 
knowledge of bounded ethicality may allow businesses to design superior fraud controls aimed at 
mitigating the contextual factors that influence ethical fading. Furthermore, understanding one’s 
own biases and heuristics may help managers be more psychologically prepared when 
confronted with the decision to engage in accounting fraud. Finally, this chapter suggests to 
regulators that recognizing the difference between intentional corruption and unintentional bias, 
and the factors that drive such bias, is needed to establish more effective fraud deterrents. 
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of 
the TUAB (Chapter 2) and develops hypotheses from that theory. Section 3 explains the 
experimental method employed to test those hypotheses along with the manipulation and 
measurement of the variables. Section 4 analyzes the statistical results and Section 5 discusses 
the findings. Finally, Section 6 concludes the chapter and offers a discussion of its limitations. 
Theory and Hypothesis Development 
Most individuals perceive themselves as more ethical than their peers (Tenbrunsel, 1998), 
overestimate the extent to which they will engage in behaviors that are socially acceptable in the 
future (Epley & Dunning, 2000), and view their own dubious actions as less objectionable than 
the comparable conduct of others (Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2007). Furthermore, research suggests 
that people often display “moral hypocrisy” wherein one presents him or herself as an ethical 
person while simultaneously behaving in a manner inconsistent with his or her moral principles 
(Batson, Kobrynowicz, Dinnerstein, Kampf, & Wilson, 1997). Recent studies from behavioral 
ethics provide insight as to how an individual is able to act against his or her moral standards 
while upholding the self-image that he or she is an ethical person. The concept of “bounded 
ethicality” emerged from this research to explain the discordance between one’s moral self-
image and his or her ethical behavior.  
Bounded ethicality is defined as the “systematic and predictable psychological processes 
that lead people to engage in ethically questionable behaviors that are inconsistent with their own 
preferred ethics” (Tenbrunsel et al., 2010, p. 7). These processes include inherent biases and 
heuristics that inhibit one’s ability to make an ethical decision (Chugh, Bazerman, & Banaji, 
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2005). Implicit forms of prejudice, in-group favoritism, and a tendency to overclaim credit are all 
specific examples of biases that researchers in behavioral ethics have used to illustrate the role of 
bounded ethicality in decision-making (Banaji, Bazerman, & Chugh, 2003; Bazerman, 2011). As 
these psychological tendencies operate at a subconscious level (Gino, Moore, & Bazerman, 
2011), the most insidious aspect of bounded ethicality is that it allows the person to behave 
unethically without his or her awareness of doing so. This is accomplished through the 
mechanism of ethical fading wherein one’s psychological constraints, (e.g., the activation of 
inherent biases) fade any moral considerations from the decision-making process (Tenbrunsel & 
Messick, 2004).  
As usual with relatively new fields such as behavioral ethics, theoretical models are 
sparse (Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008). As such, Chapter 2 unified disparate theories and 
ideas from psychology and behavioral ethics as a means of constructing a theory that includes 
the concepts of bounded ethicality and ethical fading. What follows is an overview of that 
theory.  
Distinction Between the System 1 and System 2 Components of the TUAB  
The TUAB (Chapter 2) incorporates two distinct modes of cognitive processing, 
described by Kahneman (2011) as System 1 and System 2 thinking, to explain how unethical 
behavior may occur. System 1’s primary function is to create connections among corresponding 
ideas of contexts, events, actions, and outcomes (Kahneman, 2011). These links help to establish 
a working model that allows one to understand his or her environment, create a narrative for the 
experiences of that person’s life, and build future expectations. Kahneman (2011) defines System 
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1 thinking as automatic, intuitive, impulsive, effortless, and emotional. In other words, System 1 
assesses stimuli “automatically and quickly, with little or no effort and no sense of voluntary 
control” (Kahneman, 2011, p. 20). As such, one’s intuitions of a particular context are essentially 
the creation of the primitive evaluations conducted by System 1. These intuitions, however, are 
prone to systematic errors (i.e., cognitive biases and heuristics) that are ingrained within System 
1 and activated under certain conditions (Kahneman, 2011). 
The primary function of System 2 is to monitor the intuitions, intentions, impressions, 
and feelings that are continuously suggested by System 1 (Kahneman, 2011). System 2 thinking, 
in contrast to System 1, is more deliberative and capable of reasoning and self-control 
(Kahneman, 2011). As such, System 2 is thought to be the final authority in decision-making 
because of its capacity to resist the suggestions of System 1. Although an individual who is able 
to utilize System 2 thinking when making a decision theoretically increases his or her chances of 
acting ethically (Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011), this mode of cognition should not be viewed as 
a perfect model of rationality (Kahneman, 2011). This is because System 2 is “lazy,” meaning 
that it typically functions without exerting the effort necessary to weigh the ethical implications 
of a decision and, as a result, passively accepts the suggestions of System 1 (Kahneman, 2011). 
In addition, when System 2 is prompted to put forth more effort, it will often rationalize the 
emotions generated in System 1 and thus act more like an “apologist” for the affect-laden 
intuitions of that system rather than a critic (Kahneman, 2011). Furthermore, a problem exists in 
that System 2’s evaluations are dependent on System 1’s biased interpretation of contextual 
stimuli.  
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Findings from research across psychology (e.g., Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, & Eyre, 
2007) and accounting (e.g., Farrell, Goh, & White, 2014) support Kahneman’s (2011) dual-
process conceptualization. However, the system of thinking under which the majority of 
unethical behavior occurs is an empirical question that is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
Bazerman and Tenbrunsel (2011), though, argue that managers often rely on System 1 given the 
hectic demands of their work environment. As such, this chapter tests the System 1 component 
of the TUAB (Chapter 2) as an explanation for unethical behavior (i.e., fraud). If System 2 
actually explains the majority of unethical actions, then we would expect to see the same 
emotions and biases activated in similar contexts. The key difference is that we would expect to 
observe more cognitive effort in one’s decision-making under System 2.  
Overview of the System 1 Component of the TUAB 
TUAB (Chapter 2) argues that, under System 1 thinking, contextual stimuli, both quasi-
static factors such as one’s organizational environment and other, situational or task-specific 
elements, interact to instigate certain biases and heuristics. Egocentric biases that function to 
maintain one’s sense of self-worth are particularly vulnerable to provocation by such stimuli. 
The need to protect one’s self-image may result in a distorted interpretation of stimuli which will 
favor a preferred outcome (Messick & Sentis, 1983) and/or create the perception that the solution 
which benefits him or her is the most “fair” (Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008). These 
automatic and primitive evaluations happen so rapidly and effortlessly that a person’s 
interpretations and perceptions may not feel biased or skewed in any way (Bazerman & Banaji, 
2004). 
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 Not only are contextual stimuli interpreted in a biased, egocentric manner, but they may 
also generate an emotional response in a person (Slovic, 1999). TUAB (Chapter, 2) argues, as an 
example, that a manager’s sense of competency may feel threatened if he or she is unlikely to 
meet a key organizational goal such as meeting analysts’ expectations. If engaging in an 
unethical act alleviates any negative emotions experienced in a particular situation, then the 
individual’s affect-laden intuition is inclined to suggest that such an act is “good” or, at least, 
suitable, in that it is the most emotionally satisfying. The individual is thus likely to depend on 
an affect heuristic wherein negative emotions serve as the basis to guide his or her decision. As 
such, he or she automatically substitutes a difficult question (what is the ethical or proper 
action?) with an easier one (how would this particular option make me feel?). Ethical fading has 
occurred at this point as the moral implications of each alternative decision are not considered, 
thus increasing the likelihood of the person engaging in unethical behavior. Figure 3 represents 
TUAB (Chapter, 2).  The remainder of this section elaborates upon this model and utilizes it to 
make predictions about whether inferior positions of income/wealth increase a manager’s 
probability of committing financial statement fraud. 
Contextual Stimuli and Biases/Heuristics 
Gino and Pierce (2009) argue that his or her environment influences one’s ethical actions. 
Semi-static, environmental factors such as reward systems (e.g., Hegarty & Sims, 1978), norms 
and culture (Treviño, Butterfield, & McCabe, 1998), and codes of conduct (Cressey & Moore, 
1983) have been shown to affect ethical conduct within organizations (Gino & Pierce, 2009). In 
addition, Kern and Chugh (2009) demonstrate that situational, or task-specific, stimuli such as 
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time pressure may influence one’s ethical behavior. TUAB (Chapter 2) contends that both types 
of factors interact to elicit particular biases and heuristics. In turn, the provocation of these biases 
and heuristics results in the individual evaluating and interpreting the contextual stimuli not 
through his or her moral lens, but in a self-interested manner which is context-dependent.  
Research suggests that people have difficulty interpreting stimuli in an unbiased way 
(Babcock & Loewenstein, 1997; Diekmann, Samuels, Ross, & Bazerman, 1997). An individual’s 
assessment, and the subsequent weighting, of environmental information are governed by 
egocentric biases which are designed to maintain the person’s sense of self-worth, such as the 
need to see him or herself as moral, competent, and deserving (Chugh, Bazerman, & Banaji, 
2005). The need to preserve one’s self-worth can lead to a distorted interpretation of stimuli 
which supports the individual’s preference for a particular outcome (Messick & Sentis, 1983) 
and/or results in the perception that the most beneficial for him or her is the most “fair” 
(Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008). As one automatically and effortlessly processes information 
egocentrically (Epley & Caruso, 2004), that is, evaluates contextual stimuli on the basis of how 
those factors affect the person’s sense of self-worth, his or her perceptions may not feel biased or 
distorted in any way (Bazerman & Banaji, 2004). 
Application of TUAB (Chapter 2) to inferior positions of income/wealth  
General Strain Theory posits that the stress from one’s social environment to achieve 
material success can motivate an individual to take part in criminal activity (Langton & Piquero, 
2007). This stress, and the succeeding inducement towards criminal behavior, is the result of a 
social comparisons process. The Self-evaluation Maintenance Model, along with other social 
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comparison theories (e.g., Festinger, 1954), suggests that one compares his or her abilities to 
others to maintain or improve evaluations of the self (Tesser, 1988). According to Pfeffer and 
Langton (1988), research indicates that employees form reactions to the distribution of rewards 
or wealth they receive from such comparisons (e.g., Alwin, 1987). Specifically, an individual 
will weigh the distribution of resources by considering both the economic utility of his or her 
share of rewards or wealth and the social utility generated from the comparisons (Messick & 
Sentis, 1985). With respect to executive management, in particular, researchers have started to 
investigate CEO reactions to their pay relative to the labor market in which they participate 
(Fong, 2010). 
Kuhnen & Tymula (2012) argue that prior research by Frank (1984), for example, 
demonstrates that people are concerned about social status as defined by their wealth relative to 
others. This may be especially true for CEOs.  Fong (2010), citing Porac, Wade, and Pollack 
(1999), states that “the complex causes of organizational outcomes can motivate, or even 
necessitate, social comparisons by CEOs and thus they could recognize the going labor market 
rate for their services and possible deviations from such rates” (p. 1099). As such, CEOs will 
compare their pay against other CEOs (Fong, 2010) since individuals typically evaluate 
themselves against others who possess similar abilities (Goodman, 1974). Compensation 
schemes are argued to be important to managers in that they are a reflection of their competence 
and importance (March 1984). Thus, an executive whose pay is relatively lower than others in 
the same labor market may view this as a threat to his or her competency, thus motivating that 
CEO to behave in ways that lead to higher pay (Fong, 2010). This motivation may stem from the 
executive’s biased perception of what he or she considers fair compensation.  
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Gino and Pierce (2009) contend that researchers have built on Adams’ (1965) equity 
theory by demonstrating that people judge the fairness of a given setting by comparing their ratio 
of inputs to outcomes with those of referent others. However, Wade-Benzoni and Tost (2009) 
cite an extensive body of research demonstrating peoples’ propensity towards “egocentric 
interpretations of fairness,” wherein a person’s judgment of fairness is biased in a self-serving 
manner despite the belief that his or her judgment is objective (e.g., Diekmann et al., 1997; Epley 
& Caruso, 2004; Messick & Sentis, 1979, 1983; Ross & Sicoly, 1979; Wade-Benzoni, 
Tenbrunsel, & Bazerman, 1996). Furthermore, as discussed in Samnani, Salamon, and Singh 
(2013), researchers have found that perceived injustice/unfairness (Cohen-Charash & Mueller 
2007; Hershcovis et al., 2007; Jones 2009) is related to counterproductive work behaviors.  
Translating these concepts into the terminology of bounded ethicality, a manager will 
compare his or her earnings to others in the same labor market. If his or her earnings are 
relatively lower, then this process of social comparison is a contextual stimulus that may threaten 
the manager’s own feelings of competency. In turn, the manager will egocentrically interpret 
stimuli in a way that reassures his or her managerial abilities. That is, the manager will 
manufacture the perception that the lower pay is a result of an unfair situation rather than his or 
her inferior competency. As such, the first hypothesis is stated as: 
H1: A manager who compares his or her earnings to a higher-paid referent will 
perceive the disparity as more unfair than a manager who compares his or 
her earnings to a lower-paid referent 
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Biases/Heuristics and Affect-laden Intuition 
TUAB (Chapter 2) postulates that provoking egocentric biases also triggers negative 
affect in addition to distorting one’s perceptions of stimuli. When an individual’s sense of self-
worth is threatened, he or she will be motivated to diminish any negative emotion quickly 
without engaging in a deliberate thought process (Kahneman, 2011). Thus, as visceral impulses 
typically dominate during decision-making (Loewenstein, 1996), the individual may rely on his 
or her “affect-laden intuition” (i.e., gut feeling) to evaluate whether a potentially unethical 
behavior is appropriate in a given situation (Murphy & Dacin, 2011). As such, one might employ 
an “affect heuristic,” a mental shortcut whereupon the person’s intuition, formed by the quick 
and automatic emotions that precede cognition, serves as a basis to inform his or her behaviors 
and/or decisions (Bazerman & Chugh, 2006; Finucane, Alkahami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000).  
Application of TUAB (Chapter 2) to inferior positions of income/wealth  
As discussed in Blanchflower and Oswald (2011), the idea that one’s subjective well-
being is dependent on relative factors like income dates back to Duesenberry’s (1949) “relative-
income hypothesis” and continues through modern research such as Clark and Senik (2010) and 
Layard (2010). Consistent with this idea is relative deprivation theory, which suggests that an 
individual will feel less happy as his or her earnings fall in comparison to a particular referent 
(Clark & Oswald, 1996). Empirically, Frank (1999, 2007) has demonstrated that ones’ relative 
wealth standing, as opposed to absolute net worth, is a stronger predictor of his or her well-being 
and Clark and Oswald (1996), for example, found an inverse relationship between U.K. workers’ 
reported level of satisfaction and their comparison wage rates. As discussed above, one who 
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earns less than a particular referent will egocentrically interpret this situation as unfair and will 
react negatively (Nickerson & Zenger, 2008). Envy, along with unhappiness, is a probable 
reaction to a person’s inferior position of income/wealth.   
Smith and Kim (2007) define envy as “as an unpleasant, often painful emotion 
characterized by feelings of inferiority, hostility, and resentment caused by an awareness of a 
desired attribute enjoyed by another person or group of persons” (p. 46). Nickerson and Zenger 
(2008) state that “varying perspectives on social comparison and disparity perceptions are 
consistent with the notion that individuals are envious of salient referents perceived to receive 
superior income relative to their contributions” (p. 1434). Cohen-Charash and Mueller (2007) 
explain that envy occurs in social comparisons when Person A recognizes that Person B has an 
object or trait (e.g., material or personal) that Person A desires but does possess, and that object 
or trait is important to Person A’s self-concept. Specifically, Cohen-Charash and Mueller (2007) 
continue, the feeling of envy threatens one’s self-perception since it is an acknowledgement of 
his or her inferiority relative to another. Furthermore, the “comparison component” of envy is 
related with behaviors intended to improve one’s position. A similar argument is applicable to 
the reactionary behaviors of executive management to income/wealth inequalities. Goel and 
Thakor (2010), for example, support their claim that higher-earning CEOs who increase their pay 
through mergers and acquisitions induce envy among lower-earning CEOs, who, in turn, are 
motivated to increase their salaries through acquisitions.  
Translating these ideas into the terminology of bounded ethicality, a manager will 
compare his or her pay to others in the same labor market. If his or her earnings are lower, then 
this process of social comparison may serve as a contextual stimulus that endangers the 
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manager’s own sense of self-worth. Thus, the manager will egocentrically interpret stimuli in a 
way which manufactures the perception that his or her lower pay is a result of an unfair situation 
rather than his or her own inferiority. In addition to egocentrically interpreting this situation as 
unfair, the threat to the manager’s sense of self-worth is also expected to elicit negative affect, 
specifically, envy. As such, the second hypothesis is stated as: 
H2: Perceptions of unfairness regarding pay are positively related to feelings of 
envy. 
Affect-laden Intuition, Ethical Fading, and Unethical Behavior 
As discussed earlier, an individual faced with a dilemma will be motivated to reduce any 
negative affect without engaging in a slow, effortful thinking process (Kahneman, 2011). As 
such, visceral responses tend to dominate during decision-making (Loewenstein, 1996). The 
individual, as a result, will both rely on his or her affect-laden moral intuition to determine 
whether a potentially unethical action is acceptable and employ an affect heuristic to guide the 
decision-making process.   
Haidt (2001) contends that quick intuition often precedes moral judgment. This may be 
due to the affect heuristic. Kahneman (2011) argues that the affect heuristic is an instance of 
substitution where a more cognitively taxing question (e.g., what is the most ethical decision?) 
with an easier one (e.g., how would engaging in this action make me feel?). As such, how the 
individual feels towards the decision alternatives will determine whether ethical fading will 
occur (Chapter 2). 
Kahneman (2011) maintains that people are overconfident in their intuitions formed from 
automatic processes such as the affect heuristic. Thus, as reasoned from TUAB (Chapter 2) a 
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conscious, reasoned decision to forsake one’s ethics is not necessarily driving his or her 
unethical behavior. Instead, a person’s behavior in an ethical dilemma is more of an “emotional 
reflex” that is governed by biased and automatic cognitive processes. Consequently, if an 
unethical act may relieve any negative affect experienced in a particular dilemma, then the 
individual’s affect-laden intuition is likely to suggest that such an act is “good” or, at least, 
appropriate, in that it is the most emotionally attractive (Chapter 2). The desire to appease 
visceral impulses may result in ethical fading wherein the “moral colors of an ethical decision 
fade into bleached hues that are void of moral implications” (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004, p. 
224). Finally, TUAB (Chapter 2) postulates that the fading of ethical considerations in a dilemma 
increases the probability of one engaging in unethical behavior without the person’s awareness 
that he or she is doing so. 
Application of TUAB (Chapter 2) to inferior positions of income/wealth 
Gino and Pierce (2009) state that feelings of envy lower one’s job-related esteem which, 
in turn, motivates the person to rectify the situation. As such, envy can have a significant 
influence on an individual’s ethical behavior. Supporting this claim, Gino and Pierce (2009) 
discuss research that suggests one’s feelings of envy may lead to deception, decreased 
cooperation, and overt hostility (Brigham, Kelso, Jackson, & Smith, 1997; Duffy & Shaw, 2000; 
Feather, 1989, 1991; Moran & Schweitzer, 2008; Parks, Rumble, & Posey, 2002). However, 
research indicates that some form of ethical fading may play a key role in the link between envy 
and unethical behavior. Samnani et al.’s (2013) findings suggest that moral disengagement, a 
concept related to ethical fading, moderates the relationship between negative affect and 
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counterproductive work behaviors.
 10
 Additionally, a multilevel study of student teams indicates 
that envy has an indirect effect on social undermining through moral disengagement (Duffy, 
Scott, Shaw, Tepper & Aquino, 2012). 
Applying TUAB (Chapter 2), a manager who earns less than referent others will be 
motivated to reduce the envy created from social comparisons. As such, the manager will rely on 
his or her affect-laden moral intuition to determine whether a potentially unethical act is suitable 
and will utilize an affect heuristic to guide the decision making-process. The manager will then 
automatically substitute a difficult question (what is the ethical or proper action?) with an easier 
one (how would engaging in this behavior make me feel?). At this point, ethical fading has 
occurred since the manager is no longer considering the ethical implications of his or her 
decision. Thus, the third hypothesis is stated as: 
H3: Feelings of envy are positively related to the likelihood of ethical fading. 
There is a dearth of empirical research on ethical fading since it is a relatively new 
concept. However, studies on moral disengagement support the hypothesized link between 
ethical fading and unethical behavior. For example, Deter, Treviño, and Sweitzer’s (2008) results 
                                                 
10
 The distinction between moral disengagement and ethical fading has yet to be established to the best of the 
author’s knowledge. However, Moore, Detert, Treviño, Baker, & Mayer (2011) argue that Bandura (2002) 
conceptualizes moral disengagement as an individual trait wherein the propensity to employ mechanisms of 
disengagement vary across people. One may infer from this conceptualization that morally disengaging in an ethical 
scenario is a conscious strategy employed by the decision maker. Ethical fading, in contrast, is the effect of a 
subconscious process governed by biases inherent in all individuals. As such, there is not “conscious” decision to 
fade the implications from one’s decision.  
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suggest a positive relationship between moral disengagement and unethical decision-making. In 
addition, Moore, Detert, Treviño, Klebe, Baker, and Mayer (2012) utilized experimental and 
field procedures to examine the effect of moral disengagement on various types of unethical 
conduct within organizations. Moore et al. (2012) found that one’s propensity towards moral 
disengagement was a strong predictor of unethical behavior, such as the decision to engage in 
fraud, and more relevant than other antecedents of unethical behavior that are related to 
individual differences.  
Translating these concepts into the terminology of bounded ethicality, a manager who 
earns less than referent others will employ an affect heuristic where the envy produced by social 
comparisons of pay/wealth serve as the basis to guide his or her decision. Thus, the manager will 
automatically substitute a difficult question (what is the ethical or proper action?) with an easier 
one (how does choosing this particular option make me feel?). Ethical fading, at this point, has 
transpired whereupon the manager’s affect-laden intuition suggests the action that alleviates the 
envy experienced in this particular scenario is the most appropriate, including behavior 
considered unethical. When confronted with the opportunity to raise his or her compensation 
(i.e., acquire bonuses and/or stock options by meeting company goals) by engaging in financial 
statement fraud, a relatively lower-paid manager, as opposed to a higher-paid manager, is more 
likely to push beyond the acceptable boundaries of GAAP. This is because contravening GAAP 
would be the most emotionally appealing action since it adjusts for the manager’s perceived 
unfairness of his or her inferior pay, eases his or her feeling of envy, and upholds his or her sense 
of self-worth. As such, TUAB predicts the following: 
H4: Ethical fading is positively related to the likelihood of engaging in unethical 
behavior (i.e., fraud). 
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H5: The relationship between pay disparity and unethical behavior (i.e., fraud) is 
mediated by perceived unfairness.  
H6: The relationship between pay disparity and unethical behavior (i.e., fraud) is 
mediated by episodic envy. 
H7: The relationship between pay disparity and unethical behavior (i.e., fraud) is 
mediated by ethical fading. 
 
Methods 
The hypotheses were tested utilizing a 1 x 2 between-participants design. Random 
assignment directed the participants into one of two conditions consisting of a low-pay group 
(LPG) and a high-pay group (HPG). The experiment is a modified version of the procedure 
employed in Schwartz and Wallin (2002) where the participant’s task, across all groups, is to sell 
an “asset” to a computerized buyer. In brief, the participants had to decide how to disclose the 
quality of the asset and determine its price before selling it to the buyer.  Participants retained a 
percentage of the money received for the price at which an asset was sold. As such, there existed 
an incentive for the participants to misrepresent lower quality assets as higher in that selling 
assets disclosed as high quality could have resulted in a larger payout for them.  
Experimental Procedure 
What follows is a detailed explanation of the experimental procedure. The participants 
interfaced with a computer for all aspects of the experiments, except when receiving their cash 
payout from the experimenter. Figure 4 shows the chronological order of the procedure. 
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Step 1: Role assignment and instructions regarding experiment  
The experiment began with the participants being informed that they had been assigned 
the role of sellers with corresponding identification numbers. The study administrator then asked 
the participants what role they were assigned while shuffling through two sets of color-coded 
instructions. The purpose of this action was to intimate that other role assignments, such as a 
buyer, were possible.
11
 The instructions were then read aloud by the study administrator. First, 
the participants were advised to raise their hand if they had any questions regarding the 
instructions. The instructions then stated that the task, for 25 rounds, is to sell the assets to 
potential buyers. Next, the participants were told that they would be provided with information 
regarding the names, qualities, and value-ranges of assets to be sold to potential buyers. For 
example, the participants may be given an Epsilon asset of average quality with an assessed 
value between 400 to 500 Credits.
12
 In addition, they were notified that determining an asset’s 
quality and value-range is subjective.  
With respect to the asset-selling task, the instructions stated that the participants must 
determine both the price of the asset and how to disclose its quality before they are matched with 
a buyer. For example, if the participant is given an Epsilon asset of average quality with a value 
between 400 to 500 Credits, then he or she could change its “average quality” designation to 
                                                 
11
 An open-ended question was asked regarding the participants’ opinions as to where the sellers were located. Of 
the 75 individuals who participated, only 5 suggested that the buyers were part of a computer program. These 
participants’ responses were included in the analysis since the difference in the results between including and 
excluding their data was insignificant. 
12
 A Credit is a fictional currency. 
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“above average” if he or she feels that the assessment was inaccurate. The value-range of the 
asset moved in conjunction with any changes to the asset quality. As such, changing an asset of 
“average quality” to “above average” in the example above would have shifted the value-range 
from 400 to 500 Credits to 450 to 550 Credits. The participants were then instructed that they 
must determine a price, within the value-range, at which to sell the asset (e.g., 550 Credits). 
Finally, the participants were advised that the others taking part in this study did not have access 
to any information regarding their decisions about pricing an asset and disclosing its quality. 
The participants were subsequently advised that their offers could be declined. Next, the 
participants were told that the buyer could purchase an audit for any transaction immediately 
following the sale of an asset. Specifically, the instructions stated that all transactions could be 
subjected to an audit with variable success rates of detection. For example, the probability of a 
successful detection for a “poor quality” asset disclosed as “excellent quality” was higher than 
that same asset disclosed as “average quality.” Furthermore, the participants were informed that 
a successful audit, that is, one that detected a misrepresentation of quality, would result in a fine 
of 1000 Credits in addition to the relinquishment of any Credits gained from the previous 
transaction.   
The participants were then advised that they would be prompted to answer a question 
after the instructions are read and the response to this question could determine their rate of pay 
for the experiment. Next, the participants were informed that they would be asked to complete a 
survey after the 13
th round of transactions and finish a “word completion” exercise after the final 
round, for which additional Credits could be earned. The participants were also notified that any 
Credits earned from both the asset-selling task (minus any assessed penalties) and the word 
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completion exercise would be converted to US dollars and paid out upon completion of the 
experiment. The conversion rate of Credits to US dollars was not provided, but the participants 
were informed that the rate is positive.
13
 The participants were then told that they would be asked 
to write down their identification numbers, place them into an envelopes, and bring those 
envelopes to the experimenter for payment at the end of the study. Finally, the participants were 
asked to confirm that they understand the task and click the “Begin Task” link on the computer 
screen. A list of the instructions is located in Appendix C. 
Step 2: Group assignment and manipulation check  
Following the instructions, the participants were asked to select their preference for one 
of two given images (i.e., patterns of lines with no extrinsic meaning) and advised that this 
decision may play a role in determining their pay rate, and thus their potentials earnings, for the 
experiment. Before selecting one of the two images, however, the participants were prompted to 
click a box acknowledging that they understand the possible link between his or her preference 
and pay rate. The actual assignment to conditions was random. The participants were then routed 
to a new screen that provided their group assignment, which was either to the LPG or HPG. In 
addition, the participants were notified of their pay rate for the experiment. That is, for each 
successful transaction, those in the LPG would receive 25 percent of an asset’s sales price 
whereas those in the HPG would collect 50 percent. Finally, the participants were prompted to 
answer a manipulation question regarding their group assignment and rate of pay.  
                                                 
13
 The conversion rate was 1 Credit equals 0.005 US Dollars. 
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Step 3: Asset quality information  
The task of selling assets began as the participants were given information regarding the 
asset. In particular, they were provided its name, quality, and value range.
14
 For each round, the 
asset’s information was the same for all participants. In addition, there was a disclaimer stating 
that determining the asset’s actual quality and value-range is subjective. Furthermore, there was 
a header at the top of the screen showing the current round, the total amount of Credits the 
participant had earned, and the participant’s identification number and group assignment. This 
header was constant throughout the asset-selling task. Another icon showing the date, time, and 
the number of “buyers” online (a random number between 700 and 799) was also shown at the 
top of the screen throughout the asset-selling task. 
Step 4: Disclosing and pricing of asset  
Next, the participants had to decide how to disclose the value of the asset to a potential 
buyer and determine its price. Once finished, the participants were prompted to enter “the 
marketplace” to sell their asset. 
                                                 
14
 Each asset is named after a letter in the Greek alphabet (e.g., “Epsilon”). The letters Alpha, Beta, and Omega are 
not used as they may imply a position within a hierarchy or a value in relation to another. There are five quality 
designations, which are “poor,” “below average,” “average,” “above average,” and “excellent.” 
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Step 5: Sale of asset  
Once in the marketplace, the participants were told that Buyer X, with the X representing 
a random letter and three-digit number, either purchased or declined to buy the asset. The buyer 
was an algorithm within Qualtrics set to where each transaction has an 80 percent probability of 
success and, accordingly, a 20 percent chance of failure. It is important to note, however, that the 
participants were not told the buyer was an algorithm. In fact, no information was provided about 
the buyers. The intent with limiting the participants’ information regarding the buyer, along with 
establishing the possibility of an unsuccessful sale, was to create the impression that the sellers 
were transacting with a human counterpart. After each successful transaction, the participants’ 
balances were updated to reflect the Credits received from the sale of the asset. 
Step 6: Audit of transaction  
An algorithm determined whether an audit was conducted and, if so, its success in 
detecting a misrepresentation of an asset’s quality. The chance of an audit occurring was 25 
percent regardless of whether, and to what degree, the participants misrepresented their assets. 
However, if an audit transpired, then the degree to which the participant misreported the asset’s 
quality determined the likelihood of a successful detection. Specifically, the probability of 
detection increased by a constant 20 percent for each level of quality reported beyond that which 
was given. For example, if the participant was given an asset of poor quality and an audit 
followed its sale, then he or she would have faced a 20, 40, 60, or 80 percent probability of 
detection had the asset been disclosed as below average, average, above average, or excellent, 
respectively. Whether or not an audit did occur and, if so, its results were communicated to the 
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participants. The participants were informed about both the penalty (1000 Credits) they must pay 
and the loss of Credits from the previous transaction if an audit effectively detected a 
misrepresentation. Finally, the round ended after the participants’ earnings were updated to 
reflect any assessed penalty. Steps 3 through 6 were repeated for another 12 rounds. 
Step 7: Zodiac and Personality Survey  
After the 13
th
 round of transactions, the participants were informed that their accumulated 
Credits thus far place them in the top (HPG) or bottom tier (LPG) of earners, respectively.
15
 
Next, the computer prompted the participants to complete a variation of the Zodiac and 
Personality Survey utilized by Gino and Pierce (2009). This survey asked personality and 
demographic questions as a means of obfuscating the measures related to the participants’ 
feelings of envy, egocentric perceptions of unfairness, and ethical fading. The survey’s questions 
that were not related to envy, perceptions of fairness, and ethical fading are modified versions of 
those found in the Big Five personality instrument from John and Srivastava (1999). Consistent 
with Gino and Pierce (2009), the instructions provided basic information about the Zodiac and 
stated that research shows a relationship between one’s judgments and his or her sign. Finally, 
the participants were asked to indicate their Zodiac sign and then answer questions related to 
their personalities, preferences, and emotions. The Zodiac and Personality Survey is located in 
Appendix D.  
                                                 
15
 The prompt that the participants were given was independent of their actual performance. Those in the HPG were 
advised that they were in the high-tier of earners whereas those in the LPG were told that they were in the lower-tier. 
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Step 8: Resume the sale of assets  
Steps 3 through 6 are repeated for the remaining 12 rounds (rounds 14 through 25). 
Step 9: Word completion task 
After the 25
th
 and final round of transactions, the participants were instructed to finish a 
word completion task. The word completion task was employed to measure ethical fading. 
Consistent with prior studies (Gino, Schweitzer, Mead & Ariely, 2011; Shu, Mazar, Gino, 
Ariely, & Bazerman, 2012), the participants were provided with a list of eight word fragments, 
five of which could have been completed using words related to ethics. For example, the 
participants could have finished the fragment “TR_ _ _” with the word “trust.” However, the 
participants may also have used a neutral word such as “trunk.” The participants were advised to 
fill in the blanks using the first word that came to their mind and that no one answer was correct. 
In addition, the participants were informed that they would be awarded an additional 250 Credits 
for any completed word fragment. Finally, the words were presented individually for which the 
participants were provided with only 45 seconds to complete the fragment. The word completion 
task is listed in Appendix E.  
Step 10: Demographic data  
Upon finishing the word completion task, the participants responded to a questionnaire 
that captures demographic data such as gender, major, GPA, and the number of account-related 
courses each participant has taken. The demographic questionnaire is listed in Appendix F. 
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Step 11: Experiment ends and the participant is paid  
Upon finishing the word completion task, the participants were advised that the 
experiment had ended. The participants were then instructed to write down their selling numbers, 
place them into envelopes, and bring those envelopes to the experimenter for payment. Finally, 
the experimenter translated the earned Credits into US dollars and the participants were paid.   
Manipulated Variable 
There was one manipulated variable, pay rate. Random assignment directed each 
participant into one of two conditions consisting of a low-pay group (LPG) and a high-pay group 
(HPG). Participants were informed of both their group assignment and respective pay rate after 
responding to a prompt asking them to choose between one of two images consisting of different 
line patterns. Those in the HPG received 50 percent of an asset’s sales price whereas those in the 
LPG collected 25 percent. After the 13
th
 round of selling assets, the participants in both the HPG 
and LPG were informed that their accumulated Credits thus far place them in either the top or 
bottom tier of earners, respectively.  
Measured Variables 
There were four measured variables in this study, which are perceptions of unfairness, 
episodic envy, ethical fading, and fraud (misrepresentation). 
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Perceptions of unfairness  
Perceived unfairness was captured using a modified version of Smith, Parrott, Ozer, and 
Moniz’s (1994) Objective Injustice Beliefs Scale. The four items that comprise the scale are as 
follows:  
1. “An objective judge who knows the facts would agree that the people in the 
higher tier of earnings do not deserve those earnings.”  
2. “Anyone would agree the people in the higher tier of earnings had an advantage 
that was unfairly obtained.”  
3. “The people in the higher tier of earnings achieved their advantage through unjust 
actions or unjust procedures.”   
4. “An objective judge who knows the facts would agree that the people in the 
higher tier of earnings are there mostly due to luck.” 
The items were rated on the degree to which the participant agrees or disagrees with the 
situation, with the scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). A higher score 
indicates the participant perceived the situation as more unfair.   
Cohen-Charash and Mueller (2007) utilized a similar version of the Objective Injustice 
Beliefs scale. They argue that Smith et al.’s (1994) scale was developed explicitly to measure 
unfairness in situations involving envy. In addition, this scale operationalizes the “monistic 
view” of fairness (Cropanzano & Ambrose, 2001) in that it examines overall unfairness 
perceptions rather than a specific type (Cohen-Charash & Mueller, 2007). The items measuring 
overall unfairness perceptions were embedded within the Zodiac and Personality Survey.  
Episodic envy 
Episodic envy was measured using a modified version of the scale developed in Cohen-
Charash (2009). The seven items that constitute the measurement are as follows: 
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1. “I feel envious now.” 
2. “I feel bitter now.” 
3. “I feel irritated now.” 
4. “I feel resentful now.” 
5. “I lack some things others here have.” 
6. “I feel resentment toward those here who have more than I do.” 
7. “Others here have more things going better for him/her than I do.” 
The items were rated on the degree to which the participant agrees or disagrees with the 
situation, with the scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). A higher score 
indicates the participant was experiencing a higher degree of envy.  
 Gino and Pierce (2009) utilized a similar measurement of episodic envy. Cohen-Charash 
(2009) argues that episodic envy is composed of both a “feeling” component and a “comparison” 
component. As such, Cohen-Charash (2009) developed and validated the episodic envy measure 
across three studies. Questions 1 through 4 capture the feeling component of envy whereas 
questions 5 through 7 represent its comparison component. The items measuring envy are 
embedded within the Zodiac and Personality Survey. 
Ethical fading 
There were two separate ethical fading measurements. The first is a modified version of 
the one-item scale utilized in Kouchaki, Smith-Crowe, Brief, and Sousa (2013). An additional 
two measures were added for the purpose of creating a more robust measurement. The questions 
are as follows: 
1. “The decisions regarding how to represent the quality of the assets and determine 
their price in this task are primarily economic decisions.” 
2. “The decisions regarding how to represent the quality of the assets and determine 
their price in this task are primarily financial decisions.” 
3. “The decisions regarding how to represent the quality of the assets and determine 
their price in this task are primarily business decisions.” 
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The items were rated on the degree to which an individual agrees or disagrees with the scenarios, 
with the scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Kouchaki et al.’s (2013) 
adapted this measure from Tenbrunsel and Messick (1999) to capture how one frames his or her 
decision to lie in a deception game. If a person sees the decisions in this task as primarily 
economic in nature (i.e., adopts an economics frame), then it conceptually follows that ethical 
considerations have faded from his or her decision-making. As such, higher scores represent a 
higher degree of ethical fading. This first measure of ethical fading was contained within the 
Zodiac and Personality Survey. 
Ethical fading was also measured by the participants’ performances in a word completion 
task. The participant was given a list of eight word fragments, five of which might have been 
completed using words related to ethics. The participants were prompted to fill in the blanks 
using the first word that came to their minds and that no one answer is correct. In addition, the 
participants were informed that they would be awarded an additional 250 Credits for any 
completed word fragment. Finally, the words were presented separately and the participants were 
allowed only 45 seconds to complete the fragment. The eight words used in this experiment were 
as follows: 
1. “M O _ _ _” 
2. “V I _ _ _ _” 
3. “E T _ _ _ _ _” 
4. “H O _ _ _ _” 
5. “T R _ _ _” 
6. “R A _ _ _” 
7. “C H _ _ _ _” 
8. “B I _ _ _” 
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Word fragments 1 through 5 are words that can be completed using either an ethics-related word 
(e.g., “MORAL,” “VIRTUE,” “ETHICAL,” “HONEST,” and “TRUST”) or a neutral term (e.g., 
“MURAL,” “VIOLET,” “ETERNAL,” “HOUSES,” and “TRACK”). Fragments 6, 7, and 8, 
however, cannot be completed with an ethics-related word. A higher degree of ethical fading was 
represented by fewer uses of ethics-related words. 
 Several studies have utilized word completion tasks to measure “moral awareness” (e.g., 
Gino & Bazerman, 2009; Gino et al., 2011; and Shu et al., 2012). Gino et al. (2011) argue that 
the ethical implications of a situation are not salient when a person’s moral awareness is 
impaired. This is due to the individual’s difficulty in accessing the ethical decision-making script 
necessary to act honestly in situations involving the opportunity to cheat for money. As such, 
ethical constructs are less likely to be prominent in one’s mind when an ethical decision-making 
script is inaccessible. As reviewed in Gino and Bazerman (2009), research suggests that word 
completion exercises measure implicit cognitive processes (Bassili & Smith, 1986; Tulving, 
Schacter, & Stark, 1982). Thus, such exercises may function as an implicit measure of a person’s 
ability to retrieve ethical concepts.  
Fraud  
The participant’s decision to misrepresent the quality of the asset served as a proxy for 
his or her willingness to engage in fraudulent behavior. Fraud was measured by the frequency at 
which the participant misrepresented an asset in rounds fourteen through eighteen. The reason 
these particular rounds were used is because they follow the Zodiac and Personality Survey, 
which itself occurs immediately after the participant was informed that his or her accumulated 
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Credits thus far place them in the top (HPG) or bottom tier (LPG) of earners, respectively. 
Considering that emotions fade, the rounds immediately following the survey are when the 
feelings of the participant with respect to his or her earnings are the most intense.  
Control Variable 
 Gender was included as a control variable in this study. The reviews of the ethical 
decision-making literature indicate that the relationship between gender and ethical behavior is 
mixed (Craft, 2013; O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2005; Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008). As 
discussed in Tenbrunsel and Smith-Crowe (2008), some studies suggest that women make more 
ethical judgments (e.g., Reiss & Mitra, 1998), some, albeit fewer in number, show men making 
more ethical determinations (e.g., Weeks, Moore, McKinney, & Longenecker, 1999), and the 
others find no gender differences with respect to ethical decision-making (e.g., 
Abdolmohammadi, Read, & Scarbrough, 2003). O’Fallon and Butterfield (2005) conclude that 
the more recent literature has consistently failed to demonstrate any gender variations. However, 
they, along with Tenbrunsel and Smith-Crowe (2008), state that females tend to be more ethical 
than males when differences are found. Tenbrunsel and Smith-Crowe (2008) believe that gender 
does have an influence on ethical decision-making and argue that the inconsistent findings across 
studies may be the result of the differences between the contexts of those studies. As such, 
gender could have an impact on the decision to engage in fraud, especially when considering that 
men comprise the biggest percentage of those who commit fraud (ACFE, 2012).  
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Results 
First Analysis 
Participants 
 The participants were recruited from several upper-level, undergraduate business courses 
(e.g., Financial Management, Legal Environment of Business, and other core business classes) at 
a public university in the northeast United States. A total of 75 students participated in the 
experiment, which was carried out over two separate sessions. The participants, on average, 
spent 23 minutes completing the experiment and were paid a total of $6.15, which included a flat 
fee of $3 that was independent of their performance. The demographic data in Table 1 show that 
the sample consisted of 48 males (64.0 percent) and 27 females (36.0 percent). Several business 
majors were represented, with most of the participants identifying as either accounting or 
marketing students (28.0 percent and 20.0 percent, respectively). Finally, 57 students (76.0 
percent) reported their GPA as being at 3.0 or above. 
Manipulation check 
 After the participant’s assignment to either one of the two conditions (LPG or HPG), he 
or she was prompted to answer a manipulation check question regarding his or her group 
assignment. Specifically, the question asked the participant to which pay group he or she had 
been assigned based on his or her choice of pattern. All 75 participants passed the manipulation 
check.  
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Hypotheses testing 
 H1 predicts that a person who is paid less will see this disparity in pay as more unfair 
than one who is paid more. To test this hypothesis, an ANCOVA was conducted using Group as 
the predictor/independent variable (Coded as 0 = HPG, 1 = LPG), Perceived Unfairness as the 
outcome/dependent variable, and Gender as the lone covariate (Gender, coded as 0 = female, 1 = 
male). Since higher scores on the Perceived Unfairness questions indicate that the participant 
viewed the situation (i.e., the pay disparity) as more unfair, the LPG was expected to have a 
higher mean on this measure than the HPG. The results listed in Table 2 (Panel A) reveal that the 
LPG’s mean score for the Perceived Unfairness measure (Mean = 2.61, SD = 0.73) was higher 
than that of the HPG (Mean = 2.45, SD = 0.83). However, the results in Table 2 (Panel B) show 
that this difference was insignificant (p = .28).  Thus, H1 is not supported. 
 The remaining six hypotheses were tested utilizing the PROCESS add-in to SPSS. 
PROCESS is a statistical method that allows testing for “path analysis–based moderation and 
mediation analysis as well as their integration in the form of a conditional process model” 
(Hayes, 2013, p. 419). In particular, PROCESS has the ability to test serial multiple mediator 
models such as the theoretical framework in this chapter. In addition to its capacity to calculate 
the direct and indirect effects in mediation models, PROCESS can estimate unstandardized 
model coefficients, standards errors, t-values, p-values, and confidence intervals utilizing either 
OLS regression (for continuous outcomes) or maximum likelihood logistic regression (for 
dichotomous outcomes) (Hayes, 2013).  
 H2 posits that perceptions of unfairness regarding pay are positively related to feelings of 
envy. That is, one is expected to experience a higher degree of episodic envy if he or she views a 
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situation as more unfair than another. PROCESS was used to test this hypothesis with Group 
(Coded as 0 = HPG, 1 = LPG) as the predictor/independent variable, FCL5 (number of frauds 
committed in rounds 14 through 18) as the outcome/dependent variable, PU (perceived 
unfairness) as the first mediating variable, EE (episodic envy) as the second mediating variable, 
EFQ (ethical fading questions) as the third mediating variable, and Gender (gender, coded as 0 = 
female, 1 = male) as the single covariate. Similar to the interpretation of the PU measure, higher 
scores on the EE measure indicate a greater degree of episodic envy. As such, a positive 
coefficient was anticipated. The results in Table 3 (Panel A) indicate that when EE is designated 
as the outcome variable, its relationship with PU is positive (coeff. = 0.31) and significant (p < 
.05). Therefore, H2 is supported.  
 H3 postulates that feelings of envy because of pay disparity are positively related to the 
likelihood of ethical fading. More specifically, a person is expected to be less likely to consider 
the ethical implications of his or her decision if he or she is experiencing a greater degree of 
episodic envy than another. A positive coefficient is expected since higher mean scores on the 
EFQ questions suggest a greater degree of ethical fading. The results in Table 3 (Panel B) show 
that the relationship between EE and EFQ is positive (coeff. = 0.03), but not significant (p = 
.85), when EFQ is designated as the outcome variable. Thus, H3 is not supported. 
 Ethical fading was also measured by the participant’s performance on a word completion 
task (labeled EFW). As such, a second analysis was conducted substituting EFQ for EFW. Since 
the use of more ethics-related words indicates less ethical fading, EFW’s relationship with EE is 
expected to produce a negative coefficient. The results listed on Table 4 (Panel A) do reflect a 
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negative (coeff. = -0.06), but insignificant (p = .56), relationship. Thus, H3 is still not supported 
when EFW is employed as an alternative ethical fading measure. 
 H4 states that there is a positive relationship between ethical fading and unethical 
behavior. In other words, one who experiences a higher degree of ethical fading is predicted to 
be more likely to engage in fraud. As FCL5 captures the number of frauds the participant 
committed in rounds 14 through 18, its relationship with EFQ is expected to produce a positive 
coefficient. The results from Table 3 (Panel C) reflect that the relationship between EFQ and 
FCL5 is positive (coeff. = 0.25), but insignificant (p = .22), when FCL5 is specified as the 
outcome variable. Thus, H4 is not supported when EFQ is used as the ethical fading measure. 
When EFW is substituted for EFQ as presented in Table 4 (Panel B), the relationship between 
fraud and ethical fading is still not significant (p = .73). Although not hypothesized, it is 
interesting to note that Gend has a significant relationship with FLC5 (p < .05). The positive 
coefficient (coeff. = .81) indicates that men were more likely to misrepresent than women, which 
is consistent with the research that suggests women are more ethical when gender differences are 
present (see O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2005; Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008). 
H5 predicts that perceived unfairness mediates the relationship between pay disparity and 
unethical behavior. In more precise terms, a person who compares his or her pay to a higher-paid 
individual is anticipated to view the disparity as more unfair than one who compares his or her 
earnings to a lower-paid referent, thus increasing the probability of that individual engaging 
fraudulent behavior holding episodic envy and ethical fading constant. The results reported in 
Table 5 (Panel A) show that the indirect effect of pay disparity (Group) on unethical behavior 
(FCL5) through perceived unfairness (PU) is not statistically significant with the bootstrapped 
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confidence intervals ranging from a low of -.0096 to a high of .2515.
16
 Thus, H5 is not supported 
when EFQ is used as the ethical fading measure. When EFW is utilized as the ethical fading 
measure, the indirect effect (lower-level confidence interval = -.0122, upper-level confidence 
interval = .2485) is still not significant as can be seen in Table 6 (Panel A). 
H6 postulates that episodic envy mediates the relationship between pay disparity and 
unethical conduct. That is, the individual receiving less pay is expected to experience a more 
intense feeling of episodic envy and thus more likely to engage in fraud holding perceived 
unfairness and ethical fading constant. Table 5 (Panel B) indicates that, when EFQ is used as the 
ethical fading measure, the indirect effect of pay disparity (Group) on unethical behavior (FCL5) 
through episodic envy (EE) is not significantly different from zero (lower-level confidence 
interval = -.1555, upper-level confidence interval = .2222). H6 is therefore not supported. When 
EFW is designated as the ethical fading measure, as shown in Table 6 (Panel B), the indirect 
effect is still not significantly different from zero (lower-level confidence interval = -.0619, 
upper-level confidence interval = .0974). 
H7 states that ethical fading mediates the relationship between pay disparity and 
unethical action.  Specifically, when holding perceived unfairness and episodic envy constant, 
one who is paid less is predicted to experience a higher degree of ethical fading, which, in turn, 
makes him or her more likely to commit fraud. The results in Table 5 (Panel C) show that the 
indirect effect of pay disparity (Group) on unethical behavior (FCL5) through ethical fading 
                                                 
16
 Since the bootstrapped confidence intervals straddle zero, the indirect effects are not statistically significant 
(Hayes, 2013). The bootstrap analysis is bias-corrected and based on 10,000 samples. In addition, the intervals and 
are set to a confidence level of 90 percent.  
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(EPQ) is not statistically significant with the bootstrapped confidence intervals ranging from a 
low of -.0126 to a high of .2921. Thus, H6 is not supported when EFQ is specified as the ethical 
fading measure. The indirect effect is still not statistically significant from zero (lower-level 
confidence interval = -.0567, upper-level confidence interval = .0182) when EFW is designated 
as the ethical fading measure, as can be seen in Table 6 (Panel C). 
Second Analysis 
Participants  
A secondary analysis was conducted wherein those participants who identified 
themselves as accounting majors were removed. Martinov-Bennie & Mladenovic (2015) state 
that educators and professionals believe that ethical decision-making should be an essential 
component of an accounting student’s education, especially given the corporate scandals of the 
early 2000s (e.g., Enron), and thus support the inclusion of ethics-related materials into 
accounting curricula. They also discuss research that supports the idea that accounting students’ 
ethical judgments can be positively affected by interventions such as exposure to the AICPA’s 
code of ethics (e.g., Green & Weber, 1997) and the completion of a stand-alone ethics course 
(e.g., Cloninger & Selvarajan, 2010).  As such, one could argue that the emphasis on ethics in 
their curricula results in accounting students being more ethically sensitive, and thus more likely 
to behave ethically, than other business students whose respective curriculum does not have this 
emphasis.  
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 Research by Clikeman and Henning (2000) and Sweeney and Costello (2009) support the 
argument that accounting majors are more pre-disposed to act ethically than other business 
majors. Clikeman and Henning (2000) show that senior accounting students were more strongly 
opposed to questionable acts of earnings management than senior students from other business 
majors. More recently, Sweeney and Costello (2009) found that the ethical intentions and 
judgments of accounting students were significantly higher than those of non-accounting 
students across various scenarios. Clikeman and Henning’s (2000) argument for the 
“socialization” aspect of accounting education may explain these results. That is, accounting 
students are socialized to give “priority to financial statement users' needs, while students 
majoring in other business disciplines come to identify more closely with the goals of corporate 
managers” (Clikeman and Henning, 2000, p. 1). This argument is similar to Shaub’s (1994) 
claim that accounting curricula stresses a rule-based approach that is rooted in ethics. Thus, in 
light of the empirical evidence that supports the notion that accounting students are more 
inclined to act behave ethically than non-accounting students, the 21 participants (28 percent) 
who identified themselves as accounting majors were culled from the analysis.  
 The participants in this analysis, on average, spent 20 minutes completing the experiment 
and were paid a total of $6.21, which included a flat fee of $3 that was independent of their 
performance. The demographic data in Table 7 show that the sample consisted of 36 males (66.7 
percent) and 18 females (33.3 percent). Several business majors were represented, with most of 
the participants identifying as either marketing or finance students (27.8 percent and 16.7 
percent, respectively). Finally, 39 students (72.2 percent) reported their GPA as being at 3.0 or 
above.  
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Hypothesis testing 
 H1 predicts that a person who is paid less will see this disparity in pay as more unfair 
than one who is paid more. To test this hypothesis, an ANCOVA was conducted using Group as 
the predictor/independent variable (Coded as 0 = HPG, 1 = LPG), Perceived Unfairness as the 
outcome/dependent variable, and Gender as the lone covariate (Gender, coded as 0 = female, 1 = 
male). Since higher scores on the Perceived Unfairness questions indicate that the participant 
viewed the situation (i.e., the pay disparity) as more unfair, the LPG was expected to have a 
higher mean on this measure than the HPG. The results listed in Table 8(Panel A) reveal that the 
LPG’s mean score for the Perceived Unfairness measure (Mean = 2.81, SD = 0.63) was higher 
than that of the HPG (Mean = 2.38, SD = 0.80). The results in Table 8 (Panel B) also show that 
this difference was significant (p < .05).  Thus, H1 is supported. 
 Similar to the first analysis, the remaining six hypotheses were tested utilizing the 
PROCESS add-in to SPSS wherein Group (Coded as 0 = HPG, 1 = LPG) was the designated 
predictor/independent variable, FCL5 (number of frauds committed in rounds 14 through 18) the 
outcome/dependent variable, PU (perceived unfairness) the first mediating variable, EE (episodic 
envy) the second mediating variable, EFQ (ethical fading questions) the third mediating variable, 
and Gender (gender, coded as 0 = female, 1 = male) the single covariate. H2 posits that 
perceptions of unfairness regarding pay are positively related to feelings of envy. As with the 
interpretation of the PU measure, higher scores on the EE measure indicate a greater degree of 
episodic envy. As such, a positive coefficient was anticipated. The results in Table 9 (Panel A) 
indicate that when EE is designated as the outcome variable, its relationship with PU is positive 
(coeff. = 0.34) and significant (p < .05). Therefore, H2 is supported.  
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 H3 postulates that feelings of envy because of pay disparity are positively related to the 
likelihood of ethical fading. A positive coefficient is expected since higher mean scores on the 
EFG questions suggest a greater degree of ethical fading. The results in Table 9 (Panel B) show 
that the relationship between EE and EFQ is positive (coeff. = 0.34), but not significant (p = 
.30), when EFQ is designated as the outcome variable. Thus, H3 is not supported. 
 As with the first analysis, an alternate measure of ethical fading, EFW, was substituted 
for EFQ. Since the use of more ethics-related words indicates less ethical fading, EFW’s 
relationship with EE is expected to produce a negative coefficient. The results listed on Table 10 
(Panel A) do reflect a negative (coeff. = -0.64), but not significant (p = .55), relationship. Thus, 
H3 is still not supported when EFW is employed as an alternative ethical fading measure. 
 H4 states that there is a positive relationship between ethical fading and unethical 
behavior. In other words, one who experiences a higher degree of ethical fading is predicted to 
be more likely to engage in fraud. As FCL5 captures the number of frauds the participant 
committed in rounds 14 through 18, its relationship with EFQ is expected to produce a positive 
coefficient. The results from Table 9 (Panel C) reflect that the relationship between EFQ and 
FCL5 is positive (coeff. = 0.56) and significant (p < .05) when FCL5 is specified as the outcome 
variable. Thus, H4 is supported when EFQ is used as the ethical fading measure. However, when 
EFW is substituted for EFQ as presented in Table 10 (Panel B), the relationship between fraud 
and ethical fading is not significant (p = .92). Again, it is worth noting that Gend has a 
significant relationship with FLC5 (p < .01), with the positive coefficient (coeff. = 1.00) 
suggesting that men were more likely to misrepresent than women. 
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H5 predicts that perceived unfairness mediates the relationship between pay disparity and 
unethical behavior. The results reported in Table 11 (Panel A) show that the indirect effect of 
pay disparity (Group) on unethical behavior (FCL5) through perceived unfairness (PU) is 
statistically significant with the bootstrapped confidence intervals ranging from a low of .0280 to 
a high of .8793.
17
 Thus, H5 is supported when EFQ is used as the ethical fading measure. When 
EFW is utilized as the ethical fading measure, however, the indirect effect (lower-level 
confidence interval = -.0201, upper-level confidence interval = .5535) is not significant as can be 
seen in Table 12 (Panel A). 
H6 postulates that episodic envy mediates the relationship between pay disparity and 
unethical conduct. That is, the individual receiving less pay is expected to experience a more 
intense feeling of episodic envy and thus more likely to engage in fraud holding perceived 
unfairness and ethical fading constant. Table 11 (Panel B) indicates that, when EFQ is used as 
the ethical fading measure, the indirect effect of pay disparity (Group) on unethical behavior 
(FCL5) through episodic envy (EE) is not significantly different from zero (lower-level 
confidence interval = -.3328, upper-level confidence interval = .0414). H6 is therefore not 
supported. When EFW is designated as the ethical fading measure, as shown in Table 12 (Panel 
B), the indirect effect is still not significantly different from zero (lower-level confidence interval 
= -.2814, upper-level confidence interval = .0694). 
                                                 
17
 Since the bootstrapped confidence intervals do not straddle zero, the indirect effects are statistically significant 
(Hayes, 2013). The bootstrap analysis is bias-corrected and based on 10,000 samples. In addition, the intervals and 
are set to a confidence level of 90 percent.  
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H7 states that ethical fading mediates the relationship between pay disparity and 
unethical action. Specifically, when holding perceived unfairness and episodic envy constant, 
one who is paid less is predicted to experience a higher degree of ethical fading, which, in turn, 
makes him or her more likely to commit fraud. The results in Table 11 (Panel C) show that the 
indirect effect of pay disparity (Group) on unethical behavior (FCL5) through ethical fading 
(EPQ) is statistically significant with the bootstrapped confidence intervals ranging from a low 
of .0127 to a high of .6696. Thus, H6 is supported when EFQ is specified as the ethical fading 
measure. However, the indirect effect is not statistically significant from zero (lower-level 
confidence interval = -.1840, upper-level confidence interval = .2182) when EFW is designated 
as the ethical fading measure, as can be seen in Table 12 (Panel C).  
Supplemental Analysis 
 The lack of support for H3 and H6 could mean that key mediating and/or moderating 
variables were excluded from the model that, when included, might lead to significant indirect 
effects and would thus warrant episodic envy’s inclusion as an essential construct that mediates 
the relationship between pay disparity and fraud. Some of these potential mediating and/or 
moderating variables could be individual attributes that research has suggested as important to 
the decision-making process such as one’s creativity (e.g., Bierly, Kolodinsky, & Charette, 
2009), emotional intelligence (e.g., Deshpande, 2009), and religiosity (e.g., Tang & Chiu, 2003). 
Another individual characteristic of potential significance could be one’s preference for risk.  
 Most of the research in the ethical decision-making literature has focused on the 
individual’s perceptions of risks associated with alternative actions or situations (e.g., Cherry & 
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Fraedrich, 2002). As such, there is paucity of research that directly examines the influence of an 
individuals’ preference for risk on his or her ethical decision-making in a business context, 
especially his or her behavior related to misreporting. However, the impact of risk preference on 
decision-making, in general, has been studied extensively in the psychology and management 
literatures (e.g., Hung & Tangpong, 2012) and it should be expected to affect one’s ethical 
decisions in a business scenario. In particular, logic would dictate that one who is risk averse is 
less likely to experience ethical fading, and thus less likely to engage in fraud, than a person who 
is more risk seeking. Thus, risk preference could be a key variable that moderates that 
relationship between episodic envy and ethical fading. 
To test the possible moderating effect of risk preference on the relationship between 
episodic envy and ethical fading, a PROCESS analysis was conducted using the sample of 54 
participants from the second analysis that specified episodic envy (EE) as the predictor, risk 
preference (RP) as the mediator, EFQ (ethical fading questions) as the outcome, and Gender 
(Gend) as the single covariate. The risk preference measure comes from a question in the Zodiac 
and Personality that asks the participant’s general attitude towards risk. That question, “I enjoy 
taking risks,” is rated on the degree to which an individual agrees or disagrees with this 
statement, with the scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Thus, higher 
scores indicate the person is more risk seeking whereas lower scores suggest an aversion to risk.  
The results from the PROCESS analysis listed in Table 13 reflect that the effect of the 
interaction between risk preference (RP) and episodic envy (EE) on ethical fading (EFQ) is 
marginally significant (p = .06). As such, these results suggest that one’s preference for risk has a 
moderating effect on the relationship between episodic envy and ethical fading. More 
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specifically, Figure 5 shows that when episodic envy is high, those who are more risk neutral 
and risk seeking are more likely to experience ethical fading. When episodic envy is low, 
however, these differences among risk preferences are more muted. Thus, whether one ethically 
fades in response to episodic envy seems to be dependent on the individual’s risk preference. 
Discussion 
 Results from the first analysis indicate that perceptions of unfairness are positively 
related to feelings of envy. None of the other hypothesized relationships were supported, 
however. A second analysis was conducted wherein those participants who identified themselves 
as accounting students were extracted from the sample. Consistent with prior literature, the 
substantial change in the results between the two analyses suggests that the “socialization” aspect 
of their education makes accounting majors “different” from other business majors with respect 
to their ethical sensitivity and/or ethical decision-making (e.g., Clikeman & Henning, 2000; 
Sweeney & Costello, 2009). As such, removing accounting students from the sample pool was 
appropriate. 
The findings from the second analysis imply that an individual paid at a lower rate is 
more likely to perceive his or her situation as unfair, which leads to a greater feeling of envy. 
Although this feeling of envy had no significant effect on ethical fading, a supplemental analysis 
using the sample without the accounting students indicates that a person’s preference for risk 
may moderate this relationship. That is when envy is high, those who are more risk neutral and 
risk seeking, as opposed to risk averse, are more likely to experience ethical fading. Furthermore, 
the findings from the second analysis suggests that those who experience a higher degree of 
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ethical fading are more likely to engage in fraud, and that ethical fading, along with perceived 
unfairness, appear to be significant processes that explain how disparities in pay may lead to 
fraud.  
 There are three items to consider when interpreting the results. First, ethical fading was 
only significant as a predictor of fraud and as a mediator between pay disparity and fraud when it 
was measured utilizing questions about the participant’s framing of the decision (EPQ) rather 
than his or her responses to a word completion exercise (EFW). Since ethical fading is a 
relatively new construct, more research is needed regarding how to best measure it. The second 
consideration should be that, in the supplemental analysis, the moderating effect of risk 
preference on the relationship between episodic envy and ethical fading was tested independently 
from the overall model. When included in the model, the significance of one’s risk preference as 
a moderator may be reduced. Further theorization should be considered to understand the 
potential relationships among envy, individual characteristics such as risk preference, and ethical 
fading. The third, and final, consideration when interpreting these findings is the substantial 
change in the results when those participants who identified themselves as accounting students 
were removed from the sample. More research is needed to explore whether the inclusion of 
ethics related material in their curricula makes accounting students more “immune” to ethical 
fading. 
Conclusion 
 Financial statement fraud has received considerable attention among researchers, 
regulators, audit firms, and organizations since the corporate scandals of the late 1990s and early 
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2000s. Despite extensive organizational and legislative efforts aimed at its deterrence, however, 
financial misrepresentation appears to be on the rise (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011). The 
simplistic explanations offered as to one’s motivation for engaging in fraud and the nature of 
unethical acts itself may explain the failure to curtail incidents of misreporting thus far. That is, 
fraud is believed to be an intentional act by a manager who has sacrificed his or her ethics for 
personal gain. Contrary to this conceptualization, the demographic and anecdotal evidence 
supports the idea that most fraudsters are the “accidental” type who did not intend to act 
unethically yet somehow became entangled in a vicious cycle of concealing their actions (e.g., 
ACFE, 2012). As such, understanding financial statement fraud may require a more nuanced 
investigation into the psychological processes underlying a manager’s decision-making. 
Murphy and Dacin (2011) argue that environmental factors such as the pressure to meet 
earnings expectations of analysts may induce managers to commit fraud without knowing they 
are behaving unethically. This lack of awareness is perhaps the result of ethical fading, a 
mechanism where one’s inherent psychological constraints, such as biases or heuristics, fade any 
moral considerations from the decision-making process. Thus, research with the objective of 
identifying the psychological processes that lead to ethical fading, as well as the contextual 
factors that trigger those operations, can contribute towards implementing measures that are 
more effective at deterring and preventing accounting fraud. The purpose of this chapter is to 
investigate how a particular contextual factor, pay disparity among managers, influences 
egocentric perceptions of unfairness and envy to affect the likelihood of one engaging in ethical 
fading and fraudulent behavior. 
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Based on the Theory of Unintended Amoral Behavior (Chapter 2) it is predicted that a 
manager who compares his or her pay to one that is paid more will perceive this disparity as 
more unfair than a manager who compares his or her earnings to a lower-paid referent. 
Furthermore, it is hypothesized that this perception will produce feelings of envy, which in turn 
increases the likelihood of ethical fading, and thus fraudulent behavior, in the manager who is 
paid less. A 1 x 2, between-participants design, with pay rate as the manipulation, was utilized to 
test these predictions. The experiment required the participant to sell assets of given values to a 
computerized buyer whereupon he or she had the opportunity to misrepresent the quality of those 
assets prior to each transaction. The participants’ perceptions of unfairness, episodic envy, 
ethical fading, and rate of misrepresentation were measured during this experiment. 
The results suggest that a person paid at a lower rate is more likely to view this disparity 
as unfair, which leads to a greater feeling of envy. Although envy had no significant direct effect 
on ethical fading in the primary analyses, a supplemental analysis indicates that one’s preference 
for risk may moderate this relationship. Furthermore, the primary findings of this chapter 
indicate that those who experience a higher degree of ethical fading are more likely to engage in 
fraud, and that ethical fading, along with perceived unfairness, seem to be significant processes 
that explain how disparities in pay may lead to fraud. Ethical fading, however, was only 
significant as a predictor of fraud and as a mediator between pay disparity and fraud when one 
type of measure was used. 
As with any research, this chapter is not without its limitations. The first limitation of this 
chapter is that the above outlined results only held when accounting students were removed from 
the sample. The substantial change in the results between the two analyses suggests that the 
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“socialization” aspect of their education makes accounting majors “different” from other 
business majors with respect to their ethical sensitivity and/or ethical decision-making, which is 
consistent with other studies (e.g., Clikeman & Henning, 2000; Sweeney & Costello, 2009). 
Further inquiry is needed to determine whether the inclusion of ethics related material in their 
curricula makes accounting students more “immune” to ethical fading. 
The second limitation is that the sample is comprised exclusively of upper-level business 
students. The generalizability of the results generated from student samples has been 
controversial in that the studies examining the ethical decision-making of students compared to 
those of professionals has been mixed. One could argue that the education, experience, and 
socialization of professionals provide them with the cognitive tools and the motivation to behave 
more ethically than students. Conversely, Bazerman and Tenbrunsel (2011) argue that the 
psychological processes that inhibit ethical behavior are “ordinary” since they “affect even very 
honest and smart people, including managers, executives, and other professionals” (p. 45). 
Nevertheless, business students as a suitable proxy for experienced workers is an unresolved 
question that requires further empirical research.  
The third limitation of this chapter is that the ethical fading was only significant as a 
predictor of fraud and as a mediator between pay disparity and fraud when it was measured using 
questions about how the participant framed his or her decisions rather than his or her responses 
to a word completion exercise that has been used successfully in psychology studies. Two 
explanations that address the difference in the results produced by the two measures can be 
offered. The first reason is that business student may have not yet developed the language skills 
that are demanded by a word completion exercise. The second, and perhaps more legitimate 
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reason for the difference, is that the word completion exercise was completed after the 25
th
 round 
of selling assets as opposed to the alternate ethical fading measure which was closer in time to 
the questions regarding the participant’s perceptions of unfairness and feelings of envy. As with 
any new construct, how to best measure ethical fading is still unresolved and requires further 
research. 
The final limitation is that the moderating effect of risk preference on the relationship 
between episodic envy and ethical fading was analyzed apart from the overall model given the 
constraints of the data. When included in the model, the significance of one’s risk preference as a 
moderator may become muted. As such, additional theoretical consideration that includes risk 
preference is required to assess its suitability for incorporation into the TUAB (Chapter 2). 
Furthermore, future tests of the model may also try to incorporate other individual attributes that 
possibly have mediating or moderating effects. 
There are two key contributions of this chapter. First, this research identifies some of the 
psychological processes suggested by bounded ethicality that limit one’s ability to make an 
ethical decision as well as an important contextual factor that provokes those processes. Second, 
and probably most importantly, this chapter offers evidence that the decision to commit fraud is 
not necessarily a conscious compromise of one’s ethics for some other desired goal (e.g., profit). 
In addition, this research may also provide specific contributions to the auditing profession, 
organizations, regulators, and research.  
Regarding the auditing profession, an understanding of how certain contextual factors 
and psychological processes can lead to unethical behavior may result in improved fraud 
detection. Furthermore, given the subconscious nature of ethical fading, this research suggests 
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that auditors might re-evaluate the considerable weight they attach to management’s character 
and attitude when conducting fraud risk assessments. With respect to organizations, an 
understanding of bounded ethicality may allow organizations to design superior fraud controls 
aimed at mitigating the contextual factors that prompt ethical fading. In addition, an awareness of 
one’s own biases and heuristics may help managers be more psychologically adept in their 
ethical decision-making. This chapter also suggests that regulators recognize the difference 
between intentional corruption and unintentional bias, and the factors that drive such bias, if they 
are to establish effective legislation aimed at deterring fraud. Finally, this chapter contributes to 
research by both serving as an initial test of the TUAB (Chapter 2) and identifying a key 
contextual factor that constrains one’s ability to act ethically.  
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CHAPTER 4: CAN THE PRESSURE TO MEET EARNINGS EXPECTATIONS 
RESULT IN UNINTENTIONAL FINANCIAL FRAUD? (STUDY 3) 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine how a particular contextual factor, the pressure 
to meet earnings forecasts, may trigger psychology processes such as biases and negative affect 
that, in turn, influence the likelihood of one unknowingly engaging fraudulent behavior. The lack 
of awareness that one is behaving unethically is the result of a psychological mechanism of 
ethical fading wherein the person’s psychological constraints fade any moral considerations from 
the decision-making process (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004). Research indicates that 
environmental factors such as sanctioning systems (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999) can 
significantly influence ethical fading in an individual (Tenbrunsel et al., 2010). In the accounting 
ethics literature, Murphy and Dacin (2011) contend that the pressure to meet earnings 
expectations may influence managers to engage in financial statement fraud without their 
awareness that they are behaving unethically. 
Fraud has received considerable attention among regulators, organizations, audit firms, 
and researchers given its exorbitant costs to society. However, incidents of fraud have increased 
over the past decade (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011) despite legislative efforts, such as the 
passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), aimed at its deterrence and prevention. A 
significant factor as to why these efforts have been ineffective in curtailing fraud might stem 
from a basic, yet inaccurate, assumption regarding the ethical decision-making that underlies 
such behavior. Greed, or some other basic emotion such as fear, is commonly offered as an 
explanation as to why managers commit fraud. This explanation is perhaps too simple, however, 
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since there are many “aggressively acquisitive” individuals who never engage in this behavior 
(Duffield & Grabosky, 2001). Contrary to the notion of “predator” fraudsters who look to enrich 
themselves through the exploitation of weak accounting controls, the evidence indicates that 
“accidental fraudsters” perpetrate a larger number of frauds. As such, fraud may not be the result 
of an individual making the intentional decision to forsake his or her morals for some other 
desired goal. 
An accidental fraudster is characterized as a decent, law-abiding person who, under 
typical circumstances, would have never considered committing fraud (Dorminey, Fleming, 
Kranacher, & Riley, 2012). Data from the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (2012) 
suggest most individuals who commit fraud fit such a description in that they are trusted 
employees with clean employment histories and no prior criminal offenses. The former chief 
accountant for the SEC’s enforcement division, Charles Niemeier, explained that "[p]eople who 
never intend to do something wrong end up finding themselves in situations where they are 
almost forced to continue to commit fraud once they have started doing this. Otherwise, it will be 
revealed that they had used improper accounting in the earlier periods" (quoted from Bazerman, 
Loewenstein, & Moore, 2002, p. 100). Thus, understanding financial statement fraud may 
require a more nuanced investigation into the psychological processes that leads to a manager’s 
decision.  
Wyatt (2004) states that many of the FASB standards contain conceptual impurities that 
allow for “gaming the system” (p. 52). Supporting this claim, Xu, Taylor, and Dugan’s (2007) 
review of the earnings management literature suggests that managers “take advantage of the 
accounting discretion in GAAP to manipulate accruals through accounting choices and 
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estimates” (p. 195). However, as the line between “clever earnings management” and outright 
fraud is not necessarily distinct, a manager can be too aggressive in meeting these targets and 
engage in fraud without the awareness that he or she is acting unethically (Murphy & Dacin, 
2011). The effects of bounded ethicality and ethical fading can explain why some managers may 
unwittingly commit fraud in order to meet earnings expectations. 
The Theory of Unintended Amoral Behavior (Chapter 2, hereafter TUAB), which 
includes the concepts of bounded ethicality and ethical fading, is utilized to predict that a 
manager who falls below earnings forecasts will manufacture the egocentric perspective that 
unfair circumstances were the reason the target was not met. Furthermore, it is hypothesized that 
this egocentric perspective will elicit negative affect, which in turn increases the probability of 
ethical fading, and thus fraudulent behavior, in the manager who falls below earnings estimates. 
Finally, a prediction is made that those who are below, yet close, to an earnings target are more 
likely to commit fraud than managers who either have already reached the goal or are further 
from it. 
Two experiments utilizing an asset-selling task were conducted to test the predictions. 
Across 25 rounds, participants were required to sell an asset to a computerized buyer whereupon 
they could earn money on each successful transaction. Before each attempted sale, however, the 
participants had the opportunity to misrepresent the value of their assets in order to sell them at 
higher prices. Furthermore, the participants were advised that they could earn a bonus if a certain 
earnings target was reached. For Experiment 1, the independent variable was whether the 
participant, who was given one of three earnings goals (i.e., hard, moderate, easy), was above or 
below his or her respective goal after the penultimate round. Experiment 2 consisted of a 1 x 3 
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design where the independent, manipulated variable was the participant’s “closeness to goal” 
(i.e., reached, near, or far) before the final round of selling assets. The participants’ egocentric 
perceptions, negative affect, ethical fading, and fraudulent behavior were measured and/or 
observed across the two experiments. 
The primary findings of this chapter, although somewhat mixed, suggest that fraud is 
more likely to occur as an individual experiences a higher degree of ethical fading. In addition, 
the results indicate that those people who are closest to meeting an earnings target carry the 
highest probability of engaging in fraudulent behavior. Finally, the findings did not support the 
predictions that one’s egocentric perceptions of fairness and negative affect contribute towards 
his or her ethical behavior in a goal achievement setting. 
Research with the goal of identifying and examining the contextual factors responsible 
for ethical fading, as well as the psychological processes that underlie such an operation, can 
contribute towards implementing more effective fraud deterrence measures. As such, one of the 
main contributions of this chapter is that it identifies a psychological process suggested by 
bounded ethicality that limits one’s ability to make an ethical decision as well as an important 
contextual element that triggers those processes. That is, ethical fading may occur in response to 
the pressure placed on meeting earnings targets. Correspondingly, this chapter provides evidence 
that the decision to commit fraud is not necessarily a conscious trade-off between ethics and 
some other desired goal (e.g., profit). This research also provides specific contributions to the 
auditing profession, managers/organizations, regulators, and research.  
In regards to the auditing profession, an understanding of how certain contextual factors 
and psychological processes interact to influence unethical behavior may result in improved 
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fraud detection. In addition, given the subconscious nature of ethical fading, this research 
suggests that auditors reconsider the substantial weight they attach to management’s character 
and attitude when conducting fraud risk assessments. With respect to organizations and 
managers, knowledge of bounded ethicality may allow organizations to design superior fraud 
controls aimed at mitigating the contextual factors that influence ethical fading. Furthermore, 
understanding one’s own biases and heuristics may help managers be more psychologically 
prepared when confronted with the decision to engage in accounting fraud. This chapter also 
suggests to regulators that recognizing the difference between intentional corruption and 
unintentional bias, and the factors that influence such bias, is perhaps needed to establish more 
effective fraud deterrents. Finally, this chapter contributes to research by both serving as a test of 
TUAB (Chapter 2) and identifying a key contextual factor that limits one’s ability to act 
ethically.   
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of 
TUAB (Chapter 2) and develops hypotheses from that theory. Section 3 explains the 
experimental methods employed to test those hypotheses along with the manipulation and 
measurement of the variables. Section 4 analyzes the statistical results and Section 5 discusses 
the findings. Finally, Section 6 concludes the chapter and offers a discussion of the chapter’s 
limitations. 
Theory and Hypothesis Development 
 Individuals typically overestimate the extent to which they will engage in socially 
acceptable behaviors in the future (Epley & Dunning, 2000), perceive themselves as more ethical 
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than their peers (Tenbrunsel, 1998), and view a questionable act as less objectionable when it is 
performed by them as opposed to others (Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2007). In addition, research 
indicates that people often display “moral hypocrisy” in that they will present themselves as 
moral individuals while simultaneously behaving in a self-interested manner (Batson, 
Kobrynowicz, Dinnerstein, Kampf, & Wilson, 1997). The behavioral ethics literature offers a 
potential explanation, the concept of bounded ethicality, as to how one can violate his or her own 
moral standards while upholding the self-image that he or she is an ethical person.  
 Tenbrunsel et al. (2010) define bounded ethicality as the “systematic and predictable 
psychological processes that lead people to engage in ethically questionable behaviors that are 
inconsistent with their own preferred ethics” (p. 7). These processes are comprised of innate 
biases and heuristics that constrain ethical decision-making (Chugh, Bazerman, & Banaji, 2005). 
In-group favoritism, a tendency to overclaim credit, and implicit forms of prejudice are specific 
examples of biases that influence bounded ethicality (Banaji, Bazerman, & Chugh, 2003; 
Bazerman, 2011). As these psychological operations occur at a subconscious level (Gino, Moore, 
& Bazerman, 2011), the most pernicious aspect of bounded ethicality is it permits one to behave 
unethically without his or her awareness of doing so. This is accomplished through the 
mechanism of ethical fading wherein the person’s cognitive biases fade any moral considerations 
from decision-making (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004). 
 As usual with relatively new fields such as a behavioral ethics, theoretical frameworks 
are not very well defined (Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008). As such, Chapter 2 constructed a 
theory, TUAB, which incorporates the concepts of bounded ethicality and ethical fading, by 
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assembling disparate theories from psychology and behavioral ethics into a coherent whole. 
What follows is an overview of that theory. 
Distinction between the System 1 and System 2 Components of TUAB  
Kahneman (2011) differentiates between two modes of cognitive processing, which he 
termed System 1 and System 2 thinking. TUAB (Chapter 2) incorporates this distinction to 
explain how one may behave unethically under either system of thinking. What follows is a brief 
discussion regarding both the differences between System 1 and System 2 thinking and how they 
will be utilized in this chapter to make predictions about unethical behavior in relation to 
earnings targets.  
The primary goal of System 1 is to establish links among corresponding ideas of 
contexts, actions, and outcomes (Kahneman, 2011). These connections form a working model 
that allows one to make sense of his or her environment, form a narrative for that person’s 
experiences, and create future expectations. Kahneman (2011) describes System 1 thinking as 
automatic, intuitive, impulsive, effortless, and emotional. As such, System 1 assesses stimuli 
“automatically and quickly, with little or no effort and no sense of voluntary control” 
(Kahneman, 2011, p. 20). One’s intuitions of a situation therefore, are essentially the product of 
the primitive assessments carried out by System 1. These intuitions, however, are subject to 
systematic errors (i.e., cognitive biases and heuristics) that are embedded within System 1 and 
provoked under certain conditions (Kahneman, 2011). 
 The fundamental objective of System 2 is to oversee the intuitions, intentions, 
impressions, and emotions that are continuously suggested by System 1 (Kahneman, 2011). 
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System 2 thinking, in contrast to System 1, is characterized as deliberative and capable of 
reasoning and self-control (Kahneman, 2011). Furthermore, as it possesses the ability to resist 
the suggestions of System 1, System 2 is considered the final authority in decision-making and 
one who can utilize this mode of thinking can theoretically increase his or her chances of acting 
ethically (Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011). System 2 should not be thought of as a perfect model 
of rationality, however, due to its “laziness” (Kahneman, 2011).  That is, System 2 typically 
functions without exerting the effort required to weigh the ethical implications of a decision 
(Kahneman, 2011). System 2, instead, often just passively accepts the suggestions of System 1 
and, even when it is prompted to put forth more effort, will usually rationalize the emotions 
generated in System 1 (Kahneman, 2011). In addition, System 2 should not be thought of as a 
perfect model of rationality even when it is critically evaluating System 1’s intuitions due to its 
dependence on that system’s biased interpretation of contextual stimuli. 
 Kahneman’s (2011) dual-process conceptualization is supported across research from 
psychology (e.g., Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, & Eyre, 2007) and accounting (e.g., Farrell, Goh, 
& White, 2014). However, whether the majority of unethical behavior occurs under System 1 or 
System 2 is an empirical question that is beyond the scope of this chapter. Bazerman and 
Tenbrunsel (2011), however, contend that managers often rely on System 1 given the demands of 
their work environment. Thus, this chapter utilizes the System 1 component of TUAB (Chapter 
2) to make predictions regarding the relationships among earnings targets, biases, emotions, 
ethical fading, and fraud. If most unethical behavior actually does occur under System 2, then we 
would expect to observe the same emotions and biases activated as in System 1. The key 
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difference is that we would expect to see more cognitive effort in one’s decision-making under 
System 2.  
Overview of the System 1 Component of TUAB 
 TUAB (Chapter 2) states that quasi-static factors such as one’s organizational 
environment and other situational, or task-specific elements, trigger particular biases and 
heuristics. Egocentric biases that function to maintain a person’s sense of self-worth are 
particularly vulnerable to such contextual stimuli. The need to preserve one’s self-image may 
lead to a distorted interpretation of stimuli that favor a preferred outcome (Messick & Sentis, 
1983) and/or manufactures the perception that the solution which yields the highest benefits to 
him or her is the most “fair” (Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008). These primitive evaluations 
occur so rapidly, effortlessly, and automatically that the person’s interpretations of contextual 
information may not feel biased or distorted in any way (Bazerman & Banaji, 2004). 
 Contextual stimuli are not only interpreted in a biased, egocentric manner, but they can 
also elicit an emotional reaction (Slovic, 1999). In circumstances where threats to one’s ego 
produce negative affect, the person will be motivated to reduce such emotions quickly without 
utilizing a deliberate thought process (Kahneman, 2011). As such, if engaging in a questionable 
behavior alleviates negative affect, then the individual’s affect-laden intuition is likely to suggest 
that such an act is “good” or “appropriate” in that it is the most emotionally satisfying option.  
Thus, the person is inclined to depend on an “affect heuristic” wherein the negative emotions 
experienced serves as the basis for his or her judgment. The individual is then likely to substitute 
a more difficult question (what is the ethical or proper action?) with an easier one (would this 
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decision make me feel better?). Ethical fading occurs since the moral implications of the 
alternative decisions are not given any consideration, thus increasing the probability that the 
person behaves unethically. TUAB (Chapter 2) is represented by Figure 3. The remainder of this 
section elaborates upon this model and utilizes it to make predictions regarding the effects of not 
meeting earnings targets on a manager’s likelihood of committing financial statement fraud. 
Contextual Stimuli and Biases/Heuristics 
Environmental factors can and do influence a person’s ethical actions (Gino & Pierce, 
2009). TUAB (Chapter 2) contends that semi-static factors such as one’s organizational climate 
interacts with other task-specific or situational elements, such as time pressure, to provoke 
certain biases and heuristics. In turn, the elicitation of these mechanisms results in the person 
interpreting contextual stimuli not through his or her moral lens, but in a self-interested manner. 
A person’s ethical actions are influenced by the environment in which he or she operates (Gino 
& Pierce, 2009) 
Research indicates that individuals have difficulty interpreting stimuli in an unbiased 
manner (Babcock & Loewenstein, 1997; Diekmann, Samuels, Ross, & Bazerman, 1997). One’s 
assessments, and the subsequent weighting, of environmental information are governed by 
egocentric biases that function to preserve his or her sense of self-worth, such as the need to see 
him or herself as competent, moral, and deserving (Chugh, Bazerman, & Banaji, 2005). The need 
to maintain a high self-worth can distort the processing of stimuli in a way that supports a 
person’s preference for a particular outcome (Messick & Sentis, 1983) and/or manufactures the 
idea that the option yielding the highest benefits is the most “fair” (Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 
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2008). Since one evaluates information automatically and effortlessly (Epley & Caruso, 2004), 
that is, assesses the contextual stimuli on the basis of how those factors affect the person’s self-
worth, his or her perceptions may not feel biased or distorted in any way (Bazerman & Banaji, 
2004). 
Application of TUAB (Chapter 2) to Earnings Expectations 
Bargh and Chartrand (1999) state that the majority of one’s responses, that is, his or her 
judgments, behaviors, and decisions, to the environment are directed by how the person relates 
the available information to whatever goal he or she is currently pursuing. However, the 
motivation that drives goal or task-directed behavior may also elicit egocentric perspective 
taking (Wicklund & Steins, 1996), especially when an individual is making judgments related to 
the outcomes derived from such behavior. Beauregard and Dunning (2000) found that 
participants who “failed” an experimental task, an ego-threatening event, were more likely to 
judge a target's intelligence based on how that target's performance compared with their own 
than those individuals who did not fail the task.  Furthermore, Libby and Rennekamp’s (2012) 
results demonstrate that when an individual performs well, a positive outcome, he or she is likely 
to engage in self-attribution wherein he or she gives greater weight to internal factors rather than 
external ones as explanations for his or her performance. Evaluations regarding the fairness of 
goal outcomes (i.e., goal attainment or goal failure), along with the processes that lead to those 
outcomes, are also subject to egocentric interpretations. Supporting this claim, Blanthorne and 
Kaplan (2008) note that research across psychology (Epley & Caruso, 2004; Messick & Sentis, 
1979), organizational behavior (Neale & Bazerman, 1983; Thompson & Loewenstein, 1992), 
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and accounting (Kachelmeier & Towry, 2002; Kaplan, 2001; Luft & Libby, 1997) indicates that 
individuals have a tendency to display egocentric perceptions of fairness and ethics. 
Biases can be exaggerated under conditions of uncertainty (Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 
2011), which the interpretation of accounting standards can produce. As such, translating the 
above ideas into the terminology of bounded ethicality, the possible failure of not meeting 
earnings forecasts serves as a contextual factor that triggers the manager’s egocentric biases 
related to self-worth. One’s sense of both competency and deservingness as a manager may feel 
threatened if his or her company is unlikely to achieve these targets. However, if a manager is 
able to meet earnings expectations by pushing beyond the acceptable boundaries of GAAP, then 
he or she is likely to prefer such an option because of the desire to maintain his or her sense of 
self-worth. Accordingly, the manager will subconsciously search and place more emphasis on 
the evidence which supports the decision to violate GAAP while evaluating more critically, or 
completely discounting, the evidence which does not support that option. Moreover, as a means 
to further protect his or her self-worth, the manager will manufacture an egocentric perspective 
that he or she was placed at a disadvantage and the “fair” solution is the one that will yield the 
deserved benefits associated with meeting earnings targets. Thus, the first hypothesis is stated as: 
H1: A manager who falls below earnings expectations will display a higher 
degree of egocentrism regarding his or her perceptions of fairness than a 
manager that has already met earnings expectations. 
Biases/Heuristics and Affect-laden Intuition 
 Along with distorting a person’s perceptions and interpretations of stimuli, TUAB 
(Chapter 2) predicts that provoking egocentric biases related to self-worth will elicit negative 
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affect. When experiencing such emotions, the individual is motivated to diminish those feelings 
without engaging in a deliberate thought process (Kahneman, 2011). Thus, since visceral 
impulses typically dominate at the time one is making a decision (Loewenstein, 1996), the 
person may rely on his or her “affect-laden intuition” (i.e., gut feeling) to determine whether 
potentially unethical actions are suitable responses to a dilemma (Murphy & Dacin, 2011).  
Consequently, he or she will utilize an “affect heuristic,” a mental shortcut whereupon the 
person’s intuition, formed by the quick and automatic emotions that precede cognition, serves as 
the basis to guide his or her behaviors and/or decisions (Bazerman & Chugh, 2006; Finucane, 
Alkahami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000). 
Application of TUAB (Chapter 2) to Earnings Expectations 
Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; 1984) posits that outcomes that exceed a 
reference point are considered psychological gains and those below are losses. Experiencing a 
loss from falling below a reference point, or target, evokes strong, negative emotions 
(Kahneman, 2011). This is consistent with the Unfolding Emotion Episode Theory (Stein, 
Trabasso, & Liwag, 1993) which states that a change in the status of a valued goal will trigger 
emotional reactions (Cron, Slocum, VandeWalle, & Fu, 2005). Specifically, one who has 
expended some amount of effort to achieve a goal of personal importance will experience 
positive emotions when that goal is achieved. Conversely, not achieving that goal will elicit 
negative emotions. Aarts, Custers, and Holland (2007) point to literature (Carver & Scheier, 
1998; Higgins, 1998; Martin & Tesser, 1996) which suggests that failure events, such as goal 
disconfirmation, can trigger a variety of distinct, individual-dependent emotional reactions. As 
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discussed in Cron et al., (2005), these emotions can range from anger and sadness (Williams, 
Donovan, & Dodge, 2000) to general discomfort (Ilgen & Davis, 2000). In addition to the 
emotional response when one fails to achieve a target, Cohen-Charash and Spector (2001) argue 
that the person’s emotions are influenced by whether he or she views a particular outcome as 
fair. Research from the procedural justice literature supports this claim (e.g., Krehbiel & 
Cropanzano, 2000; Weiss, Suckow, & Cropanzano, 1999).  
In terms of bounded ethicality, earnings forecasts serve as a natural reference point for 
management (Murphy & Dacin, 2011) and not meeting them, along with the forfeiture of 
benefits (e.g., stock options) that are normally associated with reaching such goals, registers as a 
psychological loss for a manager. That is, not achieving the critical goal of meeting earnings 
targets, the contextual stimuli, suggests to the manager that he or she is not suited for a 
management position, thus producing negative affect. Additionally, the manager’s egocentrically 
manufactured perspective of having been placed in an unfair situation will elicit a negative 
emotional response. Thus, the second hypothesis is stated as: 
H2: Egocentric perceptions of fairness resulting from not meeting earnings 
expectations are positively related to the intensity of negative affect. 
Affect-laden Intuition, Ethical Fading, and Unethical Behavior 
 As discussed above, one involved in a dilemma will be motivated to reduce 
negative emotions promptly without engaging in a more effortful thought process 
(Kahneman, 2011). Thus, visceral responses tend to dominate during decision-making 
(Loewenstein, 1996). The individual will correspondingly rely on his or her affect-laden 
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moral intuition to determine whether a potentially unethical action is acceptable and 
employs an affect heuristic to guide decision-making. 
 Haidt (2001) argues that quick intuition often comes before moral judgment. This 
may be due to one’s reliance on an affect heuristic. Kahneman (2011) states that this 
heuristic is an instance of substation whereupon a more cognitively taxing question (what 
is the ethical or proper action?) is replaced with a less demanding one (would this 
decision make me feel better?).  Therefore, how the person feels towards the alternative 
decisions will determine whether he or she engages in ethical fading (Chapter 2).  
Individuals are overconfident and thus biased toward their intuitions formed from 
automatic processes such as the affect heuristic (Kahneman, 2011). As such, TUAB 
(Chapter 2) posits that a well-reasoned, conscious decision to forsake one’s ethics is not 
what necessarily drives behavior. Rather, a person’s actions in an ethical dilemma seem 
more like an “emotional reflex” that is controlled by automatic and biased cognitive 
mechanisms. Thus, if a potentially unethical behavior may diminish the negative affect 
experienced in a particular dilemma, then the individual’s affect-laden intuition is 
expected to suggest that such an act is “good” or, at minimum, “suitable,” since it is the 
most emotionally attractive. The desire to satisfy visceral impulses may result in ethical 
fading, an instance where the “moral colors of an ethical decision fade into bleached hues 
that are void of moral implications” (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004, p. 224). Finally, 
TUAB (Chapter 2) claims that the probability of one subconsciously engaging in 
unethical behavior increases under instances of ethical fading. 
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Application of TUAB (Chapter 2) to Earnings Expectations 
Barsky (2008) and Moore (2008) argue that moral disengagement, a concept 
related to ethical fading, may be a significant factor in organizational corruption.
18
 
Barsky’s (2008) theoretical model posits that certain attributes of goals and goal-setting 
practices can lead to unethical behavior through moral disengagement. Research also 
indicates that negative emotions are a significant moderator in the relationships among 
stimuli such as goal orientation, moral disengagement, and unethical behavior. In their 
examination regarding the role of negative emotion in moderating goal-priming effects, 
Aarts et al. (2007), identify research that suggests affective processes can influence one’s 
motivated actions without reaching his or her conscious awareness (Damasio, 1994; 
Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2003; Fazio, 2001; LeDoux, 1996; Zajonc, 1980). Furthermore, 
Samnani, Salamon, and Singh’s (2013) results suggest that moral disengagement 
moderates the relationship between negative emotions and counterproductive work 
behaviors. Finally, a multilevel study of student teams indicates that negative affect (i.e., 
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 The distinction between moral disengagement and ethical fading has yet to be established to the best of my 
knowledge. Moore, Detert, Treviño, Baker, & Mayer (2011), however, argue that Bandura (2002) conceptualizes 
moral disengagement as an individual trait wherein the inclination to use processes of disengagement vary across 
people. One can infer from this conceptualization that morally disengaging in an ethical dilemma is a conscious, 
deliberate strategy utilized by the decision maker. In contrast, ethical fading is the effect of a subconscious process 
determined by biases inherent in everyone. Thus, there is not “conscious” decision to fade the implications from 
one’s decision. 
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envy) has an indirect effect on social undermining through moral disengagement (Duffy, 
Scott, Shaw, Tepper & Aquino, 2012). 
Applying TUAB (Chapter 2), a manager is likely to depend on his or her affect-
laden intuition and thus utilize an affect heuristic wherein the negative emotions 
produced by not meeting earnings forecasts serve as the basis to guide his or her decision. 
Consequently, the manager automatically substitutes a difficult question (what is ethical 
or in accordance with GAAP?) with an easier one (how does choosing this particular 
option make me feel?). At this point, ethical fading has transpired. As such, the third 
hypothesis is stated as: 
H3: Negative affect resulting from not meeting an earnings target is positively 
related to the likelihood of ethical fading. 
 
Gino and Pierce (2009) argue that a person’s ethical actions are influenced by his 
or her environment. Quasi-static factors such as incentive systems (Flannery & May, 
2000; Hegarty & Sims, 1978; Schweitzer & Croson, 1999; Tenbrunsel, 1998; Treviño & 
Youngblood, 1990), norms and culture (Treviño, Butterfield, & McCabe, 1998), and 
codes of conduct (Cressey & Moore, 1983; Treviño & Youngblood, 1990; Weaver, 
Treviño, & Cochran, 1999) have been identified as organizational elements that affect 
ethical behavior within organizations (Gino & Pierce, 2009, Schweitzer, Ordóñez, & 
Douma, 2004). In addition, Kern and Chugh’s (2009) results indicate that situational, or 
task-specific, features such as time pressure may impel unethical conduct. Recently, the 
pernicious effects of organizational goal setting, in particular, have gained some attention 
in the management literature (Ordóñez, Schweitzer, Galinsky, and Bazerman, 2009). 
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Jensen (2003) claims that cheating and lying are natural consequences that arise 
when rewards are linked to the achievement of goals. Correspondingly, Barsky’s (2008) 
theoretical model postulates that goal setting can hinder ethical decision-making. The 
results of Schweitzer et al. (2004) support the contentions of Jensen (1993) and Barsky 
(2008). They found that individuals with unmet goals were more likely to engage in 
unethical behavior than those who were only advised to do their best. These results held 
even when there was no economic incentive attached to goal achievement. Furthermore, 
the findings of Schweitzer et al. (2004) suggest that the proximity to a goal is an 
important determinant of one’s behavior. They theorized that a person who is close to, as 
opposed to further away from, achieving a goal will incur higher psychological costs (in 
terms of negative emotions) if he or she fails to reach that goal and, as a result, is more 
inclined to behave unethically. Supporting this notion, Schweitzer et al. (2004) 
discovered that individuals who were closer to reaching a goal were more likely to 
overstate their performance than those who were more distant. The use of organizational 
goal setting has also been associated with falsifying financial reports (Degeorge, Patel, & 
Zeckhauser, 1999; Schweitzer et al., 2004).  
Kaplan, McElroy, Ravenscroft, and Shrader (2007) argue that the intense focus to 
meet earnings targets can lead to dysfunctional conduct, including the manipulation of 
recorded earnings (Hope, Thomas, & Vyas, 2013). As such, Meyers, Meyers, and 
Skinner (2006) state that a manager who is unwilling to report a decline in earnings per 
share (EPS) is compelled to engage in aggressive accounting choices, which, in the most 
severe cases, results in financial statement fraud. Myers et al. (2006) point to the ex post 
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evidence on fraud provided by studies of both SEC enforcement actions and earnings 
restatements as support for their claim. In addition, Bell and Carcello’s (2000) 
comparison of fraud to non-fraud companies indicates that management’s overemphasis 
on meeting earnings estimates increases the probability of fraudulent financial reporting. 
Soltani (2013), utilizing a qualitative, comparative analysis of three American (Enron, 
WorldCom, and HealthSouth) and three European organizations culpable of fraud 
(Parmalat, Royal Ahold, and Vivendi Universal), discovered that the management of 
these companies made increasingly aggressive estimates and made aggressive accounting 
choices to match those unrealistic analyst targets they helped promote. Finally, Boylan’s 
(2012) experimental results show that individuals with higher earnings targets produce 
larger errors in estimates of profitability and asset values, even despite financial 
incentives to produce the most accurate estimate possible and the absence of such 
incentives to manipulate those numbers. Boylan (2012) concludes “earnings targets 
affected managers' judgment about amounts to be reported in the financial statements, 
and led to sub-conscious biases that produced results causing managers' estimates to be 
erroneously correlated with external earnings targets” (p. 209, emphasis in original). This 
inference is consistent with Barsky’s (2008) model that theorizes moral disengagement as 
a moderating factor between goal setting and unethical behavior such as misreporting.  
Since ethical fading is a relatively new concept, there is a dearth of studies 
examining this mechanism. However, empirical research on moral disengagement 
supports the hypothesized link between ethical fading and unethical behavior. For 
example, Deter, Treviño, and Sweitzer’s (2008) results indicate a positive relationship 
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between moral disengagement and unethical decision-making. In addition, Moore et al., 
(2012) utilized both experimental and field settings to explore the effect of moral 
disengagement on various types of unethical conduct within organizations. Moore et al. 
(2012) found that one’s inclination towards moral disengagement is a strong predictor of 
unethical behavior, such as the decision to engage in fraud, and more significant than 
other antecedents of unethical actions that are related to individual differences.  
Translating these concepts into the terminology of bounded ethicality, a manager who 
falls below earnings forecasts will employ an affect heuristic where negative affect serves as the 
basis to guide his or her decision. As such, the manager will automatically substitute a difficult 
question (what is the ethical or proper action?) with an easier one (how does choosing this 
particular option make me feel?). Ethical fading, at this point, has transpired whereupon the 
manager’s affect-laden intuition suggests the act that quells any negative emotion in this 
particular scenario is the most appropriate, including behavior considered unethical. When 
confronted with the opportunity to meet earnings targets by engaging in financial statement 
fraud, a manager is likely to push beyond the acceptable boundaries of GAAP. This is because 
contravening GAAP would be the most emotionally appealing action since it adjusts for the 
manager’s negative emotions resulting from the perceived unfairness of the situations and the 
threatened sense of self-worth. Furthermore, managers who are the closest to meeting an 
earnings goal will incur the highest psychological costs (i.e., negative affect) if they fail to reach 
that target and will thus be the most likely individuals to engage in fraud. As such, TUAB 
predicts the following: 
H4: Ethical fading is positively related to the likelihood of engaging in unethical 
behavior (i.e., fraud). 
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H5: A manager that has not met earnings expectations is more likely to engage in 
unethical behavior (i.e., financial statement fraud) than one that has already 
met those expectations. 
 
H6: A manager that is close to meeting earnings expectations, but still below that 
target, is more likely to engage in unethical behavior (i.e., fraud) than one 
that either is further from the target or has already met the target.   
Methods 
Two experiments were conducted to test the hypotheses. Experiment 1 was designed to 
test H1 through H5 whereas Experiment 2 was devised to test H6. Both experiments consisted of 
modified versions of the procedures employed in Schwartz and Wallin (2002) wherein the 
participant’s task, across all groups, was to sell an “asset” to a computerized buyer. In sum, the 
participants had to determine both how to disclose the quality of an asset and its price before 
each attempted sale. Since the participants would earn money from each successful transaction, 
there existed an incentive for them to misrepresent lower quality assets as higher in that selling 
assets disclosed as high quality could have resulted in larger payouts. The misrepresentation of 
an asset’s quality served as a proxy for one’s willingness to manipulate financial statements. 
Furthermore, across both studies, the participants were advised that they could earn a bonus if a 
certain earnings goal was attained. For Experiment 1, the independent variable was whether the 
participant, who was provided one of three earnings goals (i.e., hard, moderate, easy), was above 
or below his or her respective goal after the penultimate round. Experiment 2 consisted of a 1 x 3 
design where the independent, manipulated variable was the participant’s “closeness to goal” 
(i.e., reached, near, or far) before the final round of selling assets.   
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Experiment 1 
Experimental Procedure 
What follows is a detailed explanation of the experimental procedure. The participants 
interfaced with a computer for all aspects of the experiment except when receiving the task 
instructions and collecting their cash payout from the study administrator. Figure 6 shows the 
chronological order of the procedure. 
Step 1: Role assignment and Instructions Regarding Experiment 
The experiment began with informing the participants that they had been assigned the 
role of sellers with corresponding identification numbers. The study administrator then asked the 
participants what role they had been given while reviewing two sets of color-coded instructions. 
The purpose of this action was to intimate that other roles, such as a buyer, were possible.
19
 The 
study administrator then read the instructions aloud to the participants. First, the participants 
were asked to raise their hand if there were any questions about the instructions. Next, the 
participants were notified they would be provided with information regarding the names, 
qualities, and value-ranges of assets to be sold. The instructions then advised the participants that 
their task, for 25 rounds, is to sell the assets in an online marketplace. 
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 An open-ended question, across both experiments, was asked regarding the participants’ opinions as to where the 
sellers were located. Of the 90 individuals who participated in Experiment 1, only 2 suggested that the buyers were 
part of a computer program. For Experiment 2, this belief was shared by five of the 82 participants.  These 
participants’ responses were included in the analysis since the difference in the results between including and 
excluding their data was insignificant. 
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 In regards to selling assets, the instructions stated that the participants must determine 
both the price of each asset and how to disclose its quality before entering the marketplace. For 
example, if a participant is given an Epsilon asset of average quality with a value between 400 to 
500 Credits
20, then he or she could change its “average quality” designation to “above average” 
if he or she feels that the original estimate was inaccurate. The value-range of the asset moved in 
relation with any changes to an asset’s quality. As such, changing an asset of “average quality” 
to “above average” in the example above would have shifted the value-range from 400 to 500 
Credits to 450 to 550 Credits. The participants were then informed that they must determine a 
price, within the value-range, at which to sell each asset (e.g., 550 Credits).  Finally, with respect 
to the asset-selling task, the participants were advised that the others in this study did not have 
access to any information regarding their decisions on pricing and disclosing the assets, that any 
offer could be declined, and that more Credits could be earned by selling assets with higher 
disclosed values. 
Next, the participants were told that an audit, with a variable success rate of detection, 
may occur following the sale of each asset. For example, the probability of a successful detection 
for a “poor quality” asset disclosed as “excellent quality” was higher than that same asset 
disclosed as “average quality.” Furthermore, the participants were informed that a successful 
audit, that is, where a misrepresentation is detected, would result in a fine of 2000 Credits and 
that they would lose any Credits gained from the previous transaction. The participants were then 
advised that they would be awarded a 3,000-Credit bonus if a particular number of earned 
Credits is reached. Furthermore, the participants were notified that this target, which will be 
                                                 
20
 A Credit is a fictional currency used in both experiments. 
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provided to them later in the study, is believed to be reasonable and has been derived so that 
most individuals are awarded the bonus.  
The participants were subsequently informed that, after the 24
th
 round, they would be 
updated on their respective progress towards meeting the earned Credits necessary to receive the 
bonus and, following this update, will be asked to complete a survey. The instructions then stated 
that the participants would be prompted to engage in a “word completion’ exercise, for which 
additional Credits could be earned, after the final round. The participants were also notified that 
any Credits earned from both the asset-selling task (minus any assessed penalties) and the word 
completion exercise would be converted to US dollars and paid out upon completion of the 
experiment. The conversion rate of Credits to US dollars was not provided, but the participants 
were told that the rate is positive.
21
 The participants were then advised that they would be 
prompted to write down their identification numbers, place them in envelopes, and bring those 
envelopes to the experimenter for payment at the end of the study. Finally, the participants were 
asked to confirm that they understand the task and click the “Begin Task” link on the computer 
screen. A list of the instructions is located in Appendix A. 
Step 2: Group Assignment and Earnings Target 
Upon finishing Step 1, the participants were randomly assigned to either the “easy target” 
group (ETG), the “moderately difficult target” group (MDTG), or the “difficult target” group 
(DTG) and provided with the earnings target (8,000, 12,000, or 16,000 Credits for the ETG, 
MDTG, and DTG, respectively) required to receive the bonus.  
                                                 
21
 The conversion rate was 1 Credit = 0.0002 US Dollars. 
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Step 3: Asset Quality Information 
The task of selling assets began as the participants were provided information about the 
asset. In particular, they were given an asset’s name, quality, and value range.22 For each round, 
the asset’s information was the same for all participants. In addition, there was a disclaimer 
stating that determining the asset’s actual quality and value-range is subjective. Furthermore, 
there was a header at the top of the screen showing the current round, the total amount of Credits 
the participant had earned, his or her identification number and his or her respective earnings 
target. This header was constant throughout the asset-selling task. Another icon showing the 
date, time, and the number of “buyers” online (a random number between 700 and 799) was also 
shown at the top of the screen throughout the asset-selling task. 
Step 4: Disclosing and Pricing of Asset 
The participants then had to decide how to disclose the value of the asset to the 
marketplace. Once finished, the participants were prompted to enter the marketplace to sell their 
asset.   
                                                 
22
 Each asset is named after a letter in the Greek alphabet (e.g., “Epsilon”). The letters Alpha, Beta, and Omega are 
not used as they may imply a position within a hierarchy or a value in relation to another. There are five quality 
designations, which are “poor,” “below average,” “average,” “above average,” and “excellent.” 
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Step 5: Sale of Asset 
Once in the marketplace, the participants were advised that Buyer “X”, with the X 
representing a random letter and three-digit number, either purchased or declined to buy the 
assets. The buyer was an algorithm with Qualtrics set to where each transaction has an 80 
percent probability of success and, accordingly, a 20 percent chance of failure. It is important to 
note, however, that the participants were not told the buyer was an algorithm. In fact, no 
information was provided about the buyers throughout the experiment. The intent of not 
providing buyer information to the participants, along with establishing the possibility of an 
unsuccessful sale, was to create the impression that the sellers were transacting with other 
individuals. After each successful transaction, the participants’ balances were updated to reflect 
the Credits received from any successful transaction. 
Step 6: Audit of Transaction 
An algorithm determined whether an audit was conducted and, if so, its success in having 
detected a misrepresentation of an asset’s quality. The chance of an audit occurring was 25 
percent regardless of whether, or to what degree, the participant misrepresented the asset. If an 
audit did occur, however, then the degree to which the participant misreported the asset’s quality 
determined the probability of a successful detection. Specifically, the probability of detection 
increased by a constant 20 percent for each level of quality reported above that which was given. 
For example, if an audit occurred in which the participant sold an asset with a “poor quality” 
designation, then he or she would have faced a 20, 40, 60, or 80 percent probability of detection 
had the asset been disclosed as below average, average, above average, or excellent, respectively. 
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Whether or not an audit was conducted and, if so, its results were communicated to the 
participants. Furthermore, the participants were informed about any penalties levied (2000 
Credits) from any audits that successfully detected a misrepresentation of quality. Finally, the 
round ended after the participants’ earnings were updated to reflect any assessed penalty. Steps 3 
through 6 were repeated for another 23 rounds. 
Step 7: Update of Progress towards Earnings Target 
After the 24
th
 round of selling assets, the participants were updated on their respective 
progress towards meeting the earnings benchmark required to receive a bonus. The participants 
were then provided with the information of the asset to be sold in the final round (25
th
 round). 
Finally, the participants were prompted to answer a manipulation check question. This question 
required the participants to indicate whether they had met the earnings target required for the 
bonus. 
Step 8: Zodiac and Personality Survey 
The participants were then prompted to complete a variation of the Zodiac and 
Personality Survey utilized by Gino and Pierce (2009). This survey asked personality and 
demographic questions as a means of obfuscating the measures related to the participants’ 
egocentric perceptions of fairness, negative affect, and ethical fading. The survey’s questions 
that were not related to these measures were modified versions of those found in the Big Five 
personality instrument from John and Srivastava (1999). Consistent with Gino and Pierce (2009), 
the instructions provided basic information about the Zodiac and stated that research shows a 
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relationship between one’s judgments and his or her sign. Finally, the participants were asked to 
indicate their Zodiac sign and then answer questions related to their personality, preferences, and 
emotions. The Zodiac and Personality Survey is located in Appendix B. 
Step 9: Resume the Sale of Assets 
Steps 3 through 6 were repeated for the 25
th
 and final round. 
Step 10: Word Completion Task 
After the 25
th
 round of transactions, the participants were instructed to finish a word 
completion task, which served as another measure of ethical fading. Similar to prior studies 
(Gino, Schweitzer, Mead & Ariely, 2011; Shu, Mazar, Gino, Ariely, & Bazerman, 2012), the 
participants were provided with a list of word fragments (a total of eight) of which some (five of 
the eight fragments) could be completed using words related to ethics. For example, the 
participants could have finished the fragment “E T _ _ _ _ _” with the word “ethical.” However, 
the participants could have also use a neutral word, such as “eternal,” to complete the fragment. 
The participants were advised to fill in the blanks using the first word that came to their mind 
and that no one answer was correct. In addition, the participants were informed that an additional 
250 Credits could be earned for any completed word fragment. Finally, the words were presented 
individually for which the participants were allowed 45 seconds to complete the fragment. The 
word completion task is listed in Appendix C. 
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Step 11: Demographic Data 
After finishing the word completion task, the participants completed a questionnaire that 
captured demographic data such as gender, undergraduate major, GPA, and the number of 
accounting-related courses taken thus far. The demographic questionnaire is listed in Appendix 
D. 
Step 12: Experiment Ends and the Participant is Paid 
Upon finishing the word completion task, the participants were informed that the 
experiment was over. The participants were then instructed to write down their respective 
identification numbers, place them into envelopes, and bring those envelopes to the experimenter 
for payment. Finally, the experimenter translated the earned Credits into US dollars and the 
participants were paid.   
Independent Variable 
Random assignment directed each participant into either the “easy target” group 
(ETG), the “moderately difficult target” group (MDTG), or the “difficult target” group 
(DTG). The earnings goal needed to acquire the bonus varied across the three groups, 
established at 8,000, 12,000, and 16,000 Credits for the ETG, MDTG, and DTG, 
respectively. These benchmarks were derived so that approximately half of the 
participants would, based on their “natural” performance, finish below their respective 
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earnings target whereas the other half would reach their goal.
 23
  As such, the independent 
variable was whether the participant was above (ATG) or below his or her respective 
target (BTG) after the penultimate round of selling assets (Round 24).  
Measured Variables 
There were four measured variables in this experiment: egocentric perceptions of 
fairness, negative affect, ethical fading, and fraud. These four measures along with control 
variables are discussed in the following sub-sections. 
Egocentric Perceptions of Fairness 
Egocentric perceptions of fairness regarding meeting or not meeting the earnings 
benchmark was captured using modified versions of the questions used in Gelfand et al. (2002). 
Participants were first asked to rate how fair, trustworthy, and honest they had been during the 
task. Those three questions are as follows: 
1. “Overall, I would rate the fairness of my actions in the marketplace as…”  
2. “Overall, I would rate the trustworthiness of my actions in the marketplace as…”  
3. “Overall, I would rate the honesty of my actions in the marketplace as…”  
 
The participants were then asked to rate how fair, trustworthy, and honest they believe the other 
participants were during the task. Those three questions: 
1. “Overall, I would rate the fairness of others’ actions in the marketplace as…”  
2. “Overall, I would rate the trustworthiness of others’ actions in the marketplace 
as…”  
                                                 
23
 The different levels of earnings targets were derived from pilot testing.  
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3. “Overall, I would rate the honesty of others’ actions in the marketplace as…”  
 
The scales ranged from 1 (very unfair/untrustworthy/dishonest) to 5 (very 
fair/trustworthy/honest). Consistent with Gelfand et al. (2002) and Messick, Bloom, Boldizar, 
and Samuelson (1985), an overall measure of self-serving bias is derived by subtracting the 
participant’s average estimation of others’ fairness, trustworthiness, and honesty from their own. 
Thus, a positive score reflects the degree to which the participant held egocentric perceptions of 
fairness. The items measuring perceived fairness were embedded within the Zodiac and 
Personality Survey. 
Negative Affect 
Negative affect was measured using a modified version of the scale utilized in Cron, 
Slocum, VandeWalle, Fu (2005). The ten items that constitute the measurement are as follows: 
 
1. “Because of my performance, I feel angry now.” 
2. “Because of my performance, I feel frustrated now.” 
3. “Because of my performance, I feel guilt now.” 
4. “Because of my performance, I feel shame now.” 
5. “Because of my performance, I feel sad now.” 
6. “Because of my performance, I feel disappointed now.” 
7. “Because of my performance, I feel depressed now.” 
8. “Because of my performance, I feel worried now.” 
9. “Because of my performance, I feel uncomfortable now.” 
10. “Because of my performance, I feel fearful now.” 
 
The items were rated on the degree to which the participant agrees or disagrees with the 
situation, with the scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The scores 
across all ten items were averaged. A higher score indicates the participant is experiencing a 
higher degree of general, negative affect. 
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Cron et al.’s (2005) measure of negative affect is based on a segment from Bagozzi and 
Pieters’ (1998) instrument of goal-directed emotional reactions. As discussed in Cron et al. 
(2005), this measure has been used in several goal-setting studies (Brown, Cron, & Slocum, 
1997; Huy, 2002; Perugini & Bagozzi, 2001; Perugini & Conner, 2000). This measure is argued 
to capture appropriate goal-directed emotions (Cron et al, 2005), which focus on “event-based” 
and “agent-based” reactions (Huy, 2002). Cron et al. (2005) explain that an event-based emotion 
is a reaction to an event, or outcome, that is evaluated based on the implications regarding the 
attainment of one’s goal. An agent-based emotion is a response to the actions of an agent, which 
can include the self, in the form of a judgment of praiseworthiness or blameworthiness. The 
items measuring negative affect were embedded within the Zodiac and Personality Survey. 
Ethical Fading 
There were two separate ethical fading measurements. The first is a modified version of 
the one-item scale employed in Kouchaki, Smith-Crowe, Brief, and Sousa (2013). An additional 
two measures were added to create a more robust measurement. The questions are as follows: 
 
1. “The decisions regarding how to represent the quality of the assets and determine 
their price in this task are primarily economic decisions.” 
2. “The decisions regarding how to represent the quality of the assets and determine 
their price in this task are primarily financial decisions.” 
3. “The decisions regarding how to represent the quality of the assets and determine 
their price in this task are primarily business decisions.” 
 
The items are rated on the degree to which the participant agrees or disagrees with the situation, 
with the scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Kouchaki et al.’s (2013) 
adapted this measure from Tenbrunsel and Messick (1999) to capture the participant’s framing of 
  
 169 
his or her decision on whether to lie for money in a deception game. Conceptually, if one sees 
the decisions in this task as primarily financial in nature (i.e., adopts an economics frame), then it 
follows that ethical considerations have faded from his or her decision-making. Thus, higher 
scores represent a higher degree of ethical fading. This first measure of ethical fading was 
embedded within the Zodiac and Personality Survey. 
Ethical fading was also measured with the participant’s performance on a word 
completion task. The participant was provided with a list of eight word fragments, five of which 
may be completed using words related to ethics. The participant was asked to fill in the blanks 
using the first word that came to his or her mind and that no single answer was correct. In 
addition, the participant was informed that he or she would be awarded an additional 250 Credits 
for any completed word fragment. Finally, the words were presented individually for which the 
participant was provided with only 45 seconds to complete the fragment. The eight words 
utilized in this experiment were as follows: 
1.  “M O _ _ _” 
2. “V I _ _ _ _” 
3. “E T _ _ _ _ _” 
4. “H O _ _ _ _” 
5. “T R _ _ _” 
6. “R A _ _ _” 
7. “C H _ _ _ _” 
8. “B I _ _ _” 
 
Word fragments 1 through 5 represent words that can be completed using either an ethics-related 
word (e.g., “MORAL,” “VIRTUE,” “ETHICAL,” “HONEST,” and “TRUST”) or a neutral term 
(e.g., “MOTEL,” “VISION,” “ETERNAL,” “HORSES,” and “TRAIN”). Fragments 6, 7, and 8, 
however, cannot be completed with an ethics-related word. A higher degree of ethical fading is 
represented by fewer uses of ethics-related words. 
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 The use of word completion tasks to measure “moral awareness” has been used in several 
studies (e.g., Gino & Bazerman, 2009; Gino et al., 2011; and Shu et al., 2012). Gino et al. (2011) 
contend that one fails to recognize the ethical component of a situation when his or her moral 
awareness is impaired. This failure renders the individual unable to access the ethical decision-
making script required to act honestly in scenarios where he or she may cheat to earn money. 
Thus, ethical constructs are less likely to be salient in a person’s mind when an ethical decision-
making script is inaccessible. As discussed in Gino and Bazerman (2009), research suggests that 
word completion exercises assess implicit cognitive processes (Bassili & Smith, 1986; Tulving, 
Schacter, & Stark, 1982). As such, a word completion task where the fragments can be 
completed using terms related to ethics may function as an implicit measure of one’s ability to 
retrieve ethical concepts.  
Fraud 
The participant’s decision to misrepresent the quality of the asset in the final round 
served as a measurement for his or her willingness to engage in fraudulent behavior. The 
potential failure of not reaching the goal in this experiment is structured to elicit the same 
theorized biases and negative affect (i.e., pressures) experienced by one who is below meeting 
earnings expectations but can meet that target by engaging in financial statement fraud. 
Control Variables 
There were two control variables utilized in Experiment 1, the number of times the 
participant was fined for misrepresentation in the first 24 rounds of selling assets and his or her 
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gender. The former’s inclusion was justified on the belief that a participant’s experience with 
being fined in the previous 24 rounds might make him or her more risk averse and thus less 
likely to engage in fraud in the final round. With respect to gender, there has been an extensive 
amount of literature examining its relationship with ethical decision-making, but this research 
has produced mixed results (Craft, 2013; O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2005; Tenbrunsel & Smith-
Crowe, 2008). However, Tenbrunsel and Smith-Crowe (2008) believe that gender is likely to 
have an impact on ethical behavior and argue that these inconsistent findings are possibly the 
result of the different experimental settings across the literature. As such, given that men 
comprise the biggest percentage of those who commit fraud (ACFE, 2010), it is possible that 
one’s gender might have a significant influence on his or her decision to engage in fraudulent 
behavior in a goal-setting context.   
Experiment 2 
The experimental procedure used in Experiment 2 was similar to that of Experiment 1, 
with one key exception. In Experiment 1, the participants were informed of the Credits they 
would need to earn in order to receive a bonus immediately following the instructions. In 
Experiment 2, however, the participants were not notified of the Credits required to earn a bonus 
until after the 24
th
 round of selling assets. Furthermore, in Experiment 2, the participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the three conditions, the “close-to-goal” group (CTG), the “far-
from-goal” group (FFG) and the “reached goal” group (RG).24 The participants in the RG were 
                                                 
24
 Unlike the first experiment, condition assignment was independent of the participant’s performance in the 
previous 24 rounds. 
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advised that, after 24 rounds, they had already achieved the earnings necessary to receive the 
3000 Credit bonus whereas those in the FFG group were provided with such a distance that, 
even if they had misrepresented the asset in the final round to the most extreme degree, they 
would have not been able to reach the target. Finally, the participants in the CTG were provided 
with a distance that was below the required goal, but could be reached if they misrepresented the 
quality of the asset in the final round by two levels (i.e., misrepresent an asset of average quality 
as excellent). 
Results 
Experiment 1 
First Analysis 
Participants 
 The participants for Experiment 1 were recruited from several upper-level, undergraduate 
business classes (e.g., Financial Management) at a public university in the northeast United 
States. Eighty-two students participated in Experiment 1, which was carried out over three 
separate sessions. In order to create equal cells, fourteen students removed from the below target 
group (BTG) utilizing a random number generator similar to that in Lyubimov, Arnold, and 
Sutton (2013). The remaining sixty-eight participants, on average, spent 23 minutes completing 
the experiment and were paid a total of $6.07, which included a flat fee of $3 that was 
independent of their performance.  
 The demographic data for Experiment 1 is listed in Table 14. The data reveals that the 
  
 173 
sample consisted of 45 males (66.2 percent) and 23 females (33.8 percent). Several business 
majors were represented, with most of the participants identifying as finance students (19.1 
percent). Non-business and accounting majors also made up a significant portion of the sample 
(17.6 percent and 16.2 percent, respectively). Finally, 56 students (82.3 percent) reported their 
GPA as being at 3.0 or above. 
Manipulation check 
  After the 24
th
 round of selling assets, each participant was prompted to answer a 
manipulation check question regarding whether he or she was currently above or below the target 
necessary to receive a bonus. All participants passed the manipulation check.  
Hypotheses testing 
H1 predicts that a person who falls below an earnings target will possess a higher 
degree of egocentrism regarding his or her perceptions of fairness than one who meets 
those expectations. To test this hypothesis, an ANCOVA was conducted using Group as 
the predictor/independent variable (Coded as 0 = ATG, 1 = BTG), Egocentric Perceptions 
of Fairness as the outcome/dependent variable, and Gender (Gender, coded as 0 = 
female, 1 = male) and Audit0124 (the number of times audited and fined in the first 24 
rounds) as the covariates. Since higher scores on the Egocentric Perceptions of Fairness 
questions indicate that the participant viewed his or her actions as more honest, 
trustworthy, and fair, the BTG was expected to have a higher mean on this measure than 
the ATG. The results listed in Table 15 (Panel A) reveal that the BTG’s mean score for 
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the Egocentric Perceptions of Fairness measure (Mean = 0.68, SD = 0.88) was actually 
lower than that of the ATG (Mean = 1.07, SD = 0.86), but this difference is statistically 
insignificant (p < .51).  Thus, H1 is not supported. 
H2 through H5 were tested utilizing the PROCESS add-in to SPSS. PROCESS is a 
statistical method that allows for “path analysis–based moderation and mediation analysis as well 
as their integration in the form of a conditional process model” (Hayes, 2013, p. 419). In 
particular, this method allows for testing serial multiple mediator models such as the theoretical 
framework used in this chapter. Furthermore, in addition to its ability to calculate the direct and 
indirect effects in mediation models, PROCESS can estimate unstandardized model coefficients, 
standards errors, t-values, p-values, and confidence intervals (Hayes, 2013).  
H2 posits that egocentric perceptions of fairness resulting from not meeting earnings 
expectations are positively related to the intensity of negative affect. Again, PROCESS was used 
to test this hypothesis with Group (Coded as 0 = ATG, 1 = BTG) as the predictor/independent 
variable, FLR (Coded as 0 = no fraud in last round, 1 = fraud in last round) as the 
outcome/dependent variable, EPF (egocentric perceptions of fairness) as the first mediating 
variable, NA (negative affect) as the second mediating variable, and EFW (ethical fading words) 
as the third mediating variable. Gender (Gender, coded as 0 = female, 1 = male) and Audit0124 
(the number of times fined for misrepresentation through 24 rounds) were included as covariates. 
Similar to the interpretation of the EPF measure, higher scores on the NA measure indicate a 
greater degree of negative affect. As such, a positive coefficient was anticipated. The results in 
Table 16 (Panel A) indicate that when NA is designated as the outcome variable, its relationship 
with EPF is positive (coeff. = 0.33), yet insignificant (p = .75). Therefore, H2 is not supported.  
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H3 postulates that negative affect experienced from not reaching an earnings goal is 
positively related to the likelihood of ethical fading. More specifically, a person is expected to be 
less likely to consider the ethical implications of his or her decision if he or she is experiencing 
negative affect. Since the use of more ethics-related words indicates less ethical fading, EFW’s 
relationship with NA is expected to produce a negative coefficient. The results in Table 16 (Panel 
B) show that the relationship between NA and EFW is negative (coeff. = -0.14), but not 
significant (p = .21).  Thus, H3 is not supported. 
Ethical fading was also captured using a three-item measure embedded within the Zodiac 
and Personality Survey (labeled EFW). As such, another analysis was conducted substituting 
EFW for EFQ. A positive coefficient is expected since higher mean scores on the EFQ questions 
suggest a greater degree of ethical fading. The results listed on Table 17 (Panel A), however, 
reflect a negative (coeff. = -0.03), but not significant (p = .85), relationship. Thus, H3 is still not 
supported when EFQ is employed as an alternative ethical fading measure. 
H4 predicts a positive relationship between ethical fading and unethical behavior. That is, 
an individual who experiences a higher degree of ethical fading is predicted to be more likely to 
engage in fraud. As FLR (Coded as 0 = no fraud in last round, 1 = fraud in last round) captures 
whether the participant committed fraud in the 25
th
 and final round, its relationship with EFW is 
expected to produce a negative coefficient. The results from Table 16 (Panel C) reflect that the 
relationship between EFW and FLR is negative (coeff. = -1.44), but insignificant (p = .16). When 
EFQ is substituted for EFW as presented in Table 17 (Panel B), the relationship between fraud 
and ethical fading is still not significant (p = .27).  
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H5 posits that one that falls below an earnings target is more likely to engage in fraud 
than an individual who has already met his or her respective goal. To test this hypothesis, a 
Pearson Chi-Square test was conducted. The results in Table 18 indicate that there was a 
significant association between whether an individual was above or below his or her respective 
earnings target after the penultimate round of selling assets and fraudulent behavior in the final 
round (χ = 4.22, p < .05). Based on the odds ratio, the odds of those individuals in the BTG 
committing fraud in the final round was 6.1 times higher than those in the ATG. Thus, H5 is 
supported. 
Second Analysis 
Participants 
 A secondary analysis was conducted wherein those participants who identified 
themselves as accounting majors were removed. Professionals and educators believe that ethical 
decision-making should be a core component of an accounting student’s education, especially 
given the corporate scandals of the late 1900s and early 2003 (Martinov-Bennie & Mladenovic, 
2015). As such, accounting curricula have placed an emphasis on including ethics-related 
materials. While there is disagreement regarding whether ethics can be “taught” and, if so, what 
are the most effective methods, some research does supports the idea that accounting students’ 
ethical judgments can be positively influenced by various types of interventions (e.g., Cloninger 
& Selvarajan, 2010 & Green & Weber, 1997). Thus, an argument can be made that the focus on 
ethics in their curricula results in accounting students being more ethically sensitive, and 
therefore more likely to behave ethically, than other business students whose respective 
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discipline lacks such an emphasis. 
The results from by Clikeman and Henning (2000) and Sweeney and Costello (2009) 
support the argument that accounting majors are more inclined to behave ethically in relation to 
other business students. Clikeman and Henning’s (2000) findings suggest that senior accounting 
students, when compared to other seniors across different business majors, are more opposed to 
questionable acts of earnings management. More recently, the results from Sweeney and Costello 
(2009) suggest that the ethical intentions and judgments of accounting students are significantly 
higher than those of non-accounting students across various scenarios. The “socialization” aspect 
of accounting education and its rule-based approach may explain Clikeman and Henning’s 
(2000) and Sweeney and Costello’s (2009) results. That is, accounting majors are socialized to 
give “priority to financial statement users' needs, while students majoring in other business 
disciplines come to identify more closely with the goals of corporate managers” (Clikeman and 
Henning, 2000, p. 1). Furthermore, according to Shaub (1994), accounting education emphasizes 
a rule-based approach that is grounded in ethics. As such, given the empirical evidence that 
supports the notion that accounting students are perhaps more predisposed to act ethically than 
non-accounting majors, 12 participants (approximately 15 percent) who identified themselves as 
accounting majors were omitted from the analysis. 
There remained 30 participants in the below target group (BTG) and 40 in the above 
target group (ATG) after the accounting students were removed from the data analysis. Thus, in 
order to create equal cells (30 per cell), ten participants were removed from the ATG utilizing a 
random number generator similar to that in Lyubimov, Arnold, and Sutton (2013). The 
remaining sixty participants, on average, spent 26 minutes completing the experiment and were 
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paid a total of $6.04, which included a flat fee of $3 that was independent of their performance.  
The demographic data for the secondary analysis is listed in Table 19. The data reveals 
that the sample consisted of 37 males (61.7 percent) and 23 females (38.3 percent). Several 
business majors were represented, with most of the participants identifying as finance students 
(21.7 percent). Non-business majors also made up a significant portion of the sample (20 
percent). Finally, 46 students (76.7 percent) reported their GPA as being at 3.0 or above.  
 
Manipulation check 
  After the 24
th
 round of selling assets, each participant was prompted to answer a 
manipulation check question regarding whether he or she was currently above or below the target 
necessary to receive a bonus. All participants passed the manipulation check.  
Hypotheses testing 
H1 predicts that a person who falls below an earnings target will possess a higher 
degree of egocentrism regarding his or her perceptions of fairness than one who meets 
those expectations. To test this hypothesis, an ANCOVA was conducted using Group as 
the predictor/independent variable (Coded as 0 = ATG, 1 = BTG), Egocentric Perceptions 
of Fairness as the outcome/dependent variable, and Gender (Gender, coded as 0 = 
female, 1 = male) and Audit0124 (the number of times audited and fined in the first 24 
rounds) as the covariates. Since higher scores on the Egocentric Perceptions of Fairness 
questions indicate that the participant viewed his or her actions as more honest, 
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trustworthy, and fair, the BTG was expected to have a higher mean on this measure than 
the ATG. The results listed in Table 20 (Panel A) reveal that the BTG’s mean score for 
the Egocentric Perceptions of Fairness measure (Mean = 0.51, SD = 1.08) was actually 
lower than that of the ATG (Mean = 1.01, SD = 0.76). However, the results in Table 10 
(Panel B) show that this difference is insignificant (p = 0.53).  Thus, H1 is not supported. 
Similar to the first analysis, the remaining six hypotheses were tested utilizing the 
PROCESS add-in to SPSS wherein Group (Coded as 0 = ATG, 1 = BTG) was designated as the 
predictor/independent variable, FLR (Coded as 0 = no fraud in last round, 1 = fraud in last round) 
the outcome/dependent variable, EPF (egocentric perceptions of fairness) the first mediating 
variable, NA (negative affect) the second mediating variable, and EFW (ethical fading words) the 
third mediating variable. Gender (Gender, coded as 0 = female, 1 = male) and Audit0124 (the 
number of times fined for misrepresentation through 24 rounds) were included as covariates. H2 
posits that egocentric perceptions of fairness resulting from not meeting earnings expectations 
are positively related to the intensity of negative affect Similar to the interpretation of the EPF 
measure, higher scores on the NA measure indicate a greater degree of negative affect. As such, a 
positive coefficient was anticipated. The results in Table 21 (Panel A) indicate that when NA is 
designated as the outcome variable, its relationship with PU is positive (coeff. = 0.12), yet 
insignificant (p = .23). Therefore, H2 is not supported.  
H3 postulates that negative affect experienced from not reaching an earnings goal is 
positively related to the likelihood of ethical fading. Since the use of more ethics-related words 
indicates less ethical fading, EFW’s relationship with NA is expected to produce a negative 
coefficient. The results in Table 21 (Panel B) show that the relationship between NA and EFW is 
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negative (coeff. = -0.20), but not significant (p = .12).  When EFW is replaced with EFQ, the 
results listed on Table 22 (Panel A) also show an  insignificant (p = .17), relationship. Thus, H3 
is not supported when either the EFW or the EFQ is employed as the ethical fading measure. 
H4 predicts a positive relationship between ethical fading and unethical behavior. As 
FLR (Coded as 0 = no fraud in last round, 1 = fraud in last round) captures whether the 
participant committed fraud in the 25
th
 and final round, its relationship with EFW is expected to 
produce a negative coefficient. The results from Table 21 (Panel C) reflect that the relationship 
between EFW and FLR is negative (coeff. = 0.56) and marginally significant (p < .09). Thus, H4 
is somewhat supported when EFW is used as the ethical fading measure. However, when EFQ is 
substituted for EFW as presented in Table 22 (Panel B), the relationship between fraud and 
ethical fading is not significant (p = .58).  
H5 posits that one that falls below an earnings target is more likely to engage in fraud 
than an individual who has already met his or her respective goal. To test this hypothesis, a 
Pearson Chi-Square test was conducted. The results in Table 23 indicate that there was a 
significant association between whether an individual was above or below his or her respective 
earnings target after the penultimate round of selling assets and fraudulent behavior in the final 
round (χ = 7.68, p < .01). Based on the odds ratio, the odds of those individuals in the BTG 
committing fraud in the final round was 12.4 times higher than those in the ATG. Thus, H5 is 
supported. 
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Experiment 2 
Participants 
A total of 90 students participated in Experiment 2. Accounting students were omitted 
from data analysis (a total of 19 participants, 21.1 percent) and a random number generator was 
then used to equalize the cells. After equalizing the cells, there was a total of 63 participants (21 
per cell) whose data was used in the analysis. The participants in Experiment 2, on average, 
spent 21 minutes completing the experiment and were paid a total of $5.97, which included a flat 
fee of $3 that was independent of their performance. 
The demographic data for Experiment 2 is listed in Table 24. The data reveals that the 
sample consisted of 32 males (50.8 percent) and 31 females (49.2 percent). Several business 
majors were represented, with most of the participants identifying as supply-chain management 
students (25.4 percent). Marketing majors also made up a significant portion of the sample (22.2 
percent). Fifty-one students (80.9 percent) reported their GPA as being at 3.0 or above. Finally, 
the participants, on average, had taken at least two accounting courses (mean = 2.19).  
Hypothesis Testing 
H6 postulates that an individual who is close, but still below, an earnings target is more 
likely to engage in fraud than one that either is further from the goal or has already met that 
mark. To test this hypothesis, a Pearson Chi-Square test was conducted utilizing the data from 
Experiment 2. The results in Table 25 indicate that there was a significant association between an 
individual’s distance to an earnings target after the penultimate round of selling assets and 
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fraudulent behavior in the final round (χ = 6.30, p < .01).25 Based on the odds ratio, the odds of 
those individuals in the “close-to-goal” group (CTG) committing fraud in the final round was 4.4 
times higher than those in both the “far-from-goal” (FFG) and the “reached goal” (RG) groups. 
As such, H6 is supported. 
Discussion 
Results from the first analysis suggest that individuals who are below an earnings goal 
are more inclined to misrepresent than those who have already met that target. None of the other 
hypothesized relationships were supported, however. A second analysis was conducted wherein 
those participants who identified themselves as accounting students were culled from the sample. 
The significant change in the results between the two analyses provides some support to the idea 
that the “socialization” aspect of their education makes accounting majors “different” from other 
business majors with respect to their ethical decision-making and/or moral awareness (e.g., 
Clikeman & Henning, 2000; Sweeney & Costello, 2009). As such, removing accounting students 
from the sample pool was appropriate. 
Results from the second analysis indicate that fraud is more likely to occur as the 
individual experiences a higher degree of ethical fading, but this relationship was only 
moderately significant. Furthermore, the results indicate that those individuals who are closest to 
meeting an earnings target carry the highest probability of fraudulent behavior. The analysis 
                                                 
25
 The association between an individual’s distance to an earnings target after the penultimate round of selling assets 
and fraudulent behavior in the final round was still significant when accounting students were added back into the 
sample. 
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failed to find any support that one’s egocentric perceptions of fairness and negative affect 
contribute towards his or her behavior in the context of goal achievement, however. This lack of 
significance for egocentric perceptions of fairness and negative affect could be the result of a few 
factors. One is that, in the context of goal achievement, these constructs are actually insignificant 
with respect to their influence on behavior. The second factor that may explain the absence of 
significance for egocentrism and negative affect is the possible misspecification of TUAB. In 
particular, key mediating and/or moderating variables, especially those related to individual 
characteristics, may have been excluded from the model that, when included, could have 
significant indirect effects and would thus warrant the inclusion of those constructs into the 
model.  
Finally, caution should be exercised in interpreting these results. One reason is that 
ethical fading was only significant as a predictor of fraud when it was measured utilizing one’s 
performance on a word completion exercise (EPW) rather than his or her responses to questions 
about how decisions in the asset-selling task were framed (EPQ). As with any new construct, 
more research is needed regarding how to best measure ethical fading. Furthermore, one should 
be mindful of the substantial change in the results when those participants who identified 
themselves as accounting students were removed from the sample. Further study is necessary to 
explore whether the incorporation of ethics related material in their curricula makes accounting 
students more “immune” to ethical fading. 
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Conclusion 
 Fraud is conceptualized as an intentional act by a manager who was willing to abandon 
his or her ethics for personal gain. Furthermore, simplistic explanations are often provided 
regarding one’s motivation to initially engage in fraud. The demographic and anecdotal 
evidence, however, suggests that the majority of fraudsters are of the “accidental type.” That is, 
these fraudsters did not intend to act unethically yet somehow became trapped in a vicious cycle 
of unethical actions to conceal their actions. Thus, understanding the motivations for financial 
statement fraud and the nature of the act itself may require a more nuanced investigation into the 
psychological processes underlying a manager’s decision-making. 
Murphy and Dacin (2011) contend that characteristics of the business climate, such as the 
pressure to meet earnings expectations, can encourage managers to commit fraud without the 
self- awareness that they are behaving unethically. This lack of awareness can possibly be 
explained by ethical fading, a mechanism wherein one’s inherent psychological constraints, such 
as biases or heuristics, fade any moral considerations from the decision-making process. Thus, 
identifying the psychological processes that enable ethical fading, as well as the contextual 
influences on those operations, can contribute towards a more robust understanding of 
accounting fraud. The purpose of this chapter is to examine how a particular contextual factor, 
the pressure to meet earnings forecasts, produces egocentric perceptions of fairness and negative 
affect that influence the likelihood of one engaging in ethical fading and fraudulent behavior. 
The Theory of Unintended Amoral Behavior (Chapter 2, hereafter TUAB), which 
includes the concept of ethical fading, is utilized to predict that a manager who is short of 
meeting an earnings forecasts will manufacture the egocentric perspective that unfair 
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circumstances are to blame for his or her failure in reaching the goal. Furthermore, it is predicted 
that this egocentric perspective will produce negative affect, which in turn increases the 
probability of ethical fading, and thus fraudulent behavior, in the manager who falls below 
earnings estimates. Finally, TUAB (Chapter 2) is used to hypothesize that those who are below, 
yet close, to an earnings target are more likely to commit fraud than managers who either have 
reached the goal or are far from it. 
Two experiments utilizing an asset-selling task were conducted to test the predictions. 
Across both experiments, the participants were required to sell an asset to a computerized buyer 
whereupon they could earn money on each successful transaction. Before each attempted sale, 
however, the participants had the opportunity to misrepresent the value of their assets in order to 
sell them at higher prices. The participants also had the potential to earn a bonus based on their 
performance (Experiment 1) or group assignment (Experiment 2). The participants’ egocentric 
perceptions, negative affect, ethical fading, and fraudulent behavior were measured and/or 
observed across the two experiments. 
The results from the first experiment suggests that fraud is more likely to occur as the 
individual experiences a higher degree of ethical fading, but this was true for only one measure 
of ethical fading (a word-completion exercise). Furthermore, the findings from the second 
experiment suggest that individuals who are closest to meeting an earnings goal carry the highest 
probability of fraudulent behavior. There was a lack of support that one’s egocentric perceptions 
of fairness and negative affect contribute towards his or her ethical behavior, however.  
This chapter is not without its limitations. The first being that ethical fading was only 
related to misreporting behavior when accounting students were removed from the sample. The 
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substantial change in the results between the two analyses suggests that the “socialization” aspect 
of their education makes accounting majors somehow “different” from other business majors 
with respect to their ethical sensitivity. Further research is needed to determine whether the 
inclusion of ethics related material into their curricula makes accounting students more resistant 
to ethical fading. 
The second limitation of this chapter is that the samples consist of upper-level business 
students which, when used as a proxy for professionals and quasi-professionals, has been 
controversial. One argument against the use of student samples is that the education, experience, 
and socialization of professionals provide them with the cognitive tools and the motivation to 
behave more ethically than students. Bazerman and Tenbrunsel (2011), however, argue that the 
psychology processes that constrain one’s ability to act in an ethical manner are “ordinary” since 
they “affect even very honest and smart people, including managers, executives, and other 
professionals” (p. 45). Nevertheless, the research comparing the ethical behavior of business 
students to professionals has been mixed. The second limitation of this chapter is that the ethical 
fading was only significant as a predictor of fraud when it was measured based on the 
participant’s performance on a word-completion task. As with any new construct, how to best 
measure ethical fading is still unresolved and requires further research. 
The key contribution of this chapter is that it provides support to the idea that ethical 
fading is influential in determining whether a person engages in fraud. This finding runs counter 
to the common notion that fraud is an intentional sacrifice of one’s ethics for some other desired 
goal (e.g., profit). Furthermore, this chapter indicates that the proximity to an earnings target 
matters in determining whether one will engage in fraud. That is, those managers who are the 
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closest to, yet below, an earnings target are the most likely to engage in fraud. Finally, this 
research may also provide specific contributions to the auditing profession, organizations, 
regulators, and researchers.  
With respect to the audit profession, an understanding of how certain contextual factors 
that may lead to unethical behavior may result in improved fraud detection. Furthermore, 
provided the subconscious nature of ethical fading, this chapter suggests that auditors might 
reconsider the substantial value they attach to management’s character and attitude when 
conducting their fraud risk assessments. At an organizational level, an understanding of bounded 
ethicality and ethical fading might allow for the implementation of fraud controls aimed at 
mitigating the contextual factors that can influence unethical behavior. In addition, a manager 
who is knowledgeable about common biases and heuristics might be more psychologically 
prepared when confronted with an ethical decision. This chapter also suggests that regulators 
consider the difference between intentional corruption and unintentional bias, and the factors that 
drive such bias, if they are to establish legislation that is more effective at deterring fraud. 
Finally, this chapter contributes to research by both serving as an early test of TUAB (Chapter 2) 
and identifying a key contextual factor that limits an individual’s ability to act ethically.   
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CHAPTER 5: GENERAL CONCLUSION 
 The three studies in this dissertation apply the concepts of bounded ethicality and ethical 
fading to explain the decision-making that underlies unethical behavior or accounting fraud, in 
particular. Behavioral ethics, from which these concepts emerged, is a relatively new field of 
study and as typical with emerging areas of research, the theoretical models are nebulous and 
thus not well-specified (Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008). As such, Study 1 combined 
disparate, but complimentary, theories and ideas from behavioral ethics and psychology to create 
a theory, the Theory of Unintended Amoral Behavior (TUAB), which includes the concepts of 
bounded ethical and ethical fading. Studies 2 and 3 applied TUAB (Chapter 2) to examine how 
contextual stimuli affect the psychological operations outlined in TUAB that, in turn, can lead to 
fraudulent behavior. Specifically, Study 2 examined how a lower rate-of-pay for managers in 
relation to their peers can trigger egocentric biases of unfairness that, in sequence, provoke envy 
and ethical fading, which together increase the likelihood of fraudulent behavior in those 
managers. Study 3 explored how the pressure to meet earnings forecasts can elicit, in 
progression, egocentric perceptions of fairness, a general negative affect, ethical fading, and acts 
of fraud in those managers who fall below their expected financial goals. The unique 
contributions of each of these studies will now be addressed, followed by brief discussions 
regarding the overall contributions of this dissertation and avenues for future research.  
 The purpose of Study 1 was to develop a theory that combines the concepts of bounded 
ethicality and ethical fading. In sum, TUAB (Chapter 2), states that task-specific and quasi-static 
environmental factors (e.g., an organization’s culture) can provoke certain, inherent biases and 
heuristics. If those biases related to upholding one’s perception of self-worth, in particular, are 
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triggered, then the person will interpret the contextual stimuli in a distorted manner to create the 
idea that the preferred outcome (i.e., the action that restores his or her sense of self-worth) is the 
most “fair.” These evaluations of the stimuli are primitive, that is, effortless and automatic, and 
thus do not feel biased in any way. Furthermore, TUAB states (Chapter 2) that in addition to 
interpreting contextual information in an egocentric manner, the triggering of biases will, in turn, 
elicit negative affect for which the person will be motivated to eliminate quickly and without 
utilizing considerable cognitive effort. As such, if an unethical action eliminates any negative 
affect from a threatened sense of self-worth, then the individual’s affect-laden intuition will 
suggest that such an action is “appropriate” or even “good” since it is the most emotionally 
appealing. At this point, the person is engaging in the act of substation where he or she is 
replacing a difficult question (e.g., “is this action ethical?”) with an easier one (e.g., “will this 
action make me feel better?”). Ethical fading is now occurring, according to TUAB (Chapter 2), 
since the individual is no longer considering the moral implications of the alternative actions. 
The pressure to meet earnings forecasts is discussed through the lens of TUAB as an example of 
how one may unknowingly behave in manner contrary to his or her moral principles. 
 The primary contribution of Study 1 is that it provides a testable theory that differentiates 
between unintentional and intentional immoral behavior through its inclusion of the ethical 
fading concept and the noted systematic, psychological errors that constrain one’s ability to act 
ethically. As discussed in Study 1, TUAB (Chapter 2) has the potential to explain unethical 
behavior across the different functional areas of accounting research. With respect to Financial 
Accounting research, TUAB (Chapter 2) can explain how disclosures and the ambiguity in 
standards can actually exacerbate unethical behavior. In the AIS research area, TUAB (Chapter 
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2) can be used to address whether information systems create an environment of instrumental 
rationality wherein the focus of establishing the most effective and efficient processes 
overshadows any consideration of whether carrying out those processes is ethical. TUAB 
(Chapter 2) can also explain why auditors sometimes forfeit their professional responsibilities 
and acquiesce to their clients that are pushing beyond the boundaries of law and regulation. In 
addition, this theory can explain unethical behavior in the Tax research area such as tax 
avoidance and tax compliance. Finally, in regards to the Management Accounting area, TUAB 
(Chapter 2) can be utilized to address a host of deviant behaviors such as the misappropriation of 
assets, bribery, and transfer pricing manipulation. Furthermore, this theory can be applied to the 
ethical and quasi-ethical issues related to budgeting and performance measurement such as 
dishonesty in budgeting, the formulation of budgetary slack, biased performance evaluation, and 
performance measurement falsification.  
 The results from Study 2 indicate that one who is paid at a lower rate is more likely to 
view this discrepancy as unfair as opposed to one who is paid at a higher rate, and that this 
egocentric view regarding the pay inequity produces a feeling of envy in that person who is paid 
less. However, the prediction that an individual who is experiencing a higher degree of envy 
would be more likely to fade ethically was unsupported. The supplemental analysis suggests that 
one’s preference for risk may moderate the relationship between negative affect (i.e., envy) and 
ethical fading. That is, when envy is high, those people who are either risk-neutral or risk-
seeking are more likely to experience ethical fading as opposed to those who are more risk-
averse. Findings from Study 2 also indicate that a person who is experiencing a higher degree of 
ethical fading is more likely to misrepresent and that ethical fading, along with perceived 
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unfairness, are significant processes that mediate the relationship between pay inequity and 
fraudulent behavior. 
 The main contribution of Study 2 is that it provides initial support of TUAB (Chapter 2) 
and identifies a key contextual factor, pay inequality, and its influence on the psychological 
processes that constrain ethical decision-making. Furthermore, Study 2 also contributes to the 
psychology and behavioral ethics literatures in that it offers evidence that unethical behavior is 
not necessarily the result of a person consciously abandoning his or her moral principles. Finally, 
the supplemental analysis from this study suggests that individual characteristics (i.e., personality 
traits) may have mediating or moderating effects among the relationships outlined in TUAB 
(Chapter 2), thus providing research avenues to further specify the theoretical model.  
 The findings from Study 3 also suggest that one is more likely to misrepresent if he or 
she is experiencing a higher degree of ethical fading. The relationship between ethical fading and 
misrepresentation in this study, however, was only moderately significant. The results from 
Study 3 also suggest that those people who are closest, yet still below, a financial goal are the 
most likely to engage in fraudulent behavior. Finally, the findings of this study did not support 
the predictions regarding the relationships between egocentric perceptions of fairness and a 
generalized, negative affect and between that affect and ethical fading.  
 The primary contribution of Study 3 is that it also provides some support, although 
mixed, that ethical fading is influential in determining whether an individual engages in 
fraudulent behavior. Much like Study 2, this result runs counter to the idea that fraudulent 
behavior is an intentional act. Study 3 further contributes to the accounting, behavioral ethics, 
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and management literatures by identifying an important contextual factor that influences this 
process, the pressure to meet earnings forecasts.  
 Overall, this dissertation provides three important contributions to the accounting, 
behavioral ethics, management, and psychology literatures. The first contribution is that it unifies 
disparate, but related, theories and concepts from psychology and behavioral ethics to establish a 
testable theory (TUAB) that includes the concepts of bounded ethicality and ethical fading. 
Bazerman and Tenbrunsel (2011) argue that traditional models of ethical decision-making such 
as Rest (1986) and Kohlberg (1973) rely on the tenuous assumption that judgments are based on 
a rational, linear thought-process. In particular, they argue that these models assume that (1) 
awareness is required for a decision to have ethical implications, (2) reasoning will guide an 
individual’s judgment (moral judgment), (3) and moral intention is necessary for one to 
understand his or her action (moral intention). Research in psychology and behavioral ethics, 
however, suggests that individuals often (1) lack moral awareness, (2) judge before using moral 
reasoning, and (3) misjudge moral intention (Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011). As such, this 
research, which allows for the influences of emotions, the subconscious, and intuition in 
decision-making, highlights the limitations of rationalist models (Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 
2008). This dissertation thus contributes to research by introducing a model that differentiates 
between intentional and unintentional behavior by considering the systematic, psychological 
errors that constrain one’s ability to make an ethical decision, as well as the contextual factors 
that trigger those errors. In regards to accounting research in particular, TUAB (Chapter 2) can 
be applied to predict and/or explain unethical behavior across the different functional areas of 
accounting. Furthermore, this dissertation extends Murphy and Dacin’s (2011) framework that 
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identifies the psychological pathways an individual may follow when unintentionally engaging 
in fraud.  
The second key contribution of this dissertation is that it provides some initial support of 
TUAB (Chapter 2). In particular, it offers evidence that unethical behavior (i.e., fraud), through 
the mechanism of ethical fading, may not necessarily be the result of an individual consciously 
forsaking his or her moral principles for some other desired goal. Finally, with respect to 
research, this dissertation identifies some of the psychological processes suggested by bounded 
ethicality that limit one’s ability to make an ethical decision (i.e., egocentric perceptions of 
unfairness) as well as two important contextual factors (i.e., pay inequities and earnings targets) 
that trigger those processes. This research also offers potential contributions to auditors, 
management, and regulators. 
In regards to the audit profession, auditors may improve their fraud detection capabilities 
by understanding how the psychological processes described in TUAB (Chapter 2) (i.e., biases, 
emotions, and ethical fading) influence decision-making. This dissertation also suggests that 
auditors reconsider the substantial value they attach to management’s character and attitude 
when conducting their fraud risk assessments, especially given the subconscious effects of 
ethical fading. Furthermore, knowledge of those psychological processes that impede ethical 
decision-making may prepare auditors to better defend their position when negotiating with 
clients who are pushing beyond the boundaries of law and regulation. At an organizational level, 
an awareness of bounded ethicality and ethical fading could lead to the implementation of fraud 
controls that are more effective at mitigating the contextual factors that influence unethical 
behavior. In addition, a manager who is knowledgeable about common biases and heuristics 
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might be more sensitive to the ethical implications of the alternative decisions that he or she 
faces. Finally, this dissertation suggests that regulators should acknowledge the difference 
between intentional corruption and unintentional bias, and the factors that drive such bias, if they 
are to formulate legislation that is more effective at deterring fraud or other deviant behavior.  
More research is required to assess TUAB’s (Chapter 2) explanatory power regarding the 
unethical behaviors of professional accountants and managers. Research should focus on both 
examining the relationship between ethical fading and unethical behaviors and identifying those 
psychological operations (i.e., biases, heuristics and emotions) that cause ethical fading across 
various accounting contexts. The results from Studies 2 and 3 suggest that ethical fading can 
result from a multitude of biases and emotions that vary across situations due to factors that are 
specific to particular contexts.  
Research on how to best measure ethical fading is also needed since it is a relatively new 
construct. In Study 2, ethical fading was only significant as a predictor of fraud when it was 
measured using questions about how the participant framed his or her decisions rather than his or 
her responses to a word completion exercise, which has been used successfully in psychological 
studies to capture implicit cognitive processes. In Study 3, however, the relationship between 
ethical fading and misrepresentation was moderately significant when the word completion 
exercise, rather than the framing questions, was used. With respect to Study 2, one explanation 
that may explain the difference in the results produced by the two measures is that, in the 
experimental procedure, the word completion exercise was much further away from the 
questions that addressed the participant’s perceptions of unfairness and feelings of envy than the 
alternate ethical fading measure. 
  
 208 
Furthermore, research should explore how individual characteristics (e.g., personality 
traits) affect the psychological processes outlined in TUAB (Chapter 2). The results from the 
supplemental analysis in Study 2 suggest that one’s risk preference moderates the relationship 
between ethical fading and misrepresentation. However, the effect of risk preference on the 
relationship between episodic envy and ethical fading was analyzed independently from the 
overall model due the constraints of the data. As such, when included in the model, the 
significance of an individual’s risk preference as a moderator may become muted as well as the 
other relationships as currently defined in TUAB (Chapter 2). Correspondingly, the lack of 
significance for egocentric perceptions of fairness and negative affect in Study 3 could be the 
result of key mediating and/or moderating variables that have been excluded from the model 
that, when included, could have significant indirect effects and would thus warrant the inclusion 
of those constructs into the model. At any rate, identifying the potential moderating and/or 
mediating effect of individual characteristics can provide research avenues to further specify the 
theoretical model. 
Finally, more research is needed to determine whether the inclusion of ethics related 
material in their curricula makes accounting students more “immune” to ethical fading. 
Fort the most part, the results for Studies 2 and 3 only held when accounting students were culled 
form the sample. This substantial changes in the results between analyses suggests that the 
“socialization” aspect of their education makes accounting majors “different” from other 
business majors with respect to their ethical sensitivity and/or ethical decision-making, which is 
consistent with other studies (e.g., Clikeman & Henning, 2000; Sweeney & Costello, 2009).  
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Figure 1: A Temporal Explanation of “Want” versus “Should-self” Conflict 
 
  
  
 212 
 
Figure 2: The Theory of Unintended Amoral Behavior  
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Figure 3:  The Theory of Unintended Amoral Behavior (adopted from Chapter 2) 
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Figure 4: Chapter 3 Experimental Procedure 
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Figure 5: Chapter 3 Moderating Effect of Risk Preference on Ethical Fading (EFQ)  
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Figure 6: Chapter 4 Experimental Procedure 
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Table 1: Chapter 3 Descriptive Statistics (First Analysis) 
 
Number Percent 
Gender   
 
Female 27 36.0% 
Male 48 64.0% 
Undergraduate Major    
Accounting 21 28.0% 
Business Administration 1 1.3% 
Economics 4 5.3% 
Entrepreneurial Management 3 4.0% 
Finance 9 12.0% 
General Business 4 5.3% 
Global Business Management 3 4.0% 
Marketing 15 20.0% 
Non-business 7 9.3% 
Supply-chain Management 6 8.0% 
Unidentified 2 2.7% 
GPA   
 
4.0 - 3.5 23 30.7% 
3.4 - 3.0 34 45.3% 
2.9 - 2.5 16 21.3% 
2.4 - 2.0 2 2.7% 
Below 2.0 0 0.0% 
  Mean Standard Deviation 
Number of Accounting Courses 3.25 2.14 
N = 75 
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Table 2: Chapter 3 ANCOVA Test of H1 (First Analysis) 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics (Dependent Variable: Perceived Unfairness) 
Group Mean Std. Deviation N 
High-pay group 2.4474 .82642 38 
Low-pay group  2.6081 .73253 37 
Total 2.5267 .78043 75 
Group = Randomly Assigned Condition (High-pay group = 0, low-pay group =1 ) 
 
Panel B: Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Dependent Variable: Perceived Unfairness) 
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected 
Model 
1.245 2 .623 1.023 .365 .028 
Intercept 187.021 1 187.021 247.529 .000 .810 
Predictor:       
  Group .714 1 .714 5.113 .282 .016 
Covariate:       
  Gender .761 1 .761 .613 .267 .017 
Error 43.826 72 .609    
Total 523.875 75     
Corrected Total 45.072 74     
R Squared = .028 (Adjusted R Squared = .001) 
Gender = Gender (Female = 0, Male = 1) 
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Table 3: Chapter 3 PROCESS Tests of H2, H3, & H4 (First Analysis, with EFQ) 
Panel A: Direct Effect of Perceived Unfairness (PU) on Episodic Envy (EE) 
  coeff se t p LLCI ULCI 
(constant) 1.2054 .2760 4.3668 . 0000 .7453 1.6654 
Predictor:       
  PU .3067 .0945 3.2463 .0018 .1492 .4642 
Covariate: 
        Gender -.0020 .1544 -.0128 .9898 -.2593 .2554
  
Panel B: Direct Effect of Episodic Envy (EE) on Ethical Fading (EFQ) 
  coeff se t p LLCI ULCI 
(constant) 3.3836 .3687 9.1780 .0000 2.7691 3.9982 
Predictor:       
  EE .0263 .1407 .1871 .8521 -.2083 .2609 
Covariate: 
        Gender -.0494 .1831 -.2697 .7882 -.3546 .2558 
 
Panel C: Direct Effect of Ethical Fading (EFQ) on Fraud (FCL5) 
  coeff se t p LLCI ULCI 
(constant) -1.2011 0.9208 -1.3044 .1964 -2.7363 .3341 
Predictor:       
  EFQ .2516 .2011 1.2508 .2152 -.0838 .5869 
Covariate: 
        Gender .8064 .3083 2.6160 .0109 .2925 1.3203 
 
Model 6 Variables (N = 75): 
Y =  FCL5 (Number of frauds in rounds 14 through 18) 
X =  Group (High-pay group = 0, Low-pay group = 1) 
         Mediator 1 = PU (Perceived unfairness) 
Mediator 2 =  EE (Episodic Envy 
Mediator 3 =  EFQ (Ethical fading questions) 
            Control 1 =  Gender (0 = Female, 1 = Male) 
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Table 4: Chapter 3 PROCESS Tests of H3 & H4 (First Analysis, with EFW) 
Panel A: Direct Effect of Episodic Envy (EE) on Ethical Fading (EFW) 
  coeff se t p LLCI ULCI 
(constant) .8217 .2712 3.0300 .0034 .3697 1.2738 
Predictor:       
  EE -.0600 .1035 -.5794 .5642 -.2325 .1126 
Covariate: 
        Gender -.1126 .1347 -.8363 .4058 -.3372 .1119 
 
Panel B: Direct Effect of Ethical Fading (EFW) on Fraud (FCL5) 
  coeff se t p LLCI ULCI 
(constant) -.4282 .6666 -.6423 .5228 -1.5396 .6832 
Predictor:       
  EFW .0953 .2762 .3448 .7313 -.3653 .5558 
Covariate: 
        Gender .8047 .3129 2.5721 .0123 .2831 1.3263 
 
Model 6 Variables (N = 75): 
Y =  FCL5 (Number of frauds in rounds 14 through 18) 
X =  Group (High-pay group = 0, Low-pay group = 1) 
         Mediator 1 = PU (Perceived unfairness) 
Mediator 2 =  EE (Episodic envy 
Mediator 3 =  EFW (Ethical fading words) 
            Control 1 =  Gender (0 = Female, 1 = Male) 
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Table 5: Chapter 3 PROCESS Tests of H5, H6, & H7 (First Analysis, with EFQ) 
Panel A: Indirect Effect of Pay Disparity on Fraud through Perceived Unfairness 
Mediator Effect Bootstrapped SE Bootstrapped LLCI Bootstrapped ULCI 
Perceived 
Unfairness 
(PU) 
.0504 .0715 -.0096 .2515 
 
Panel B: Indirect Effect of Pay Disparity on Fraud through Episodic Envy 
Mediator Effect Bootstrapped SE Bootstrapped LLCI Bootstrapped ULCI 
Episodic Envy 
(EE) 
.0151 .1142 -.1555 .2222 
 
Panel C: Indirect Effect of Pay Disparity on Fraud through Ethical Fading 
Mediator Effect Bootstrapped SE Bootstrapped LLCI Bootstrapped ULCI 
Ethical Fading 
(EFQ) 
.0648 .0856 -.0126 .2921 
LLCI = Lower-level confidence interval 
ULCI= Upper-level confidence interval 
 
Model 6 Variables (N = 75): 
Y =  FCL5 (Number of frauds in rounds 14 through 18) 
X =  Group (High-pay group = 0, Low-pay group = 1) 
         Mediator 1 = PU (Perceived unfairness) 
Mediator 2 =  EE (Episodic envy 
Mediator 3 =  EFW (Ethical fading words) 
            Control 1 =  Gender (0 = Female, 1 = Male) 
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Table 6: Chapter 3 PROCESS Tests of H5, H6, and H7 (First Analysis, with EFW) 
Panel A: Indirect Effect of Pay Disparity on Fraud through Perceived Unfairness 
Mediator Effect Bootstrapped SE Bootstrapped LLCI Bootstrapped ULCI 
Perceived 
Unfairness 
(PU) 
.0490 .0742 -.0122 .2485 
 
Panel B: Indirect Effect of Pay Disparity on Fraud through Episodic Envy 
Mediator Effect Bootstrapped SE Bootstrapped LLCI Bootstrapped ULCI 
Episodic Envy 
(EE) 
.0079 .0477 -.0619 .0974 
 
Panel C: Indirect Effect of Pay Disparity on Fraud through Ethical Fading 
Mediator Effect Bootstrapped SE Bootstrapped LLCI Bootstrapped ULCI 
Ethical Fading 
(EFW) 
-.0086 .0226 -.0567 .0182 
LLCI = Lower-level confidence interval 
ULCI= Upper-level confidence interval 
 
Model 6 Variables (N = 75): 
Y =  FCL5 (Number of frauds in rounds 14 through 18) 
X =  Group (High-pay group = 0, Low-pay group = 1) 
         Mediator 1 = PU (Perceived unfairness) 
Mediator 2 =  EE (Episodic envy) 
Mediator 3 =  EFW (Ethical fading words) 
            Control 1 =  Gender (0 = Female, 1 = Male) 
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Table 7: Chapter 3 Descriptive Statistics (Second Analysis) 
 
Number Percent 
Gender   
 
Female 18 33.3% 
Male 36 66.7% 
Undergraduate Major   
 
Business Administration 1 1.9% 
Economics 4 7.4% 
Entrepreneurial Management 3 5.6% 
Finance 9 16.7% 
General Business 4 7.4% 
Global Business Management 3 5.6% 
Marketing 15 27.8% 
Non-business 7 13.0% 
Supply-chain Management 6 11.1% 
Unidentified 2 3.7% 
GPA   
 
4.0 - 3.5 12 22.2% 
3.4 - 3.0 27 50.0% 
2.9 - 2.5 13 24.1% 
2.4 - 2.0 2 3.7% 
Below 2.0 0 0.0% 
  Mean Standard Deviation 
Number of Accounting Courses 2.43 0.96 
N = 54 
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Table 8: Chapter 3 ANCOVA Test of H1 (Second Analysis) 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics (Dependent Variable: Perceived Unfairness) 
Group Mean Std. Deviation N 
High-pay group 2.3796 .80375 27 
Low-pay group  2.8056 .62532 27 
Total 2.5926 .74495 54 
Group = Randomly Assigned Condition (High-pay group = 0, low-pay group =1 ) 
 
Panel B: Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Dependent Variable: Perceived Unfairness) 
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected 
Model 
2.769 2 1.385 2.650 .080 .094 
Intercept 129.312 1 129.312 247.529 .000 .829 
Predictor:       
  Group 2.671 1 2.671 5.113 .028 .091 
Covariate:       
  Gender .320 1 .320 .613 .437 .012 
Error 26.643 51 .522    
Total 392.375 54     
Corrected Total 29.412 53     
R Squared = .094 (Adjusted R Squared = .059) 
Gender = Gender (Female = 0, Male = 1) 
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Table 9: Chapter 3 PROCESS Tests of H2, H3, & H4 (Second Analysis, with EFQ) 
Panel A: Direct Effect of Perceived Unfairness (PU) on Episodic Envy (EE) 
  coeff se t p LLCI ULCI 
(constant) 1.1497 .3655 3.1455 .0028 .5371 1.7622 
Predictor:       
  PU .3409 .1298 2.6254 .0115 .1233 .5585 
Covariate: 
        Gender .0125 .1971 .0635 .9496 -.3178 .3428 
  
Panel B: Direct Effect of Episodic Envy (EE) on Ethical Fading (EFQ) 
  coeff se t p LLCI ULCI 
(constant) 3.7527 .4236 8.8594 .0000 3.0426 4.4629 
Predictor:       
  EE .1568 .1497 1.0470 .3003 -.0943 .4078 
Covariate: 
        Gender -.1730 .2087 -.8290 .4111 -.5229 .1769 
 
Panel C: Direct Effect of Ethical Fading (EFQ) on Fraud (FCL5) 
  coeff se t p LLCI ULCI 
(constant) -2.3589 1.1539 -2.0443 .0464 -4.2942 -.4235 
Predictor:       
  EFQ .5614 .2413 2.3268 .0242 .1567 .9660 
Covariate: 
        Gender .9955 .3549 2.805 .0072 .4002 1.5907 
 
Model 6 Variables (N = 54): 
Y =  FCL5 (Number of frauds in rounds 14 through 18) 
X =  Group (High-pay group = 0, Low-pay group = 1) 
         Mediator 1 = PU (Perceived unfairness) 
Mediator 2 =  EE (Episodic Envy 
Mediator 3 =  EFQ (Ethical fading questions) 
            Control 1 =  Gender (0 = Female, 1 = Male) 
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Table 10: Chapter 3 PROCESS Tests of H3 & H4 (Second Analysis, with EFW) 
Panel A: Direct Effect of Episodic Envy (EE) on Ethical Fading (EFW) 
  coeff se t p LLCI ULCI 
(constant) .2984 .2970 1.0046 .3200 -.1996 .7964 
Predictor:       
  EE -.0640 .1050 -.6091 .5453 -.2400 .1121 
Covariate: 
        Gender .0130 .1463 .0887 .9297 -.2324 .2583 
 
Panel B: Direct Effect of Ethical Fading (EFW) on Fraud (FCL5) 
  coeff se t p LLCI ULCI 
(constant) -.2628 .7623 -.3448 .7318 -1.5413 1.0157 
Predictor:       
  EFW .0356 .3629 .0982 .9222 -.5730 .6443 
Covariate: 
        Gender .8979 .3718 2.4152 .0196 .2744 1.5214 
 
Model 6 Variables (N = 54): 
Y =  FCL5 (Number of frauds in rounds 14 through 18) 
X =  Group (High-pay group = 0, Low-pay group = 1) 
         Mediator 1 = PU (Perceived unfairness) 
Mediator 2 =  EE (Episodic envy 
Mediator 3 =  EFW (Ethical fading words) 
            Control 1 =  Gender (0 = Female, 1 = Male) 
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Table 11: Chapter 3 PROCESS Tests of H5, H6, & H7 (Second Analysis, with EFQ) 
Panel A: Indirect Effect of Pay Disparity on Fraud through Perceived Unfairness 
Mediator Effect Bootstrapped SE Bootstrapped LLCI Bootstrapped ULCI 
Perceived 
Unfairness 
(PU) 
.2348 .2652 .0280 .8793 
 
Panel B: Indirect Effect of Pay Disparity on Fraud through Episodic Envy 
Mediator Effect Bootstrapped SE Bootstrapped LLCI Bootstrapped ULCI 
Episodic Envy 
(EE) 
-.0412 .0998 -.3328 .0414 
 
Panel C: Indirect Effect of Pay Disparity on Fraud through Ethical Fading 
Mediator Effect Bootstrapped SE Bootstrapped LLCI Bootstrapped ULCI 
Ethical Fading 
(EFQ) 
.2286 .1934 .0127 .6696 
LLCI = Lower-level confidence interval 
ULCI= Upper-level confidence interval 
 
Model 6 Variables (N = 54): 
Y =  FCL5 (Number of frauds in rounds 14 through 18) 
X =  Group (High-pay group = 0, Low-pay group = 1) 
         Mediator 1 = PU (Perceived unfairness) 
Mediator 2 =  EE (Episodic envy 
Mediator 3 =  EFW (Ethical fading words) 
            Control 1 =  Gender (0 = Female, 1 = Male) 
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Table 12: Chapter 3 PROCESS Tests of H5, H6, and H7 (Second Analysis, with EFW) 
Panel A: Indirect Effect of Pay Disparity on Fraud through Perceived Unfairness 
Mediator Effect Bootstrapped SE Bootstrapped LLCI Bootstrapped ULCI 
Perceived 
Unfairness 
(PU) 
.1550 .1845 -.0201 .5535 
 
Panel B: Indirect Effect of Pay Disparity on Fraud through Episodic Envy 
Mediator Effect Bootstrapped SE Bootstrapped LLCI Bootstrapped ULCI 
Episodic Envy 
(EE) 
-.0205 .0975 -.2814 .0694 
 
Panel C: Indirect Effect of Pay Disparity on Fraud through Ethical Fading 
Mediator Effect Bootstrapped SE Bootstrapped LLCI Bootstrapped ULCI 
Ethical Fading 
(EFW) 
-.0125 .1208 -.1840 .2182 
LLCI = Lower-level confidence interval 
ULCI= Upper-level confidence interval 
 
Model 6 Variables (N = 54): 
Y =  FCL5 (Number of frauds in rounds 14 through 18) 
X =  Group (High-pay group = 0, Low-pay group = 1) 
         Mediator 1 = PU (Perceived unfairness) 
Mediator 2 =  EE (Episodic envy) 
Mediator 3 =  EFW (Ethical fading words) 
            Control 1 =  Gender (0 = Female, 1 = Male) 
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Table 13: Chapter 3 Moderating Effect of Risk Preference on Ethical Fading (EFQ) 
  coeff se t p LLCI ULCI 
(constant) 5.8201 1.3868 4.1968 .0001 3.495 8.1451 
Predictor(s):       
  RP -.6990 .3587 -1.9488 .0571 -1.3004 -.0977 
  EE -1.1451 .6652 -1.7214 .0915 -2.2603 -.0298 
  RP * EE .3419 .1790 1.9102 .0620 .0418 .6419 
Covariate: 
        Gender -.1388 .2154 -.6446 .5222 -.5000 .2223 
 
Model 1 Variables (N = 54): 
Y =  EFQ (Ethical fading questions) 
X =  EE (Episodic envy) 
      Moderator 1 = RP (Risk preference) 
            Control 1 =  Gender (0 = Female, 1 = Male) 
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Table 14: Chapter 4 Descriptive Statistics (Experiment 1, First Analysis) 
 
Number Percent 
Gender   
 
Female 23 33.8% 
Male 45 66.2% 
Undergraduate Major   
 
Accounting 11 16.2% 
Business Administration 3 4.4% 
Economics 4 5.9% 
Entrepreneurial Management 1 1.5% 
Finance 13 19.1% 
General Business 7 10.3% 
Global Business Management 2 2.9% 
Marketing 4 5.9% 
Non-business 12 17.6% 
Supply-chain Management 10 14.7% 
Unidentified 1 1.5% 
GPA   
 
4.0 - 3.5 26 38.2% 
3.4 - 3.0 30 44.1% 
2.9 - 2.5 8 11.8% 
2.4 - 2.0 4 5.9% 
Below 2.0 0 0.0% 
  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Number of Accounting Courses 2.81 1.67 
N = 60 
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Table 15: Chapter 4 ANCOVA Test of H1 (Experiment 1, First Analysis) 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics (Dependent Variable: Egocentric Perceptions of Fairness) 
Group Mean Std. Deviation N 
Above Target 1.07 0.856 34 
Below Target 0.68 0.878 34 
Total 0.87 0.883 68 
Group = Performance through 24 rounds (Above Target = 0, Below Target =1 ) 
 
Panel B: Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Dependent Variable: Egocentric Perceptions of 
Fairness) 
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected 
Model 
7.903 3 2.634 3.804 .014 .151 
Intercept 31.271 1 31.271 45.151 .000 .414 
Predictor:       
  Group 0.303 1 0.303 0.437 .511 .007 
Covariate:       
  Aud0124 
  Gender 
3.397 
1.367 
1 
1 
3.397 
1.367 
4.905 
1.973 
.030 
.165 
.071 
.030 
Error 44.325 64 0.841    
Total 104.000 68     
Corrected Total 52.229 67     
R Squared = .151 (Adjusted R Squared = .112) 
Gender = Gender (Female = 0, Male = 1) 
Aud0124 = Number of times fined for misrepresentation through 24 rounds 
  
  
233 
 
Table 16: Table 16: Chapter 4 PROCESS Tests of H2, H3, & H4 (Experiment 1, First 
Analysis, with EFW) 
Panel A: Direct Effect of Egocentric Perceptions of Fairness (EPF) on Negative Affect (NA) 
  coeff se t p LLCI ULCI 
(constant) 1.2512 .2054 6.0918 .0000 .9083 1.5941 
Predictor:       
  EPF .033 .1017 .3249 .7464 -.1367 .2028 
Covariate: 
        Aud0124 -.0223 .201 -.1109 .9121 -.3256 .3133 
  Gender -.0284 .178 -.1597 .8736 -.3256 .2687 
 
Panel B: Direct Effect of Negative Affect (NA) on Ethical Fading (EFW) 
  coeff se t p LLCI ULCI 
(constant) .4532 .2333 1.9421 .0567 .0635 .8428 
Predictor:       
  NA -.1429 .1135 -1.2585 .2129 -.3325 .0467 
Covariate: 
        Aud0124 -.2194 .1812 -1.211 .2305 -.5220 .0831 
  Gender -.0683 .1604 -.4254 .6720 -.3361 .1996 
 
Panel C: Direct Effect of Ethical Fading (EFW) on Fraud (FLR) 
  coeff se z p LLCI ULCI 
(constant) -1.5352 1.1363 -1.351 .1767 -3.4043 .3339 
Predictor:       
  EFW -1.4409 1.0175 -1.4161 .1568 -3.1146 .2328 
Covariate: 
        Aud0124 -.2832 .8074 -.3508 .7258 -1.6112 1.0448 
  Gender -1.4705 .8341 -1.763 .0779 -2.8425 -.0986 
 
Model 6 Variables (N = 68): 
Y =  FLR (0 = no fraud in last round, 1 = fraud in last round) 
X =  Group (Above target group = 0, Below target group = 1) 
         Mediator 1 = EPF (Egocentric Perceptions of Fairness) 
Mediator 2 =  NA (Negative Affect) 
Mediator 3 =  EFW (Ethical Fading Words) 
            Control 1 =  Aud0124 (Number of times fined for misrepresentation through 24 
rounds) 
            Control 2 = Gender (0 = Female, 1 = Male) 
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Table 17: Chapter 4 PROCESS Tests of H3 & H4 (Experiment 1, First Analysis, with EFQ) 
Panel A: Direct Effect of Negative Affect (NA) on Ethical Fading (EFQ) 
  coeff se t p LLCI ULCI 
(constant) 3.9183 .3062 12.7966 .0000 3.407 4.4296 
Predictor:       
  NA  -.0268 .149 -.1796 .8580 -.2756 .2220 
Covariate: 
        Aud0124 -.1289 .2378 -.5419 .5898 -.5259 .2682 
  Gender -.0138 .2105 -.0656 .9479 -.3654 .3378 
 
Panel B: Direct Effect of Ethical Fading (EFQ) on Fraud (FLR) 
  coeff se z p LLCI ULCI 
(constant) .0888 2.2148 .0401 .9680 -3.5543 3.7319 
Predictor:       
  EFQ -.5360 .4857 -1.1036 .2698 -1.335 .2629 
Covariate: 
        Aud0124 -.1209 .7845 -.1542 .8775 -1.4113 1.1694 
  Gender -1.2582 .7998 -1.5731 .1157 -2.5737 .0574 
 
Model 6 Variables (N = 68): 
Y =  FLR (0 = no fraud in last round, 1 = fraud in last round) 
X =  Group (Above target group = 0, Below target group = 1) 
         Mediator 1 = EPF (Egocentric Perceptions of Fairness) 
Mediator 2 =  NA (Negative Affect) 
Mediator 3 =  EFQ (Ethical Fading Questions) 
            Control 1 =  Aud0124 (Number of times fined for misrepresentation through 24 
rounds) 
            Control 2 = Gender (0 = Female, 1 = Male) 
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Table 18: Table 18: Chapter 4 Pearson Chi-square Test of H5 (Experiment 1, First 
Analysis) 
Group * Fraud Last Round Cross-tabulation 
 
Fraud Last Round 
Total 0 1 
Group Above Target Count 32 2 34 
Expected Count 29.0 5.0 34.0 
% within Group 94.1% 5.9% 100.0% 
% within Fraud Last Round 55.2% 20.0% 50.0% 
% of Total 47.1% 2.9% 50.0% 
Std. Residual .6 -1.3  
Below Target Count 26 8 34 
Expected Count 29.0 5.0 34.0 
% within Group 76.5% 23.5% 100.0% 
% within Fraud Last Round 44.8% 80.0% 50.0% 
% of Total 38.2% 11.8% 50.0% 
Std. Residual -.6 1.3  
Total Count 58 10 68 
Expected Count 58.0 10.0 68.0 
% within Group 85.3% 14.7% 100.0% 
% within Fraud Last Round 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 85.3% 14.7% 100.0% 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 4.221
a 
1 .040   
Continuity Correction
b
 2.931 1 .087   
Likelihood Ratio 4.477 1 .034   
Fisher's Exact Test    .083 .042 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 4.159 1 .041 
  
N of Valid Cases 68     
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.00. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Table 19: Chapter 4 Descriptive Statistics (Experiment 1, Second Analysis) 
 
Number Percent 
Gender   
 
Female 23 38.3% 
Male 37 61.7% 
Undergraduate Major   
 
Business Administration 3 5.0% 
Economics 4 6.7% 
Entrepreneurial Management 3 5.0% 
Finance 13 21.7% 
General Business 9 15.0% 
Global Business Management 2 3.3% 
Marketing 3 5.0% 
Non-business 12 20.0% 
Supply-chain Management 10 16.7% 
Unidentified 1 1.7% 
GPA   
 
4.0 - 3.5 23 38.3% 
3.4 - 3.0 23 38.3% 
2.9 - 2.5 9 15.0% 
2.4 - 2.0 5 8.3% 
Below 2.0 0 0.0% 
  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Number of Accounting Courses 2.37 1.2 
N = 60 
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Table 20: Chapter 4 ANCOVA Test of H1 (Experiment 1, Second Analysis) 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics (Dependent Variable: Perceived Unfairness) 
Group Mean Std. Deviation N 
Above Target 1.01 0.795 30 
Below Target 0.51 1.082 30 
Total 0.76 0.974 60 
Group = Performance through 24 rounds (Above Target = 0, Below Target =1 ) 
 
Panel B: Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Dependent Variable: Perceived Unfairness) 
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected 
Model 
8.933 3 2.978 3.541 .020 .159 
Intercept 21.774 1 21.774 25.895 .000 .316 
Predictor:       
  Group 0.336 1 0.336 0.399 .530 .007 
Covariate:       
  Aud0124 
  Gender 
4.773 
0.376 
1 
1 
4.773 
0.376 
5.676 
0.447 
.021 
.507 
.092 
.008 
Error 47.087 56 0.841    
Total 90.778 60     
Corrected Total 56.020 59     
R Squared = .159 (Adjusted R Squared = .114) 
Gender = Gender (Female = 0, Male = 1) 
Aud0124 = Number of times fined for misrepresentation through 24 rounds 
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Table 21: Chapter 4 PROCESS Tests of H2, H3, & H4 (Experiment 1, Second Analysis, 
with EFW) 
Panel A: Direct Effect of Egocentric Perceptions of Fairness (EPF) on Negative Affect (NA) 
  coeff se t p LLCI ULCI 
(constant) 1.2177 .2050 5.9397     . 0000 .8747 1.5607 
Predictor:       
  EPF .1226 .1001 1.2250 . 2258 -.0449 .2901 
Covariate: 
        Aud0124 -.0814 .2053 -.3967 .6931 -.4249 .2620 
  Gender -.0669 .1833 -.3649 .7166 -.3735 .2397 
 
Panel B: Direct Effect of Negative Affect (NA) on Ethical Fading (EFW) 
  coeff se t p LLCI ULCI 
(constant) .5262 .2408 2.1852 .0332 .1232 .9293 
Predictor:       
  NA -.1962 .1236 -1.5871 .1183 -.4031 .0107 
Covariate: 
        Aud0124 -.1785 .1885 -.9468 .3480 -.4939   .1370 
  Gender -.0916 .1682 -.5443 .5885 -.3731 .1900 
 
Panel C: Direct Effect of Ethical Fading (EFW) on Fraud (FLR) 
  coeff se z p LLCI ULCI 
(constant) -.8153 1.4147 -.5763 .5644 -3.1423 1.5117 
Predictor:       
  EFW -1.5425 .9044 -1.7056 .0881 -3.0300 -.0550 
Covariate: 
        Aud0124 -2.074 1.1188 -1.8538 .0638 -3.9142 -.2338 
  Gender -1.6607 .9468 -1.754 .0794 -3.218 -.1034 
 
Model 6 Variables (N = 60): 
Y =  FLR (0 = no fraud in last round, 1 = fraud in last round) 
X =  Group (Above target group = 0, Below target group = 1) 
         Mediator 1 = EPF (Egocentric Perceptions of Fairness) 
Mediator 2 =  NA (Negative Affect) 
Mediator 3 =  EFW (Ethical Fading Words) 
            Control 1 =  Aud0124 (Number of times fined for misrepresentation through 24 
rounds) 
            Control 2 = Gender (0 = Female, 1 = Male) 
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Table 22: Chapter 4 PROCESS Tests of H3 & H4 (Experiment 1, Second Analysis, with 
EFQ) 
Panel A: Direct Effect of Negative Affect (NA) on Ethical Fading (EFQ) 
  coeff se t p LLCI ULCI 
(constant) 4.1799 .3082 13.5637 .0000 3.6641 4.6956 
Predictor:       
  NA  -.2180 . 1582 -1.3779 .1739 -.4827 .0468 
Covariate: 
        Aud0124 -.4071 .2412 -1.6876 .0973 -.8108 -.0034 
  Gender -.1158 .2153 -.5381 .5927 -.4761 . 2444 
 
Panel B: Direct Effect of Ethical Fading (EFQ) on Fraud (FLR) 
  coeff se z p LLCI ULCI 
(constant)  -.2778 2.7402 -.1014 .9193 -4.7849 4.2294 
Predictor:       
  EFQ -.3042 .5493 -.5539 .5797 -1.2077 .5992 
Covariate: 
        Aud0124 -1.6242 .9939 -1.6341 .1022 -3.2590 .0107 
  Gender -1.3804 .8690 -1.5885 .1122 -2.8098 .0489 
 
Model 6 Variables (N = 60): 
Y =  FLR (0 = no fraud in last round, 1 = fraud in last round) 
X =  Group (Above target group = 0, Below target group = 1) 
         Mediator 1 = EPF (Egocentric Perceptions of Fairness) 
Mediator 2 =  NA (Negative Affect) 
Mediator 3 =  EFQ (Ethical Fading Questions) 
            Control 1 =  Aud0124 (Number of times fined for misrepresentation through 24 
rounds) 
            Control 2 = Gender (0 = Female, 1 = Male) 
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Table 23: Chapter 4 Pearson Chi-square Test of H5 (Experiment 1, Second Analysis) 
Group * Fraud Last Round Cross-tabulation 
 
Fraud Last Round 
Total 0 1 
Group Above Target Count 29a 1b 30 
Expected Count 25.0 5.0 30.0 
% within Group 96.7% 3.3% 100.0% 
% within Fraud Last Round 58.0% 10.0% 50.0% 
% of Total 48.3% 1.7% 50.0% 
Std. Residual .8 -1.8  
Below Target Count 21a 9b 30 
Expected Count 25.0 5.0 30.0 
% within Group 70.0% 30.0% 100.0% 
% within Fraud Last Round 42.0% 90.0% 50.0% 
% of Total 35.0% 15.0% 50.0% 
Std. Residual -.8 1.8  
Total Count 50 10 60 
Expected Count 50.0 10.0 60.0 
% within Group 83.3% 16.7% 100.0% 
% within Fraud Last Round 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 83.3% 16.7% 100.0% 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of Fraud Last Round categories whose column 
proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level. 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 7.680
a
 1 .006   
Continuity Correction
b
 5.880 1 .015   
Likelihood Ratio 8.647 1 .003   
Fisher's Exact Test    .012 .006 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
7.552 1 .006   
N of Valid Cases 60     
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.00. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Table 24: Chapter 4 Descriptive Statistics (Experiment 2) 
 
Number Percent 
Gender   
 
Female 31 49.2% 
Male 32 50.8% 
Undergraduate Major   
 
Business Administration 2 3.2% 
Economics 1 1.6% 
Entrepreneurial Management 1 1.6% 
Finance 7 11.1% 
General Business 5 7.9% 
Global Business Management 6 9.5% 
Marketing 14 22.2% 
Non-business 11 17.5% 
Supply-chain Management 16 25.4% 
Unidentified 0 0.0% 
GPA   
 
4.0 - 3.5 13 20.6.3% 
3.4 - 3.0 38 60.3.% 
2.9 - 2.5 11 17.5% 
2.4 - 2.0 1 1.6% 
Below 2.0 0 0.0% 
  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Number of Accounting Courses 2.19 1.0 
N = 60 
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Table 25: Chapter 4 Pearson Chi-square Test of H6 (Experiment 2) 
Group * Fraud Cross-tabulation 
 
Fraud 
Total 0 1 
Group Reached Goal Count 18a 3a 21 
Expected Count 16.0 5.0 21.0 
% within Group 85.7% 14.3% 100.0% 
% within Fraud 37.5% 20.0% 33.3% 
% of Total 28.6% 4.8% 33.3% 
Std. Residual .5 -.9  
Far from Goal Count 18a 3a 21 
Expected Count 16.0 5.0 21.0 
% within Group 85.7% 14.3% 100.0% 
% within Fraud 37.5% 20.0% 33.3% 
% of Total 28.6% 4.8% 33.3% 
Std. Residual .5 -.9  
Close to Goal Count 12a 9b 21 
Expected Count 16.0 5.0 21.0 
% within Group 57.1% 42.9% 100.0% 
% within Fraud 25.0% 60.0% 33.3% 
% of Total 19.0% 14.3% 33.3% 
Std. Residual -1.0 1.8  
Total Count 48 15 63 
Expected Count 48.0 15.0 63.0 
% within Group 76.2% 23.8% 100.0% 
% within Fraud 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 76.2% 23.8% 100.0% 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of Fraud categories whose column proportions do not 
differ significantly from each other at the .05 level. 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 6.300
a
 2 .043 
Likelihood Ratio 6.026 2 .049 
Linear-by-Linear Association 4.650 1 .031 
N of Valid Cases 63   
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.00. 
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APPENDIX C: CHAPTER 3 TASK INSTRUCTIONS 
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Your task is to sell assets in an online marketplace. You will earn Credits for each successful 
sale, which will be translated into US dollars and paid to you upon completion of the study. 
Before starting this task, please read these important instructions: 
If you have any questions throughout the following instructions, then please raise your 
hand. The tasks that you will be asked to do require you to think, be attentive, and have a 
clear understanding of the instructions. 
1. If you have any questions throughout the following instructions, then please raise your 
hand. The tasks that you will be asked to do require you to think, be attentive, and have a 
clear understanding of the instructions.  
2. For each of 25 rounds, you will be given information regarding an asset’s name, 
quality, and value-range. For example, you may be provided with an “Epsilon” 
asset of average quality that is valued between 400 to 500 Credits. Please note 
that estimating the value of these assets is highly subjective. Thus, some 
assets may be valued incorrectly. 
3. Your task, for each round, is to sell the asset in an online marketplace. Before 
attempting to sell each asset, however, you must determine both the price of the 
asset and how to disclose its quality. If you think the value of the asset is 
incorrect, then it is possible to select another quality level. This will also adjust 
the price level on-screen. For example, if you rate an Epsilon asset at average 
quality, then it will have an assessed value between 400 to 500 Credits. However, 
selecting a rating of “above average” automatically moves the value-range to 450 
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to 550 Credits. Finally, you must determine a price, within the value-range, at 
which to sell the asset (e.g., 550 Credits). Please note that the other participants do 
not have access to any information regarding the pricing and disclosure of quality 
decisions you make for any asset. 
4. You will then enter the marketplace to sell your asset. Please note that your 
offer may be declined. 
5. You can earn more Credits by selling assets that have higher values.  
6. The possibility of an audit exists after each transaction. Misrepresenting the 
quality of the asset can result in a fine of 1,000 Credits if an audit (1) is 
conducted and (2) reveals that the asset was improperly disclosed at a level 
higher than initially provided. In addition, you will forfeit any Credits earned 
from the transaction. The success rate of detecting a misrepresentation can be 
anywhere from 20 to 80 percent if an audit does occur. 
7. Before you begin the task of selling assets, you will be asked a question 
wherein your answer may determine your rate of pay for the study. 
8. After the 13th round, you will be updated regarding your Credit earnings so far. In 
addition, you will be asked to complete a brief survey. Further instructions will be 
provided for that survey later in the study. 
9. You will be asked to complete a brief word completion exercise at the end of the 
last round (25th) of selling assets. You may earn additional Credits during this 
task. Further instructions will be provided later in the study. 
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10. After the word completion task, you will be prompted that the study is over and 
that you should please bring the card located at your station to the administrator 
so you may be paid. The study administrator will translate your Credits earned 
from selling assets and the word completion task into US Dollars. The exchange 
rate between US Dollars and Credits is positive. Any negative Credit balance will 
be rounded to zero. In addition to the money earned from selling assets and the 
word completion task, you will be paid a fee for participating in the study. 
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After 13 rounds, you are in the top (bottom) tier of earners. 
The following survey includes a variety of questions that ask about your personality, preferences, 
emotions, and zodiac. Answering these questions accurately requires proper reflection on how 
you really think, feel, and act in general. Please answer each question as best as you can. The 
Zodiac is made up of 12 different sun signs. Your date of birth determines which one you are. 
Previous research has shown that people’s zodiac sign is related to the type of judgments they 
make. Please indicate your Zodiac sign below and then answer the personality questionnaire.
26
 
What is your zodiac sign? 
o Aries (March 21 to April 19) 
o Taurus (April 20 to May 20) 
o Gemini (May 21 to June 20)  
o Cancer (June 21 to July 22) 
o Leo (July 23to August 22) 
o Virgo (August 23 to September 22) 
o Libra (September 23 to October 22) 
o Scorpio (October 23 to November 21) 
o Sagittarius (November 22 to December 21) 
o Capricorn (December 22 to January 19) 
o Aquarius (January 20 to February 18) 
o Pisces (February 19 to March 20) 
                                                 
26
 The wording of these instructions is taken from Gino and Pierce (2009, p., 147). 
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Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements
27
: 
1. I am usually talkative. 
2. I feel envious now. 
3. I tend to find fault with others. 
4. Anyone would agree that the people in the higher tier of earnings had an advantage that 
was unfairly obtained. 
5. I usually do a thorough job.  
6. I am frequently depressed. 
7. The decisions regarding how to represent the quality of the assets and determine their 
price in this task are primarily business decisions. 
8. An objective judge who knows the facts would agree that the people in the higher tier of 
earnings do not deserve those earnings. 
9. I am usually reserved. 
10. I am helpful and unselfish with others. 
11. I can be somewhat careless at times. 
12. I feel bitter now. 
13. The people in the higher tier of earnings achieved their advantage through unjust actions 
or unjust procedures. 
14. I lack some things others here have. 
15. I handle stress well. 
                                                 
27
 The items were rated on the degree to which the participant agrees or disagrees with the situation, with the scale 
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). 
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16. I am generally a curious person. 
17. I am full of energy. 
18. The decisions regarding how to represent the quality of the assets and determine their 
price in this task are primarily economic decisions. 
19. I am irritated now. 
20. I am a reliable worker. 
21. I can be tense at times. 
22. Others here have more things going better for him/her than I do. 
23. I generate a lot of enthusiasm. 
24. I have a forgiving nature. 
25. The decisions regarding how to represent the quality of the assets and determine their 
price in this task are primarily business decisions. 
26. I worry a lot. 
27. I feel resentful now. 
28. I feel resentment toward those here who have more than I do. 
29. I enjoy taking risks.  
30. An objective judge who knows the facts would agree that the people in the higher tier of 
earnings are there mostly due to luck. 
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Complete the following word fragments using the first real word (i.e., a word that can be found 
in the dictionary) that comes to your mind. There is no one correct answer for each fragment. For 
example, if given the fragment “B A _ _,” you can complete it using any of the words “base,” 
“baby,” or “ball” (note that capital letters can be used, but they are not necessary). 
 
You will earn an additional 250 Credits for each completed word fragment. You will have 45 
seconds to finish each fragment. 
1. “M O _ _ _” 
2. “V I _ _ _ _” 
3. “E T _ _ _ _ _” 
4. “H O _ _ _ _” 
5. “T R _ _ _” 
6. “R A _ _ _” 
7. “C H _ _ _ _” 
8. “B I _ _ _”  
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Instructions  
Please complete the following questions below.  
1. Your gender:    
o Male 
o Female 
2. Your undergraduate major: 
3. Your GPA at the start of the current semester (round if necessary): 
o 4.0- 3.5 
o 3.4- 3.0 
o 2.9 - 2.5 
o 2.4 - 2.0 
o Below 2.0 
4. How many accounting-related courses you have taken (include the current semester):  
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Instructions for Seller Task 
Your task is to sell assets in an online marketplace. You will earn Credits for each successful 
sale, which will be translated into US dollars and paid to you upon completion of the study. 
Before starting this task, please read these important instructions: 
 
1. If you have any questions throughout the following instructions, then please raise your 
hand. The tasks that you will be asked to do require you to think, be attentive, and have a 
clear understanding of the instructions. 
2. For each of 25 rounds, you will be given information regarding an asset’s name, quality, 
and value-range. For example, you may be provided with an “Epsilon” asset of average 
quality that is valued between 400 to 500 Credits. Please note that estimating the value 
of these assets is highly subjective. Thus, some assets may be valued incorrectly.  
3. Your task, for each round, is to sell the asset in an online marketplace. Before attempting 
to sell each asset, however, you must determine both the price of the asset and how to 
disclose its quality. If you think the value of the asset is incorrect, then it is possible to 
select another quality level. This will also adjust the price level on-screen. For example, 
if you rate an Epsilon asset at average quality, then it will have an assessed value between 
400 to 500 Credits. However, selecting a rating of “above average” automatically moves 
the value-range to 450 to 550 Credits. Finally, you must determine a price, within the 
value-range, at which to sell the asset (e.g., 550 Credits). Please note that the other 
participants do not have access to any information regarding the pricing and disclosure of 
quality decisions you make for any asset. 
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4. You will then enter the marketplace to sell your asset. Please note that your offer may 
be declined. 
5. You can earn more Credits by selling assets that have higher values.  
6. The possibility of an audit exists after each transaction. Misrepresenting the quality of 
the asset can result in a fine of 2,000 Credits if an audit (1) is conducted and (2) 
reveals that the asset was improperly disclosed at a level higher than initially 
provided. In addition, you will forfeit any Credits earned from the transaction. The 
success rate of detecting a misrepresentation can be anywhere from 20 to 80 percent if an 
audit does occur. 
7. In addition to the money earned from the sale of assets, you may be awarded a 3,000-
Credit bonus if you reach a certain number of earned Credits. This number is 
believed to be reasonable and has been derived so that most individuals are awarded the 
bonus. The number of earned-Credits required to receive the bonus will be provided 
during the experiment. 
8. After the 24th round, you will be updated regarding your progress toward receiving the 
bonus. In addition, you will be asked to complete a brief survey. Further instructions will 
be provided for that survey later in the study. 
9. You will be asked to complete a brief word completion exercise at the end of the last 
round (25th) of selling assets. You may earn additional Credits during this task. Further 
instructions will be provided later in the study. 
10. After the word completion task, you will be prompted that the study is over and that you 
should please bring the card located at your station to the administrator so you may be 
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paid. The study administrator will translate your Credits earned from selling assets and 
the word completion task into US Dollars. The exchange rate between US Dollars and 
Credits is positive. Any negative Credit balance will be rounded to zero. In addition to 
the money earned from selling assets and the word completion task, you will be paid a 
fee for participating in the study.  
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The following survey includes a variety of questions that ask about your personality, preferences, 
emotions, and zodiac. Answering these questions accurately requires proper reflection on how 
you really think, feel, and act in general. Please answer each question as best as you can. The 
Zodiac is made up of 12 different sun signs. Your date of birth determines which one you are. 
Previous research has shown that people’s zodiac sign is related to the type of judgments they 
make. Please indicate your Zodiac sign below and then answer the personality questionnaire.
28
 
1. What is your zodiac sign? 
o Aries (March 21 to April 19) 
o Taurus (April 20 to May 20) 
o Gemini (May 21 to June 20)  
o Cancer (June 21 to July 22) 
o Leo (July 23to August 22) 
o Virgo (August 23 to September 22) 
o  Libra (September 23 to October 22) 
o Scorpio (October 23 to November 21) 
o Sagittarius (November 22 to December 21) 
o Capricorn (December 22 to January 19) 
o Aquarius (January 20 to February 18) 
o Pisces (February 19 to March 20) 
Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements:  
                                                 
28
 The wording of these instructions is taken from Gino and Pierce (2009, p., 147). 
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1. Overall, I would rate the fairness of 
my actions in the marketplace as… 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. Overall, I would rate the fairness of 
other’s actions in the marketplace as… 
1 2 3 4 5 
  
V
ery
 U
n
tru
stw
o
rth
y
 
S
o
m
ew
h
at 
U
n
tru
stw
o
rth
y
 
N
eith
er U
n
tru
stw
o
rth
y
 o
r 
T
ru
stw
o
rth
y
 
S
o
m
ew
h
at T
ru
stw
o
rth
y
 
V
ery
 T
ru
stw
o
rth
y
 
3. 
Overall, I would rate the 
trustworthiness of my actions in the 
marketplace as… 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. 
Overall, I would rate the 
trustworthiness of other’s actions in 
the marketplace as… 
1 2 3 4 5 
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5. Overall, I would rate the honesty of 
my actions in the marketplace as… 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. 
Overall, I would rate the honesty of 
other’s actions in the marketplace 
as… 
1 2 3 4 5 
  
262 
 
  
S
tro
n
g
ly
 D
isag
ree 
S
o
m
ew
h
at 
D
isag
ree 
N
eith
er D
isag
ree o
r 
A
g
ree 
S
o
m
ew
h
at A
g
ree 
S
tro
n
g
ly
 D
isag
ree 
7. 
I am usually talkative. 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. Because of my performance, I feel 
angry now. 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. Because of my performance, I feel 
frustrated now. 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. 
I tend to find fault with others. 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. 
I usually do a thorough job. 
1 2 3 4 5 
12. Because of my performance, I feel 
guilt now. 
1 2 3 4 5 
13. 
I usually come up with new ideas. 
1 2 3 4 5 
14. Because of my performance, I feel 
shame now 
1 2 3 4 5 
15. 
The decisions regarding how to 
represent the quality of the 
assets and determine their price 
in this task are primarily 
financial decisions. 
1 2 3 4 5 
16. 
I am helpful and unselfish with others. 
1 2 3 4 5 
17. 
I can be somewhat careless at times. 
1 2 3 4 5 
18. Because of my performance, I feel sad 
now. 
1 2 3 4 5 
19. Because of my performance, I feel 
disappointed now. 
1 2 3 4 5 
20. Because of my performance, I feel 
depressed now. 
1 2 3 4 5 
21. 
I handle stress well. 
1 2 3 4 5 
22. 
I am generally a curious person. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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23. 
I am full of energy. 
1 2 3 4 5 
24. 
The decisions regarding how to 
represent the quality of the assets and 
determine their price in this task are 
primarily economic decisions. 
1 2 3 4 5 
25. Because of my performance, I feel 
worried now. 
1 2 3 4 5 
26. 
I am a reliable worker. 
1 2 3 4 5 
27. 
I can be tense at times. 
1 2 3 4 5 
28. Because of my performance, I feel 
uncomfortable now. 
1 2 3 4 5 
29. Because of my performance, I feel 
fearful now. 
1 2 3 4 5 
30. 
The decisions regarding how to 
represent the quality of the assets and 
determine their price in this task are 
primarily business decisions. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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